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Abstract: 
  
The creation of the public health and sanitary movement of nineteenth century 
Britain has long attracted the interest of social and medical historians alike.  
Attempts by civil servants typified by Edwin Chadwick and the seemingly tireless 
work of medical officers who were tasked with eradicating the worst excesses of 
industrialism and urbanisation, have long lent themselves to an overtly heroic 
interpretation.  Only in recent years have these achievements been revisited in a 
historiography which is prepared to be more critical of what was actually achieved, 
and question whether all lives were really improved. Yet despite the promising 
trend towards a more detailed analysis of the events and legacy of the public health 
movement, there still remains a reluctance to move away from the belief that the 
public health and sanitary movement in Britain was anything other than a civilian 
initiative bought into existence through an alliance between local and national 
government, which was endorsed by the medical profession.  
The following thesis therefore aims to challenge this long held misinterpretation by 
arguing that there is extensive evidence of earlier, effective initiatives in 
preventative medicine which were not only identified but also actively promoted by 
military and naval medical staff, which have never attracted the attention of any 
school of history which they warrant. In the following chapters, evidence for such 
an argument will therefore begin  by identifying how, from the mid eighteenth 
century onwards, an emerging military and naval medical specialism encouraged 
staff to look for ways of combatting the worst excesses of disease by identifying the 
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initial  cause of illness rather than relying on ineffective treatment. Moreover, in 
recognition of the large numbers this involved, medical staff in both armed forces 
were amongst some of the first practitioners to recognise the need to create a new 
paradigm relating to understanding the ways in which disease acted on the human 
body. This not only facilitated opportunities for improved classification but also 
created the opportunity for standardised treatment, across all populations, namely 
military and civilian. 
In order to illustrate how this was achieved, attention will focus on the training 
commissioned medical officers received, along with a new empirical methodology 
which actively encouraged investigation. In the same way the willingness to adopt 
an early use of quantification provided an opportunity not only to gather evidence 
but also establish a new standard regarding what was or was not seen to be 
acceptable in relation to the health of soldiers and sailors. Lastly the inclusion of 
specific diseases allowed a general dialogue regarding issues such as rights, 
ideology, and a growing insight into the decaying state of rural and urban locations 
which gave these medical officers a position of authority in calling for the 
introduction of early preventative health issues long before the more familiar work 
of their nineteenth century civilian colleagues. Their achievements, both in 
methods and ideology, therefore call for a major revision of current historical 
research which persists in excluding the role of both the army and the navy when 
identifying what were the true origins of preventative health in Britain. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout the eighteenth century, Britain became a country increasingly defined 
by its commitment to military intervention.  Beginning with the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702-1707)1, both the army and the navy played a major role in all 
subsequent conflicts including the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the 
Seven Years War (1756-1763), the American War of Independence (1775-1783), the 
French Revolutionary Wars (1793-1802) and the Napoleonic War (1803-1815). Not 
all conflicts resulted in victory, though with the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, 
Britain could nevertheless finally claim to be the greatest military and naval nation 
of the age. 
Success on this level required a new and unique type of commitment from all of 
British society in order to ensure that both the army and the navy were in a position 
to meet the many demands continually being placed upon them. With regards 
finding ways of meeting the actual costs incurred, this was to be achieved through 
what Brewer described as the creation of the fiscal military state.2 This not only 
involved new approaches to public administration, the introduction of taxation and 
acceptance with regards the concept of public debt, but was also presented as a 
burden which was to be borne out of a sense of civic, patriotic duty which in turn 
would  ensure the glory and success of the army and the navy. The true extent of 
what this equated to in monetary terms can be estimated at just under £6 million at 
                                                          
1 Britain withdrew in 1707 although the war officially ended in 1713 
2 Brewer J, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Routledge, 
1989). 
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the beginning of the century rising to a staggering £40 million towards the end.3 
Whilst part of this vast financial outlay was considered to be redeemable through 
colonial expansion, the fact remained that there had never been a time when the 
country’s economy was so driven by the needs of the army and navy. Questions 
relating to the sustainability of this were certainly raised by those who doubted as 
to whether the country could carry such a burden, but with each victory came a 
timely reminder of the rewards of patriotic duty. 
However, in addition to economic concerns, there were also those who questioned 
whether the real cost, namely, the relentless demands made on the country’s 
population, was too much to bare.  The journalist and political commentator, Israel 
Mauduit publically asked 
Can England then, by its money alone, be a match for all of Europe? If we 
were so, it is fit that one should wantonly declare it, and thereby give 
umbrage to every other state? Money may, in a qualified state, be allowed 
to be the sinews of war; but it must find men to make up the flesh and 
substance of our armies, which in the present state of Europe is impossible.4 
 
Mauduit was representative of a growing number who were not only concerned by 
the constant call to arms, but who also recognised it to be a burden borne 
repeatedly by the “poor inhabitants” of the country.5 The need to increase numbers 
was never disputed, especially if the country was to maintain an effective fighting 
force. Therefore the constant call to battle also led to the unrelenting need for 
recruits, needed to replace the loss of soldiers and sailors from battle wounds or 
                                                          
3 Peter Mathias, "Swords and Ploughshares:The Armed Forces, Medicine and Public Health in the 
Late Eighteenth Century," in War and Economic Development:Essays in Memory of David Joslin, ed. 
Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). P.73 
4 Israel Mauduit, Considerations on the Present German War (London: Wilkie, 1760). p.68 
5 Ibid. p.25 
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disease.6 As had always been the case, the rank and file were generally composed 
of men taken from communities who could least sustain the absence of adult 
males. Such a drain on essential human resources was therefore quickly felt in both 
urban and rural settings. Moreover, despite the steady growth in Britain’s 
population from the mid eighteenth century onwards, the loss of skilled labour and 
the effects on families and communities, meant that few localities escaped the call 
for men to step forward and maintain Britain’s plans for colonial expansion and 
military superiority. 7 
However, as identified by Colley, from the mid eighteenth century, there was a 
perceptible and clearly positive attitude across much of British society regarding 
military and naval affairs. 8  Although it was a long way from the pro-military stance 
found in much of Europe, there was nevertheless, a growing sense of shared 
experience in terms of the civilian9 and military populations, which Colley argues, 
not only helped forge Britain into a unified nation, but also played a profound role 
in shaping British identity at this time.10  
It is possible to suggest that such an attitude was in some ways inevitable, 
especially when one looks at this from a numerical perspective. In 1789, the British 
                                                          
6 Desertion also became an increasing problem at this time. 
7 E.A  Wrigley, Schofield, R.S, The Population History of England, 1541-1871 (London: Edward Arnold, 
1981). P.160. In what remains one of the most informative studies, Wrigley and Schofield suggest 
that figures such as this of Gregory King (1695) are highly inaccurate. Even before the first census of 
1801 the steady rate of growth possibly meant that the population at the end of the eighteenth 
century stood at approximately 8.658 million. 
8 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). This 
remains one of the most comprehensive studies of the period which focuses on the relationship 
which developed between the military and the civilian population 
9 The term “civilian” in relation to being non-military was not in use until the Napoleonic Wars 
though for clarity the term will be used throughout this research to refer to all those who were not 
enlisted or commissioned in either the army, navy or other military structure. 
10 Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. 
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army stood at around 40,000 men, which by 1814 had increased to 250,000. The 
same rate of increase also applied to the navy when prior to 1789 there had only 
been 16,000 sailors but by 1812 this had risen to 140,000.11 When one adds to 
these figures local militia, which by 1804 added a further 176,000 men,12 the reality 
was that politically, economically and socially, Britain was increasingly prepared and 
committed to the demands of modern warfare. The traditional military model 
which for centuries had involved seasonal use of able bodied men who, if fortunate 
to survive the rigours of battle, were free to return to a civilian existence, was a 
thing of the past.13 Instead, the eighteenth century was about the creation of a 
professional armed force, which differentiated between the military and civilian 
existence in ways which were completely unfamiliar to all concerned. Soldiers and 
sailors taken from their communities, could now expect nothing less than years of 
service, often at vast distances from Britain and with few, if any, opportunities to 
maintain links with home and family. 
In return, all sections of society initially appeared to acknowledge this change with 
something akin to a debt of gratitude. Favret has illustrated this by referencing 
much of the art and literature of the age, and arguing that there was a strong sense 
of Britain’s military ambitions relying on an increasingly common sense of shared 
experiences.14 She cites the views of the preacher, Joseph Fawcett, who later 
became an outspoken critic of war, but in his early years encapsulated this sense of 
                                                          
11 Ibid. p.293 
12 Ibid. p.229 
13 Jeremy Black, "A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective," in The Military Revolution 
Debate, ed. Clifford Rogers, J (Oxford: Westview, 1995). 
14 Mary Favret, A, War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). See Chapter One 
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participation by all sections of society. What was particularly interesting was the 
emphasis he placed not on the glories of victory but on the misery and particularly 
The pain it inflicts upon the mind of every contemplator of its ravages, at 
whatever distance he stands from its theatre…whose heart can bleed along 
with the thousands whose bodies are bleeding in the field.15 
 
This call for a shared compassion for those who fought for their country, was more 
than a romantic notion, but was also closely tied into the development of the 
modern state. This can be seen in the way that across much of Europe, the 
emphasis on military and naval supremacy led increasingly to the humble soldier 
and sailor being regarded as a valuable commodity, worthy of investment. 
Moreover, to protect such an asset, attention was increasingly focused on providing 
an infrastructure which would ensure better standards across all aspects of military 
and naval life, particularly in providing the most basic necessities for the lowest 
rank and file. Hence, the creation of barracks, standardised training and reform of 
rules and regulations are all evidence of this change in attitude which was 
introduced by both the army and navy throughout the eighteenth century. 16  
However, in addition to these very physical improvements, there was also a major 
commitment on the part of medical officers of both the army and the navy not only 
to treat disease but also lessen its impact by identifying ways of finding and 
removing the initial cause of sickness. Although there had long been an interest in 
understanding the cause of disease,17 this was a new paradigm, more familiarly 
                                                          
15 Ibid. p.25. Taken from Joseph Fawcett War Elegies(London: Johnson, 1801) 
16 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast1956). This highly influential debate 
not only influenced the status of military history but also chartered the development of war in the 
modern period. 
17 This can be found in writings as early as Hippocrates. 
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known as preventative health. In the following chapters this will be discussed 
specifically in relation to the emerging empirical methodology which was 
increasingly used along with the belief that its success relied on universal 
application. As the eighteenth century progressed, medical officers therefore 
shaped military and naval medicine to be a specialism which was extremely pro-
active in the way it responded to understanding the cause of disease, which would 
later be replicated in a civilian context in the guise of the public health movement. 
In order for these advances to be successful, it was important for both the army 
and the navy to acknowledge their worth amongst both the rank and file as well as 
the military and naval hierarchies. Evidence of this happening can be seen in the 
actions of military leaders such as the Marquis of Granby (1721-1770) who 
represented a new type of caring, compassionate military leader. Certainly his 
acknowledgement of the need to care for sick and injured troops was described by 
the army physician, Donald Monro18 and elicited public praise in The Gentleman’s 
Magazine.19 Charters has argued that Granby was by no means an anomaly but was 
representative of a far more pronounced change in attitude that focused on not 
only raising the required number of troops but finding ways of maintaining their 
health as befitted the valuable commodity which they were increasingly 
representing.20 In the same way, McCrae’s study of Sir John Pringle has also focused 
on the actions of the Earl of Stair. 21His decision to appoint Pringle as a physician to 
                                                          
18 Donald Monro, "Observations on the Means of Preserving the Health of Soldiers and of 
Conducting Military Hiospitals," (London: Murray, 1780). Preface p. xi 
19 The Gentleman’s Magazine vol.33. 1763 p.120 
20 Erica Charters, Disease, War and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces 
During the Seven Years' War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014). p.3 
21 Morrice McCrae, Saving the Army: The Life of Sir John Pringle (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2014). 
P.51-53 
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the army in 1742 when Britain finally became involved in the Austrian war of 
succession, provided the latter not only with a detailed understanding of the need 
to improve the health of troops but also marked the beginning of a life time’s work 
in terms of introducing preventive health as both standard theory and practice.  
Set against such a background, it is important to emphasise that the aim of this 
research extends beyond providing an extended narrative of military and naval 
medical successes which for too long has focused on examples such as the work of 
men such as Lind and Pringle.  Rather, its innovation lies in arguing that the 
motivation which lay behind many of these medical advances should be seen as 
nothing less than the origins of a model of preventative health which was 
intentionally designed by medical officers in both the army and the navy to not only 
protect the troops under their care but who also increasingly recognised and 
promoted as being applicable when it came to improving the lives of the civilian 
population as well. Moreover, this involved rejecting centuries-old traditional 
medical learning in order to pioneer new theory and practice in ways which 
revolved around the prevention of illness as the most important objective of 
medical intervention. In turn, this also led to opportunities and initiatives which not 
only included the introduction of standardised medical intervention, but also 
provided the confidence to treat large numbers secure in the belief that all of 
society, regardless of class, would ultimately benefit as well.  
15 
 
Therefore, central to this thesis has been the role of the medical officers of both the 
army and the navy.22 Although only a few have attracted the attention of 
biographers, their work is largely accessible in specialist archives and libraries, 
including the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh and the Institute of Naval 
Medicine, and it is these collections which have provided the material which 
supports this thesis. Some physicians such as Sir John Pringle and Sir Gilbert Blane 
are better known to historians, though interpretation of their work also remains 
heavily narrative.23 This is particularly the case with Pringle, whose reputation as 
the “father of military medicine” has attracted the attention of both military and 
medical historians. However the true value of his work in terms of identifying how 
poor conditions played such a role in promoting poor health has generally been 
overlooked. This is unfortunate as he was the first to argue that any unhealthy 
confined space, be it a garrison or the local gaol, could become a danger to all those 
who were directly associated with it.24 Pringle’s understanding of the need to apply 
his findings to all sections of society, regardless of status, location or occupation is 
representative of types of argument contained in this thesis. Views such as his 
marked the beginning of a period in which generations of military and naval 
medical officers similarly proposed and initiated change. Much of this was due to 
the unique specialist training they received in Scottish medical schools, which also 
                                                          
22 The history of both the military and naval medical officers is extensively covered by the work of 
Lloyd, Coulter and Cantlie. 
23 John Pringle, "Observations on the Diseases of the Army, in Camp and Garrison. In Three Parts.  
With an Appendix Containing Some Papers  of Experiments Read at Several Meetings of the Royal 
Society," (London: A.Millar, D.Wilson & T.Payne, 1752). 
24 Ibid. 
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gave them the confidence to promote their findings beyond the confines of the 
barracks and ports into all parts of British life. 
The extensive achievements of military and naval medical officers in terms of 
understanding the causes of disease therefore places them at the forefront of 
implementing and promoting preventative health. They played a major role in 
discussions relating to the association between dirt, disease and environment, 
whilst continuing to argue that forms of direct intervention would prove to be 
beneficial to all populations. However, many causes of illness resolutely remained 
beyond the reach of early medical intervention until late into the nineteenth 
century as in the case of Typhus and Typhoid Fever which continued to present 
both a high morbidity and mortality rate due to their association with lice and 
contaminated provisions.25 The same could be said of Dysentery was responsible 
for the deaths of thousands of soldiers until the introduction of effective treatment 
in the early twentieth century. 
It is diseases such as these which, while significant, have for too long allowed 
discussions to repeatedly focus on the perceived ineffectiveness of both military 
and naval medicine until the post Crimean period. Such a narrow approach also fails 
to take into account the considerable achievements which can be credited to 
medical officers particularly in relation to early achievements in recognising the 
environmental cause of many diseases and the creation of standards which aimed 
to remove the worst excesses of military and naval lives regardless of rank or 
location. Moreover, of equal significance was the discussion promoted by the same 
                                                          
25 Typhus was still a major problem amongst the armies in WW2, particularly for prisoners of war. 
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medical officers concerning the declining state of towns and villages as evidenced in 
the poor state of newly raised recruits. It was factors such as these which led naval 
and military medical officers alike to actively promote preventative health 
measures within all sections of society in the belief that this would halt the physical 
and even mental decay of the most vulnerable sections of the population. Likewise 
they were amongst the first to understand that failure to redress these problems 
would endanger not just the security of the nation but also the future economic 
and social status of Britain.  
In summary, military and naval medicine was therefore far more advanced in 
identifying and implementing preventative health than generally credited. Many of 
the practices were at the forefront of innovation both in ideology and methodology 
which was openly promoted in the vast body of literature produced by many of its 
medical officers. Simultaneously, these men were also at the forefront of ethical 
questions relating to the rights of compulsory preventative measures in ways which 
were all too often lacking, particularly in comparison with legislation which 
emerged from the civilian public health and sanitary movement of the mid 
nineteenth century. The innovations in preventative health, initiated by military and 
naval medical officers, were therefore of immense significance, particularly in 
identifying an acceptable standard of wellbeing which had to be applied to all 
British citizens, regardless of who or where they were. In the following chapters the 
argument will be made that these achievements must therefore be identified as the 
true point of origin in writing the future history of preventative and public health in 
late eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain.  
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Chapter One: The historiographical context 
 
In 1975, the economic historian Peter Mathias contributed to a collection of essays 
reviewing the relationship of war and economic development.26 In this work, he 
argued that throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Britain’s 
commitment to military intervention was such that there were very few areas of life 
which were not positively affected in some way by this action. In order to illustrate 
the true extent of what this really meant, Matthias chose to focus on the growing 
institutionalisation of the armed forces medical services. He was amongst the first 
modern historians to argue that this was an intentional development, with the aim 
of proactively maintaining an effective fighting force which would successfully meet 
the country’s military and naval commitments.27 As a consequence of this, the 
medical staff of the British army and navy were not only given unprecedented 
opportunities to implement extensive reforms in order to improve the lives of those 
                                                          
26 Mathias, "Swords and Ploughshares:The Armed Forces, Medicine and Public Health in the Late 
Eighteenth Century." P.75 
27 Ibid. p.74 
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under their command, but also saw this as extending the purpose of medical 
intervention.28  
What is particularly significant in this early work is the way in which Mathias 
emphasised that these reforms were not only effective amongst the troops but also 
had a positive impact on the civilian population at large. He therefore argued that 
this should be acknowledged as nothing less than an early model of public health29. 
In his short but informative essay, Matthias could only focus on a selection of 
examples taken from areas such as professionalism, innovation and the use of 
institutions. He also briefly discussed the influence of individual practitioners such 
as John Pringle and James Lind particularly in relation to the way in which they 
emphasised the need to understand the cause of disease as opposed to merely 
finding ways of implementing standardised treatment which had long been 
recognised as being of limited effectiveness. 
Mathias acknowledged that his work provided only the briefest of discussions and 
called for further research in relation to understanding the true legacy of military 
medicine and the role it played in defining preventative health.30 It is unfortunate 
that within his own work, there was little criticality of the examples he used and he 
also failed to suggest why the innovations he cited could be interpreted as being 
antecedent to the public health movement of the mid nineteenth century. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of Mathias’ original essay, the following research 
still owes a debt of acknowledgement to this work, in terms of being the first 
                                                          
28 Ibid. p.74 
29 Ibid. p.75 
30 Ibid. p.71 
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publication to present the achievements of military and naval medicine as nothing 
less than an early a model of preventative medicine, which had as its main objective 
an applicability to all sections of society. 
The aim of this thesis is therefore to locate a body of evidence in order to support 
the argument that preventative health was not just the creation of the civilian 
public health and sanitary movements of mid nineteenth century Britain, but had its 
much earlier origins in the work of military and naval medical officers who 
understood the value of avoiding disease as opposed to trying to cure it. The same 
group also recognised the need to apply this innovative way of approaching medical 
practice not just to the men under their care but also the general population, on 
the grounds that this would ultimately create a far healthier supply of future 
recruits. Locating this evidence has involved accessing specialist archives and 
libraries which hold the work of both army and naval medical officers. Along with 
the more familiar writings of John Pringle, Gilbert Blane and James McGrigor, there 
has also been the opportunity to locate lesser known work written by medical 
officers including William Lempriere, Richard Brocklesby and Thomas Dickson 
Reide.31 What is significant is the extent to which many of these medical texts 
actively promoted the shared idea of preventative health, both in terms of 
improving the standard of health of the men under their control and also in 
recognising that this in itself would achieve little unless the findings were applied to 
all sections of society. 
                                                          
31 Each of these medical authors works are referenced in the Bibliography. 
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Despite the existence of this highly relevant primary material, the same cannot be 
said in relation to the interpretation of events found in the current historiography. 
A possible explanation for this may arise from the fact that discussion relating to 
the true origins of preventative health, positions itself directly on an interface 
shared by social, medical and military history, each with their own interpretation of 
events and areas of perceived relevance. As a consequence of this, all three subject 
areas have to be considered in terms of identifying the different contributions they 
make to this particular debate. Whilst all have therefore to be reviewed, it is 
interesting that the most relevant discussions to emerge are located in the small, 
though increasingly significant area of military medical history. It is therefore within 
this particular subject area that this research will be primarily focused. 
Social historians of the nineteenth century have long considered public health to be 
an ideal opportunity to study one of the most fundamental aspects of what is 
generally regarded as a true measure civilised existence. 32It has therefore attracted 
an extensive historiography, which continues to attract new areas of research and 
debate. Attempts to provide an overview of both the public health and sanitary 
movement can be found in work such as that written by the social historian 
Anthony Wohl.33 Despite the importance of narratives of this type, the complexity 
of the public health and sanitary movement has meant that similar comprehensive 
texts are generally no longer written, with the exception of work done more 
                                                          
32 Christopher Hamlin, "Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth Century Medical 
Thought," Social History of Medicine 5, no. 1 (1992). Hamlin is just one example of the many social 
historians whose work focuses on the emergence of nineteenth century public health. 
33 Anthony Wohl, Endangered Lives:Public Health in Victorian Britain (London: Methuen, 1984). 
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recently by Dorothy Porter.34 Instead, the subject of public health has become 
justifiably fragmented in order to try to understand each of the many forces at work 
and which has inevitably resulted in a more complex and challenging range of 
interpretations.  
An example of this can be seen in the work of Labisch, who argues that the 
simplistic models are all too often a product of the language in which discussions 
continue to be framed. He has therefore called for recognition by social historians 
to begin by acknowledging the need for a more detailed semantic debate regarding 
the term “public health.”35 Labisch argues that it is increasingly important to move 
away from looking at the history of public health, to be replaced by a model which 
focuses directly on the action of history in public health. Furthermore, he also 
makes a highly persuasive case when emphasising that more careful attention to 
terminology is the only way to ensure that future studies of public health avoid 
being little more than a response to past events, but instead facilitate an approach 
which allows one to identify and assess all the different factors which have a role to 
play.  The importance of Labisch’s model is that it is possible to interpret public 
health more critically in terms of providing an ever changing response to the needs 
of communities, both military and civilian and encourages recognition of what he 
calls “hidden lives”36 with regards how and why it is developed at any point in time, 
or in response to specific needs and requirements. 
                                                          
34 Dorothy  Porter, Health, Civilisation and the State. A History of Public Health from Ancient to 
Modern Times (Oxford: Routeledge, 1999). 
35 Alfons Labisch, "History of Public Health - History in Public Health. Loking Back and Looking 
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Despite the validity of Labisch’s views, there remains little evidence of terminology 
playing a more significant role in new interpretations. However, this is not to say 
that there has not been more of an effort to present the history of public health as 
a highly complex model, responding to a variety of needs amongst different 
populations. Hence Sigsworth and Worboys have focused on analysing more 
accurately the perceived impact on recipients, particularly the working classes, and 
in doing so have identified the existence of a myriad of highly effective local 
initiatives, very few of which been given the attention they credit.37 In the same 
way the revisionist history of Hamlin38 has also helped to provide a more balanced 
discussion regarding the involvement of individuals such as Chadwick as opposed to 
the type of hagiographic biographies written in post-war Britain.39 Moreover, 
Szreter’s discussion on the destabilising role of economic growth in the nineteenth 
century has also been important in terms of reassessing the true intention of public 
health initiatives of the time and suggests that the call for improvement came from 
a far wider group than previously acknowledged, all of which had a vested interest 
in implementing public health, if only seeing it as a way of avoiding social and 
economic unrest.40 
Therefore in terms of developing a more accurate understanding of the way in 
which public health in Britain was introduced and developed, there has been, in the 
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past thirty years, a sustained interest in relation to developing an accurate 
historiography which reflects the true complexity of the many factors which were 
instrumental in its formation. However, there still remains a reluctance on the part 
of social historians to present this as anything other than a predominantly 
nineteenth century civilian phenomenon. Moreover, the continued reliance on 
terminology such as “public health” and the “sanitary movement”, whilst being 
correct for its time, has nevertheless acted in ways which have prevented a more 
analytical understanding of where the true origins of these movements really lie. At 
the heart of this shortcoming is the widespread failure to both identify and discuss 
the role played by both military and naval medical officers when it came to an early 
understanding the value of preventing disease by focusing on the conditions in 
which many troops were forced to live long before the much more familiar work of 
civilians such as Chadwick, Simon and Snow. 
 In order to locate the necessary historiography needed to support this argument, 
one therefore has to focus on the work of those medical historians with a specific 
interest in the role of war on society.  Although military and naval medicine first 
came to prominence as a distinct specialism with the early work of Garrison,41 it is 
important to emphasise that its status within medical history has often been 
ambiguous and at times problematic. The origins of this perceived conflict of 
interest date back to what is generally considered to be the first significant 
generation of medical historians which included Richard Shryock (1893-1972), Erwin 
Ackerknecht (1906-88) and George Rosen (1910-1977). In response to the political 
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turmoil they witnessed in the first half of the twentieth century, this group of 
influential clinically trained medical historians felt compelled to emphasise the 
social history of medicine as being predominantly a positive representation which 
placed great emphasis on ways in which the medical profession focused on the 
needs of civilian society, rather than the role of medicine in times of war. This is 
evident in the work of Rosen who wrote the first history of public health in 1958, 
and which was presented in a way which offered sufficient areas of commonality 
for it to be readily endorsed by social historians.42 Its emphasis on progress, wide 
scale application, civic achievement and endorsement by the medical professional 
provided a model which would be replicated by future generations to come, and 
which is still evident in the work of medical historians typified by Joan Lane43 and 
Roy Porter.44 
In the second half of the twentieth century the term “medical history” therefore 
became increasingly synonymous with predominantly “social” issues, and 
effectively and purposefully distanced itself from the impact of war. For this reason 
the role and influence of both military and naval medicine found itself being 
increasingly marginalised, isolated and even ignored. Social historians increasingly 
recognised the appeal of the history of medicine particularly if it focused on the 
needs of the patient as opposed to the institutions and professional structure which 
for so long had appeared to dominate any discussion as to who and what initiated 
progress. In the 1970’s the same social historians also found their concerns being 
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echoed in the writing of Michel Foucault. In his most influential work45 Foucault 
argued that appearance of the French clinics and hospitals at the end of the 
eighteenth century marked the point at which doctors were able to successfully 
distance themselves from the past and progress into the age of modernity. 
 In what was a highly complex philosophical model, the views of Foucault were 
nevertheless considered by many contemporary historians of the time to hold a 
particular resonance. His rejection of the long held belief that medicine naturally 
progressed throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was replaced by a 
much more ruthless argument in which he claimed the medical profession used the 
clinics and hospitals to become a discipline which also involved subjugating the 
needs of the patient to merely being part of a process. This dehumanising aspect of 
modern medicine resonated with social and medical historians such as Roy Porter 
who saw in Foucauldian thought the opportunity to replace the traditional model of 
the history of medicine which had long focused on the role of the individual and the 
rise of the medical profession, by one which put the patient at the centre of studies  
If one was to genuinely understand the real nature of illness from a historical 
standpoint. 
Porter therefore continued to model social medical history from such a 
perspective.46   His influence throughout the later decades of the twentieth century 
particularly in Britain saw the patient narrative as taking precedence over all other 
discussions. Whilst this has bought a much needed dimension to medical history, 
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what is particularly significant to this thesis is the notable absence of any sustained 
discussion in his many works in relation to the role played by either the army or 
navy in actively promoting preventative health. Such a shortcoming is difficult to 
ignore, particularly when one sees soldiers and sailors in terms of belonging to the  
Moreover, the influence of views such as those held by Porter has been such that it 
is often seen to be replicated by other social historians with an interest in medical 
history. An example of this can be seen in Walkowitz’s influential study of the 
Contagious Diseases Acts.47 This remains a highly regarded and insightful account of 
what was a significant piece of legislation, and which continues to inform medical, 
social, political and women’s history. Yet despite Walkowitz’s highly detailed 
account, there remains a reticence throughout her work to acknowledge and 
analyse the complex issues particularly in relation to the extensive debates that 
took place amongst military and naval staff. Failure to include material of this kind 
has led to an assumption that both the army and navy were fully prepared to 
endorse extreme legislation to remove the threat of diseases such as Syphilis when 
in reality, all commissioned officers  were far more concerned about how this 
would impact on the relationship with the civilian population. 
This misunderstanding regarding the true value of military medicine has restricted 
its ability to claim its status within the history of medicine as a valid and worthwhile 
area of study. Criticisms relating to what is identified as its overtly hagiographic 
tendencies often arise in reference to early works such as those of Lloyd,48 Coulter 
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and Cantlie. 49 These vast, encyclopaedic works remain a highly valuable asset in 
charting the history of medicine and surgery in both the army and the navy. The 
same can be said of Blair’s history of the Royal Army Medical Corps.50 Yet despite 
providing a detailed narrative history, works of this type rarely engaged in more 
critical discussion, particularly in relation to assessing aspects such as the impact of 
the work of medical officers on society in general. 
It is therefore understandable that social historians such as Cooter have openly 
admitted to a growing sense of disquiet in identifying any real worth emanating 
from military medicine in its current state. His concerns are certainly valid, arguing 
that of all the subjects covered by the history of medicine, none have been so badly 
served as that of warfare.51 Amongst the many criticisms he has raised in relation to 
existing works, Cooter remains particularly concerned by the fact that unlike the 
social history of medicine, which he argues, attracts the highest standard of 
academic engagement, in the case of military medicine, much of this appears to be 
dominated by what he terms a “reductionist realpolitik”.52 The use of such a phrase 
is interesting in that it implies ignoring sentiment and emphasising only facts. 
However, for the military and naval historians of the past, the human story which 
can be said to equate to sentiment, had no place in charting the history of conflict. 
Only in recent years has there been a revisionist attitude seen in the way modern 
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warfare is increasingly analysed in terms of human suffering and endeavour, 
particularly in relation to the twentieth century. 
Cooter also denounces the ongoing tendency to deny military medicine and surgery 
its true complexity and worth, through a continued emphasis on presenting it in the 
simplistic model of being a catalyst for progress. Such an apologist stance certainly 
has many problems, led by the fact that this limits any genuine discussion as to the 
accuracy of such a statement and the variations that are involved in terms of time 
and place. Cooter’s particular views on the state of military medicine have 
therefore played a major role in calling for a new approach to be introduced in 
order to encourage meaningful scholarship. In cases where this has been achieved, 
he notes that the contribution made to medical history has been expansive, 
informed and greatly valued, as seen in Summer’s study on military nursing53. For 
Cooter, this type work exemplifies the importance of placing military medicine 
within a range of theoretical paradigms, such as feminism, social history, military 
medicine to name but a few, which in return provides the subject with a validity 
which has been absent for too long.54 
 The concerns of Cooter are without doubt, justifiable. More importantly they have 
also encouraged a new interest in military and naval history which meets the 
challenges of illustrating the true complexity of the subject. A particular example of 
this new approach, which is particularly relevant to this research, can be located in 
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the recent work of David McLean55. Using the second Cholera epidemic of 1848-49, 
McLean focuses on the relationships which existed between local government and 
the navy in response to controlling the disease when it appeared in Plymouth and 
the surrounding areas of Devonport and East Stonehouse. In addition to providing 
an opportunity to assess the specialist medical knowledge of naval practitioners 
when dealing with Cholera, compared to their civilian counterparts, this work also 
provides a valuable insight in terms of identifying and analysing the role played by 
naval officers amongst the local communities to which they frequently returned. 
This is particularly valuable for this thesis in helping to explain why the transfer of 
military and naval expertise beyond the garrison and port was often met with open 
antagonism and mistrust. McLean has also found evidence which suggests that in 
relation to naval officers, their perceived Tory tendencies often put them 
ideologically at a distance from local government officials who were increasingly 
more liberal in their views and actions.  
The complexity of McLean’s work, has therefore done much to redress the 
criticisms and concerns of Cooter. It is also part of a growing body of work which is 
recognising the complexity of what is perceived by the military/civilian relationship, 
which has been ignored for too long. Although early military works such as those 
produced by Spiers, 56Skelley57 and Harries-Jenkins58 attempted to identify more 
clearly soldier’s and sailor’s lives in terms of social composition and the lived 
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experience beyond the battlefield, these works did not extend into the community, 
and rarely considered the problem of health and disease. Using a very different 
perspective, Favret has attempted to address the lack of understanding as to how 
eighteenth century society reacted to conflict and the military presence.59 Her work 
has become a valuable addition to military history through her use of a vast range 
of contemporary material to understand how the military and warfare was 
perceived by the general population.  
However, of all the responses to the concerns raised by Cooter, possibly the most 
influential has been the substantial body of work produced by Mark Harrison whose 
research continues to be instrumental in establishing and maintaining British 
nineteenth century military medicine as a highly valued, globally respected area of 
historical study. Harrison’s own particular field of enquiry emerged in response to 
an early interest in the effects of colonial expansion on medical provision. Colonial 
medicine has not been without its own significant controversies, including 
accusations that the early histories only tended to focus solely on European 
recipients, and that little has been done by authors to respond to the accusations 
that western medicine was imposed on countries in ways which failed to 
acknowledge basic personal freedoms. It was Arnold who led the demand for a 
revision of the way colonial medicine was appraised both in terms of intention and 
outcome. He also argued that colonial medicine could not be seen as a generic 
response and called for specific studies closely linked to individual locations. This 
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challenge was likewise met by Harrison who has subsequently focused much of his 
own work on India60.  
What is particularly relevant to this research is Harrison’s discussion regarding 
medicine being used as a form of social control.61 He asserts that in the early 
colonial setting, medicine was initially an effective, if somewhat benign, pretence to 
segregate white settlers from native populations. Only well into the nineteenth 
century did this develop into yet another branch of the authoritarian policies which 
enforced European imperial policy. Given the particular focus of his work, it is 
significant that Harrison has not expanded on his area of interest by looking at the 
considerable evidence which exists on the part of both army and naval medical 
officers and their interest in preventative health. The only work where this is briefly 
considered is him his study of contagion.62However, his decision to associate this 
with trade and commerce meant that yet again, the link to early preventative 
health had once again failed to be discussed. Consequently, though his discussions 
on the way diseases, such as Cholera, were perceived by the army and the military 
stance on methods of disease transmission and contagion have been discussed in 
chapters two and five, his influence on this research has been limited.63 
Furthermore, it reinforces the originality of this particular thesis in terms of 
constructing an argument regarding the legacy and impact of military and naval 
innovation in terms of promoting preventative health as both theory and practice. 
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Nevertheless, the work of Harrison has been of particular importance in 
encouraging a new interest in military medicine which includes the work of 
Chakrabarti64 and Charters.65 Both these historians have played a greater role in 
supporting many of the discussions contained in this research. Chakrabarti, whose 
work remains closest to that of Harrison in terms of a shared interest in presenting 
the advancement of medicine as a direct result of imperial expansion, has helped 
contextualise one of the key arguments of this thesis, namely the importance of 
colonial medicine in its own right and the distinct way it recognised the radical need 
to prevent disease rather than treat it. Moreover, Chakrabarti argues that had it not 
been for the way in which commissioned medical officers were allowed to adapt 
and produce their own unique form of medicine, the early days of colonial 
development would have been nowhere near as successful as they were. Views 
such as these have been instrumental not only in highlighting the immense value of  
military medicine, but also play a significant part in supporting the call for colonial 
medicine to be recognised as a distinct entity, worthy of inclusion along with the 
more established traditional classifications found within western medicine.66 
Consequently, Chakrabarti’s writing contains an extensive overview of military and 
naval medicine developed in a colonial context. He also argues that colonial 
medicine was actively encouraged to develop beyond the confines of the traditional 
                                                          
64 Pratik Chakrabarti, Medicine and Empire 1600-1960 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
65 Charters, Disease, War and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces During the 
Seven Years' War. 
66 Chakrabarti, Medicine and Empire 1600-1960. p. xii. The term “colonial medicine” was introduced 
in the work of George Bassalla, as part of a wider concept of colonial science. It is increasingly being 
recognised as having the necessary concepts and content to be considered as a discreet area of 
study which would permit it to stand as a separate entity within the existing classifications found 
within the history of medicine. 
34 
 
medical establishment in response to the increasingly urgent need to maintain the 
health of troops tasked with securing British acquisitions in ever distant and 
dangerous environments. However, for it to be seen as truly unique, the colonial 
medical experience has to be compared with what was being offered both in terms 
of theory and practice amongst the civilian population back in Britain. It is 
unfortunate that this is not as explicit as it might be in Chakrabarti’s work due to 
much of the focus being case studies of colonies such as India and Africa, with the 
emphasis on location rather than comparison. However this is directly addressed in 
this particular thesis, particularly in those chapters focusing on diseases such as 
Smallpox, Yellow Fever and Cholera. 
Nevertheless, the views of Chakrabarti remain integral to this research in terms of 
the way in which his work enters into a discussion relating to the extent to which 
military and naval medical officers had the right to act in the way they did. 67 The 
British civilian-military relationship became increasingly complex throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and affected medical issues in many ways, as 
will be discussed below. However, at this point, the issue of “right” is more 
concerned about the emergence of a military belief which facilitated extremely 
radical changes in relation to the way illness was both understood and treated, 
without professional repercussions. Up to this time medical theory had for 
centuries been bound by ancient classical beliefs. This ensured that diagnosis of any 
illness was perceived to be a personal emanation and as such was accompanied by 
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a sense of inevitability68. Hence even the most trained physicians recognised the 
limitations of medicine as being little more than alleviation of the most extreme 
symptoms and suffering. Medical treatment was also a commodity which few could 
afford. The result was that for the majority of the population health was an 
individual concern and illness was regarded with a sense of fate. 
Yet the constant demands made on both the army and the navy throughout the 
eighteenth century instigated a complete change, necessitated by issues such as 
scale. Troops were considered to be a valuable commodity and as such required 
medical intervention to protect them from illness. This was repeatedly seen as a 
perpetual problem as seen by the fact that more troops continued to be lost to 
disease, rather than from wounds obtained in battle. Chakrabarti cites the concerns 
of the naval physician, Gilbert Blane, on this subject who announced that most 
British losses in the West Indies during the American war of Independence were not 
even due to adverse climate but from diseases which could be prevented.69 
However for as long as dominant views on treating disease required each patient to 
be considered as a unique entity, this problem could never be overcome. The 
answer lay in effectively inverting classical interpretations of illness which would 
allow diseases to be classified as discreet entities. This type of thinking also meant 
that any given disease would not only impart the same symptoms on different 
patients, but also could be treated by standardised medical intervention. Moreover, 
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the categorisation of disease in this way would also allow a greater opportunity for 
finding ways of preventing its occurrence. 
This medical thinking was not only innovative, but actively opposed every element 
of medical education found in universities such as Oxford and Cambridge, which 
fiercely held on to classical models regarding the nature and treatment of disease. 
Only on the continent and in Scotland could one find universities with medical 
schools who were prepared to embrace such radical thinking. It was therefore 
inevitable that the same institutions became a focal point of training for medical 
students planning on a career as a commissioned medical officer. In places such as 
these, medicine was presented as an empirical science, which could be classified, 
standardised, quantified and therefore be applicable to treating numbers rather 
than individuals. Furthermore, following such training military doctors were able to 
respond to the need of finding ways of treating far greater numbers. The 
knowledge was still limited, and would remain so until the emergence of scientific 
medicine, but it permitted men such as Pringle and his contemporaries to begin to 
look at diseases in the army and navy as preventable, once it had been identified 
and understood. It was this major development which Chakrabarti identifies, and in 
doing so feels justified in claiming that preventative health was first introduced by 
doctors working in military establishments, and as such became the foundation of 
nineteenth century public health.70   
It is therefore unfortunate that Chakrabarti fails to expand on such a significant 
statement relating to the development and potential impact of military medicine in 
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the eighteenth century. Fortunately this has been extensively redressed through 
the work of Charters who’s research on the Seven Years War (1754-1763) 71has 
been instrumental in establishing the true status of military medicine and the 
changes it implemented. Through the contributions of both her book72 and a highly 
influential earlier article73, Charters has been able to question the views of 
established historians such as Brewer who maintain that Britain’s emergent 
administrative and financial system was so effective that concerns and shortages 
relating to manpower were effectively overlooked primarily through the country’s 
ability to purchase extra mercenaries and other foreign troops when needed. 
74Whilst Charters acknowledges that the secure fiscal standing certainly played a 
central role in permitting the country to expand in terms of both military and 
colonial aspirations, she contests the interpretation that this in some way allowed 
the military and political hierarchy to ignore the wellbeing of “home” soldiers and 
sailors who constituted the largest proportion of the rank and file.  
Rather, Charters rightly argues that there was infact evidence of a growing 
recognition of those in positions of authority to use preventative medical 
intervention as an investment to actively protect soldiers and sailors, citing both 
practical and moral grounds.75 Disease had long been recognised as one of the main 
factors affecting the chances of British military and naval success, but there was 
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now also a growing realisation that it also affected morale in general, and as such, 
had to be eradicated as far as possible amongst the rank and file.  
This early caveat, in terms of limitation of what could really be achieved, is 
significant in relation to the following research particularly when attempting to 
assess the implementation of “preventative health” measures in military and naval 
environments during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moreover, it 
was even acknowledged by medical officers of the time who repeatedly exhibited a 
very detailed and sophisticated understanding of the health needs of the men 
under their command. This can be seen in the writings of the army doctor Robert 
Jackson when discussing the dangers of new recruits who persistently showed a 
greater propensity to fall victim to a range of diseases. Jackson believed that this 
was generally due to such men having little in the sense of belonging to their new 
life, especially when it involved being posted at ever increasing distances from 
Britain and which he believed manifested itself in a tendency to be more 
susceptible to illness. 76 In the same way the naval surgeon Thomas Trotter was a 
very public advocate of introducing compulsory preventative health measures in 
the navy when it came to interventions such as compulsory inoculation against 
smallpox and successfully campaigned for the close of public houses in naval towns 
such as Plymouth. Yet when discussing the feasibility of controlling all disease on 
board ships, he remained concerned by the danger posed by “raw” recruits who he 
saw as a constant source of infection.77 Trotter, like Jackson, also discussed the 
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cause of low morale, which in the case of the navy he attributed to the very 
genuine horrors of impressment. He also saw this as the reason why such sailors 
showed themselves to be persistently more prone to contagious diseases 
regardless of the attempts made by the Admiralty to improve conditions on board 
all ships.78 
Despite Charters’ limited discussion as to what could really be achieved in the 
context of military and naval preventative health,  her work has nevertheless played 
a pivotal role in acknowledging the value of medical officers and their often 
innovative response to protecting the army and the navy from the worst ravages of 
disease.  Moreover her extensive study of the Seven Years War has been 
instrumental in proving the existence of a dialogue between influential politicians 
such as Barrington,79 military leaders and military medical staff in an attempt to 
actively find ways of preventing disease amongst all troops and associated 
populations. However it is possible to identify in her work two areas which would 
benefit from additional attention particularly in the way they are able to enhance 
the case she is making for military and naval medicine. The first of these is a failure 
to emphasise the way in which the material gathered by military medical officers 
was regarded as being the findings of “experts”. This terminology is significant as it 
reflects a contemporary belief that commissioned medical officers were in no way 
seen as being inferior to civilian practitioners, even though their status was not 
acknowledged by the all-powerful Royal College of physicians of London who 
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actively opposed any infringement of the medical hierarchy or attempts to 
modernise medical thinking from practitioners who had not followed the traditional 
university degrees, namely graduates from Oxford or Cambridge. Instead military 
medical expertise was the result of empirical studies and a way of understanding 
the nature of disease which emerged from the radical teaching offered by Scottish 
universities. The legacy of medical students who chose to train in places such as 
Edinburgh and Glasgow was immense and as such is discussed extensively in 
Chapter Three. However within the medical profession bodies such as the Royal 
College continued to refuse licentiates to Scottish trained medical graduates. Whilst 
this accreditation was essential within the civilian medical fraternity, it appears to 
have carried little weight amongst the military hierarchy, especially as the majority 
of their medical staff were Scottish graduates. It is therefore also unfortunate that 
Charters therefore omits the importance of Scotland in terms of the integral role it 
played in shaping modern military medicine, despite being pivotal to her own 
research. 
A second area which would benefit from further discussion is a more informed 
understanding of the lived experience of the soldier and sailor beyond the confines 
of the barracks or ship. Despite the many thousands of men who enlisted to fight 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, their experiences and 
relationship with the society to which they belonged generally remain forgotten. 
For many the reality was that only a few would return home after years of fighting 
as a professional soldier in what were increasingly remote areas and for ever longer 
periods of time. Yet there was an expectation that enlisted men would return and it 
was the duty of society to retain an affiliation with soldiers and sailors alike. 
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Therefore  Pringle, Cleghorn and all other military medical officers continued to 
acknowledge that civilian society remained integral to the successful functioning of 
the army and navy and as such should never be treated as anything other than a 
mutually dependant consideration. They also upheld the view that a sick society 
would produce weak, inefficient troops who were unable to withstand the 
demands of modern warfare. Therefore medical officers saw grounds for 
increasingly applying preventative medicine beyond the confines of the port and 
garrison. 
However this type of intervention remains a highly complex area in terms of 
identifying both motive and the type of intervention which would prove acceptable 
to different groups. Most recently, significant areas have been analysed in the work 
of Isaac Land.80 As part of extensive research into the experiences of British sailors 
when back on shore, Land has identified a significant number of schemes and social 
reforms to promote wide scale reform. Whilst many were supported by the medical 
profession, they also attracted the attention of other groups with a vested interest 
in not just on preventative health but with specific concerns relating to population 
growth. Land therefore argues that many of the concerns raised in relation to the 
way sailors in particular were allowed to live were initiated not by medical issues 
but more by pronatalism and concerns relating to enervation and other such 
tendencies which worked in opposition to the needs of a country committed to 
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military and naval expansion and which explains the type of solutions which were 
proposed.81 
Land’s work has unquestionably been a major addition to the existing naval and 
social historiography in terms of providing a far more accurate analysis relating to 
the lived experience of the ordinary sailor and his relationship with the rest of 
society.  It can also be argued that in this particular work, Land sees the role of the 
medical profession as taking a far less dominant role in informing the way 
occupational groups like sailors were encouraged to live. However in relation to this 
research there is extensive evidence which allows one to argue that whilst society 
was becoming increasingly aware of the role it had to play in ensuring future 
generations of healthy recruits, the medical officers of both armed forces saw their 
commitment to preventative health as their leading, and what could be argued as 
their only priority. At a time when successful containment and treatment of disease 
was still unknown, any approach to avoiding illness particularly amongst thousands 
of soldiers and sailors was recognised as being a major advantage. It was therefore 
both the practicality and the moral imperative which military medical officers 
adopted which allows their advances to be presented as the true antecedent to the 
public health movement of the nineteenth century, and by doing so establish this 
research within the historiographies of military, medical, and social history with 
particular implications for future studies on the understanding of public health. This 
has been achieved by focusing on four distinct areas which comprise the following 
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chapters, namely, the control of Smallpox through inoculation and vaccination, 
medical training in Scotland, the validation of empirical medicine through the 
adaptation of quantifiable techniques and the control of Yellow Fever and Cholera. 
Each of these has been selected in relation to the way in which they can illustrate 
how military and naval medicine developed an understanding of the importance of 
preventative health, in relation to both the soldiers and sailors under their 
command and the civilian population. It is because of this particular objective that 
any discussion on preventative medicine which only affected military 
establishments, as in the case of hospitals, is not included. In terms of chronology, 
discussion will be confined broadly to the period 1720 to 1832, with a study of 
Britain’s military and naval involvement in Europe, North America and the West 
Indies. With the exception of the arrival of Cholera, there will be no reference to 
India, the East Indies or Africa. The decision to exclude the influence of the East 
India Company has been taken on the grounds that despite being highly active 
during this period, its influence in terms of preventative medicine play a far greater 
role in terms of the mid nineteenth century, and consequently does not hold the 
same degree of relevance for this thesis. It is also necessary to reiterate that this 
research is not aiming to include any specific analysis of military initiatives located 
within the Public Health and Sanitary Movement of the nineteenth century. Rather, 
the aim remains focused on identifying an emerging belief by commissioned 
medical officers of the need to ensure not just the health of troops but also the 
society from which such men were taken, which should be interpreted as rather 
than a direct response to use professional expertise to actively promote change 
regarding all aspects of daily life. 
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Having previously addressed the relevant historiography Chapter two will establish 
this research by revisiting events surrounding the control of Smallpox, as this 
particular disease provided the first opportunity for military and naval medical 
officers to identify and acknowledge the value of preventative intervention, and the 
benefits this would bring in relation to protecting not just troops but also the 
society from which these men were taken. In an age when the majority of diseases 
could be fatal, Smallpox still managed to invoke a powerful sense of fear across all 
sections of society. Early numerical returns collected from parish mortality records 
also confirmed that the disease was becoming increasingly virulent both in 
epidemic and endemic form. It was this stark situation which led to early accounts 
of control being considered with more than intellectual curiosity. The first form of 
intervention was inoculation82 which entailed giving a mild dose of Smallpox to a 
healthy recipient. The practice could be found in areas such as South America and 
the Middle East where it was noted by early colonial administrators. The unique 
concept which lay behind inoculation made it an ideal item of interest for the Royal 
Society where the first accounts were read and discussed. 
Despite inoculation showing itself to be effective, it did so on the premise that an 
otherwise healthy patient was purposefully infected, all be it with a mild form of 
the disease.83 From the 1720’s, this generated a vast number of responses from not 
just the medical profession but also the Church and any person or group who 
considered themselves to have a viable reason for holding views on the advantages 
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and disadvantages of inoculation. The vast library material reflecting this general 
interest was catalogued by Klebs in the early twentieth century and remains one of 
the most complete references citing material concerned with the early response to 
controlling Smallpox.84 It also shows that in terms of the discussion relating to the 
introduction of inoculation in Britain, military and naval doctors were initially slow 
to react in terms of endorsement, which makes this very much a civilian initiative.  
However, the delay was only temporary, particularly when a Smallpox epidemic in 
1740 had a devastating impact on the channel fleet.85 This prompted army and 
medical military officers to begin to engage in discussions regarding the suitability 
of inoculation amongst British troops in a much more sustained and active way. 
The extensive literature written on the subject by medical officers represented by 
Sir John Pringle, Sir Richard Brocklesby, Dr Donald Monro, Dr Thomas Dickson-Reide 
and Dr Thomas Trotter are all particularly pertinent in terms of meeting the aims of 
this chapter. However what is significant is not just the amount written but the 
common themes that can be traced throughout the material. These doctors, all of 
whom had received their training either on the continent or in Scotland, typified a 
commitment to medical empiricism in relation to understanding the complexities of 
inoculation when applied to a military population. Leading such concerns was the 
possibility of potentially risking lives of otherwise healthy men if inoculation was 
performed on those troops who had not previously been infected with Smallpox. 
The issue which began in a general context, became vastly more significant during 
the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and has subsequently attracted the 
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attention of historians including Buckley, 86 Frey87 and Becker88. There was also the 
highly problematic issue as to whether inoculation could become compulsory. 
There has been a tendency to present the British army and navy as inherently 
brutal institutions where individual needs were ignored. However as seen in the 
extensive writings of the naval surgeon Thomas Trotter, his professional support of 
inoculation did not allow to him to ignore the issue of religious objection raised 
amongst the sailors who came under his care.89  
Even when Smallpox threatened the continued security of the nation, the military 
response was one of careful consideration. Pringle established communications 
with civilian practitioners, particularly those who were engaged with establishing 
compulsory programmes of inoculation as in the case of William Watson, physician 
to the Foundling Hospital in London.90 Pringle’s interest lay in finding ways of 
standardising the procedure whilst maintaining control over the cost and ensuring a 
level of safety. Monro also maintained a regular correspondence with Dr. Quiers 
who was working on slave plantations in Jamaica.91 The importance of discussions 
such as these shows that in the early days, military medical officers considered 
themselves to be an integral part of the medical profession and actively facilitated 
debates which would benefit all sections of society. In return, philanthropists such 
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as Jonas Hanway considered it a duty to introduce programmes of inoculation 
within the Marine Society as a way of ensuring that the navy would have a constant 
supply of healthy young men, all of whom were free of the scourge of Smallpox.92 
Inoculation was therefore a shared response by all members of the medical 
profession to finding ways of combatting the worst excesses of Smallpox. Its 
contagious nature and increasing propensity to affect both the young and the old 
with equally devastating outcomes meant that no one group saw its control as their 
particular responsibility. This was certainly driven by the ethical considerations 
which continued to dominate discussions regarding compulsory programmes, even 
when the procedure was simplified through the intervention of the Sutton family.93 
However, this situation changed with Jenner’s introduction of vaccination in 1798. 
Smallpox could now be controlled by the use of cowpox which was far less 
dangerous and provided an immunity. 94The significance of Jenner’s work was 
immense, though it has attracted a disproportionate number of heroic narratives95 
which began whilst he was still alive. Vaccination also continues to be presented as 
being the worthy accolade of Enlightenment thinking with little attention paid to 
the controversy it caused from its first appearance.96The same criticisms can be 
levelled against medical histories which have failed to review the extensive role 
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played by the military, particularly the navy, in promoting vaccination. Physicians 
such as Trotter and Blane were amongst the first to recognise that vaccination 
could become a compulsory medical intervention across all of society, as it was free 
of the ethical problems which had accompanied inoculation.97 This level of 
conviction was in no way affected by the looming war with France, and naval 
physicians were at the forefront of transporting and administering vaccination to 
troops stationed beyond Britain. In one of the first experimental trials of the age, 
representatives from both the army and the navy carried out tests on the local 
inhabitants of the islands of Minorca, Gibraltar and Malta, in an attempt to show 
the safety of vaccination. 98 
The control of Smallpox therefore played a significant role in testing the nature of 
the relationship between military and civilian doctors. During the period under 
discussion, the disease led many doctors to consider problems of contagion, and in 
doing so, try to understand the basis of what would become known as 
epidemiology. More recently, Foucault saw the introduction of medical procedures 
such as inoculation and vaccination in a far different way. He argued that these 
were an example of what he termed “medicalization”, 99whereby traditional 
attitudes towards health and disease were forcibly replaced by previously unknown 
intervention on the part of the medical profession. The problem with this 
interpretation in relation to mid nineteenth century Britain is that it fails to take 
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into account both the relatively low numbers who chose to undergo the procedure 
due to cost and the localised practitioners who offered the intervention. 
However Smallpox also acted as a catalyst for military and naval medical officers in 
relation to understanding the nature of illness and the importance of prevention. 
They began by using the populations under their care as testing opportunities both 
in terms of medical procedure and understanding the boundaries of intervention.100 
The uniqueness of this opportunity was not lost on those involved and as such was 
presented as providing knowledge which would be applicable to all sections of 
society. This responsibility remained at the forefront of all military medicine at this 
time because it was the most logical way of thinking. As a sick army or navy led to 
defeat in battle so a sick civilian population perpetuated the chances of this 
happening. However the moral duty of such views also remained at the forefront of 
military medicine as seen in the actions of men such as Blane. Whilst endorsing 
compulsory vaccination amongst troops on the grounds that this would also stop 
infection of the societies to which these men returned, Blane was also at the 
forefront of calling for the endorsement of Jenner to be tempered until such time 
he could provide evidence as to why vaccination worked.101 
As the eighteenth century progressed, military and naval medicine became 
increasingly defined as a discreet specialism within the medical profession at large. 
The numbers of medical officers appointed by both the army and the navy rapidly 
increased to provide care for the continuously expanding number of troops 
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required. Furthermore there were also a significant increase in the number 
employed by the East India Company to care for both the private army and the 
immense number of administrators and settlers.102 Whilst the type of troops and 
destinations varied according to the service, all medical officers were nevertheless 
tasked with the same objectives, namely providing medical care and implementing 
ways of actively preventing disease. However there was a far more significant area 
of commonality, arising from the fact that the majority medical officers had and 
continued to be been trained in a Scottish university.  
The influence of Scotland and why it became specialised in military medicine is 
therefore the focus of Chapter Three. The history of the Scottish universities has an 
extensive historiography, much of which continues to be written by academics with 
strong links to the country. However as in many aspects of military medical history 
there is a paucity of research in terms of understanding why military and naval 
medicine evolved north of the border along a different trajectory from English 
institutions.  Established texts such as Dow103 and Comrie104 provide an interesting 
narrative regarding the rise of education in Scotland which they attributed without 
question to the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment. Whilst this played a central 
role in academic and intellectual life, the true complexity of what lay behind 
Scotland’s formidable reputation has only recently been analysed by Hamilton105 
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and Kaufman.106 Of the two, the latter remains the only substantial study of events 
surrounding the establishment of a medical school in Edinburgh as well as charting 
the history of the Chair in Military Surgery which ultimately led to the university 
being closely associated with military medicine.  Kaufman’s work therefore plays a 
significant role in framing much of the general discussion in this thesis. However it 
too has remained extensively within the Scottish context, and as such does little in 
terms of looking at the role of Scottish graduates within their professional context. 
Kaufman has also chosen not to focus on the early years of the university. This is an 
unfortunate omission in the work as it has prevented discussion of the role of men 
such as John Pringle who was so influential in defining the type of learning all 
students would experience. This has now been redressed by Craig, whose paper on 
Pringle is valuable in explaining both the development of military medicine and the 
role played by the university in facilitating this emerging specialism.107 Craig 
emphasises the way in which it was continental philosophy which defined Pringle’s 
own views on the form and function of medicine in general. Moreover, the idea of 
preventative health was familiar across much of Europe and regarded as a measure 
of what could be regarded as a civilised, well-ordered society which also ensured 
that its military was fit for protecting the rest of society. Frank’s innovative concept 
of “medical police” therefore found favour in countries such as Prussia and even 
Scotland, where it gained credibility through the creation of its academic Chair.  108 
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The complex legacy of Scottish medical schools has still to be addressed in ways 
which acknowledge the diverse influences which guided their development. 
Alongside a modern curriculum which reflected Enlightenment thinking, the 
methodology was one based on empiricism, which also involved the rejection of 
traditional learning.  The result of this were generations of medical practitioners, 
many of whom accepted a commission in either the army or the navy, though it is 
important to also acknowledge the role played by many civilian doctors who left 
Scotland for careers in the many public institutions which increasingly required 
skilled staff to meet the growing number of men, women and children who were 
falling prey to the hostile conditions posed by industrialism and urbanisation. 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century Scottish trained medical 
graduates therefore became increasingly associated with reform and modernity, as 
will be shown within this thesis.  
Discussion will also include findings of the Royal Commission on Scottish 
Universities.109 Although the commissioners were concerned with assessing the 
teaching across all faculties, it was the debate regarding the presence of military 
medicine as a specialist subject in Edinburgh which is most relevant to this thesis. 
The evidence given to the Commissioners is cited extensively in this chapter as it 
remains the most detailed document in existence which shows how complex the 
military-civilian relationship had become in the period following the defeat of 
Napoleon. It will also be used in relation to charting the growing professional status 
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of medical officers which they used when presenting the case for implementing 
preventative health measures, arguing that these were applicable to all sections of 
the population. It is therefore possible to argue that the influence of Scottish 
medical training was immense, not only in providing a philosophy which gave 
credence to actively engaging with preventative health as a universal intervention 
but also provided its graduates with a training which permitted recourse to 
scientific enquiry at a time when civilian medical practice was generally unable to 
meet such challenges. 
Chapter four will therefore develop the case for military and naval medical staff 
increased commitment to preventative health by their adaptation of early 
quantifiable methods. In response to finding ways of overcoming a reluctance to 
understanding the many obvious advantages of preventative health measures, 
medical officers in both the army and the navy increasingly were forced to look for 
ways of proving that the health of all individuals was measurable. The earliest use 
of quantifiable analysis used in this way can be traced back to seventeenth century 
Britain when Petty110 and Graunt111used Bills of Mortality to attempt to measure 
the loss exacted on the country’s economy through disease. The particular way in 
which military and naval medical officers adopted early statistical analysis will 
therefore be the focus of this section. To date, there has been limited academic 
interest in developing an understanding of the way in which quantifiable analysis 
was espoused by the medical profession in general throughout the eighteenth 
century. The exception to this is the work of Trohler whose particular focus has 
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been that of the association and advancement of therapeutic diagnosis. 112With 
progress being made in scientific and medical equipment, and the growing interest 
in proving the value of medical intervention, methods had to be found which 
facilitated the recording of large amounts of information in a way which permitted 
analysis, understanding and application. The first step lay in tabulation and 
quantifiable analysis which was far more basic than the later developments of 
mathematical statistics, but which still offered an innovative approach to charting 
dynamic changes in disease frequency. 
The same level of commitment can be identified in the work of military and naval 
medical officers who also made extensive use of tabulation, though as a group they 
added little in terms of refining the process of numerical analysis and made no 
significant advances in the general evolution of statistical methodology. It is 
possible that this explains why for many years, the vast library of military medical 
publications failed to attract research in order to further an understanding of why 
quantifiable analysis was used in the way it was. However Trohler, argues that 
limitations such as these are not in themselves sufficient grounds for disregarding 
the material produced by army and navy doctors simply because it appeared to 
replicate a style used by civilian practitioners. Moreover, in subsequent work he has 
attempted to locate evidence for this view through a detailed study of all 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century military and naval medical officers who 
used numerical information in their publications113.  
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Whilst Trohler’s work is valuable in highlighting the extent to which quantifiable 
analysis was used by particular military and naval medical practitioners, it 
nevertheless fails to explicitly identify using the same material, evidence for 
creating the case that numerical analysis in military and naval publications was 
immensely significant in that it enabled medical officers to prove the connection 
between dirt, environment, climate and other malignant causes when it came to 
identifying transmission of a range of diseases common to all. At a time which was 
still without the certainties of scientific medicine, there was a clear need to find 
ways of showing that many diseases were avoidable. This was the achievement of 
the medical officers, whose findings were increasingly presented as numerical 
evidence bought into being through a range of empirical methods. Quantifiable 
analysis was therefore a highly valuable part of the process in which preventative 
health was being presented as accessible, achievable and an asset to all 
populations, regardless of whether they were military or civilian. 
It is therefore important that chapter five will contextualise this argument by 
looking at the medical officers growing professionalism and confidence to not only 
implement reform amongst their own men but also  increasingly wanting to use 
their particular expertise in terms of directing  their civilian counterparts into 
initiating similar preventative health measures. This has been far more complex in 
terms of identifying distinct examples, particularly as medical officers were far 
more integrated with society than is often acknowledged. 114Therefore in order to 
identify distinct opportunities where this took place, this research has focused on 
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epidemiological incidents relating to the control of Yellow Fever and Cholera. Whilst 
there were many other similar examples which could be used in the same way, the 
significance of these two diseases lies in the fact that they were initially considered 
not to be a particular threat to the civilian problem, and as such were known to be 
closely associated with military and naval life. 
The events which led to a complete reversal of this have received extensive 
discussion in a detailed historiography. 115However, reiterating the concerns raised 
in other chapters, there has been insufficient attention paid towards analysing the 
discourse which took place in relation to the role the military were expected to play 
in preventing both diseases from entering Britain and what in reality they were 
allowed to do.  This is most clearly seen in the parliamentary papers from the time 
where discussions on securing the safety of the civilian population was seen to lie 
with the army and the navy  in the form of implementing and maintaining 
quarantine regulations. Little attention, if any, was paid to the views of army and 
naval doctors relating to major issues such as the natural history of these diseases 
and the complex debate which existed between those who believed in the theory 
of contagionism as opposed to those who supported the anticontagionist 
argument. As will be seen, this did more than any other medical controversy of the 
time to show the disparity which had emerged between military and civilian 
medical theory and practice, as well as a pronounced distrust on the part of the 
latter to rely on any initiatives which medical officers were now in a position to 
promote from the standpoint of being experts in preventative health measures. 
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The threat of Yellow Fever and the inevitable arrival of Cholera did much to 
illustrate the increasingly complex, and often fractious opinions held by military and 
civilian medical practitioners in relation to the effectiveness and boundaries of their 
roles in matters of health. As the number of military medical officers rapidly 
increased to meet the growing demands of war across the world, they formed a 
large, identifiable and increasingly vocal section of the medical profession who 
understood both the nature and value of preventative health to a very 
sophisticated level. Yet even in the midst of the real threat of epidemics of both 
Yellow Fever and Cholera, along with prior knowledge of just how deadly both 
diseases could be, there was a concerted effort on the part of the medical 
profession and the government not to pass the nation’s health into the hands of 
the army and the navy. The importance of this final chapter therefore lies in not 
only explaining this rejection as part of the growing mistrust of military intervention 
in civilian life but also the legacy in terms of the formative years of the public health 
movement being seen as a solely civilian initiative. 
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Chapter Two: The control of Smallpox and the emergence of preventative health 
 
In the following chapter, events surrounding the early efforts to control Smallpox 
through inoculation and vaccination will be discussed in relation to the influence 
exerted by both military and naval medical officers during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and the opportunities they saw in extending this to all 
soldiers and sailors. In what has previously been regarded as a solely civilian 
achievement, the aim of this discussion will therefore be to recognise the extent to 
which medical officers influenced the development and extent of both procedures 
being used in Britain.  
This will first be addressed by discussing the growing awareness seen throughout 
the eighteenth century of the need to invest in the care of soldiers and sailors if the 
military and colonial aspirations were to be achieved and maintained. Secondly, 
there will follow a detailed analysis of the ways in which medical officers 
contributed to a general understanding of the effectiveness of ways to control 
Smallpox through the application of an empirical methodology. These studies were 
not only shared with civilian medical practitioners but also marked the point at 
which medical officers also began to talk about the benefits of preventative 
medicine as a universally applicable procedure. Lastly, discussion will also focus on 
the issues of compulsory intervention and the rights of the individual, which was a 
concern voiced by both the military and naval authorities, and the extent to which 
preventative health could be enforced. By looking at each of these areas, it is 
possible to argue that the army and navy played a far greater role in the control of 
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Smallpox than is currently acknowledged. Moreover the events provided the same 
medical officers with the confidence to propose ways in which preventative health 
should be introduced, so making their actions the forerunner of the public health 
movement. 
Despite being one of the oldest diseases known to affect humankind, Smallpox was 
relatively late arriving in Britain.116 It is impossible to give an exact date of its first 
appearance, though by the seventeenth century it was sufficiently common to 
merit inclusion in all the leading medical text books of the age. Attempts to 
effectively treat the disease were hindered by the fact that it appeared to take on 
various forms, some of which were more virulent than others. Modern research has 
shown this to be the coexistence of variola major, the most aggressive and deadly 
form of Smallpox and variola minor, which was a far milder form and often 
mistaken for measles117. More astute contemporary practitioners such as Thomas 
Sydenham (1624-1689) recognised clinical patterns in its natural history, 
particularly predilection for the young and vulnerable.118 It was also generally 
agreed that those who survived the disease would at least benefit from lifelong 
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immunity119. The value of this type of protection was increasingly acknowledged by 
eighteenth century recruiting orders where infamous pox marks on an individual 
meant that not only were they unlikely to be infected again but that they were less 
of a threat to others. Sadly, the reality was that few Smallpox victims were left 
without some far greater residual neurological damage, which in the worst cases 
led to lifelong paralysis and blindness.120  
By the eighteenth century it was also becoming increasingly apparent to the 
medical profession, both civilian and military, that the disease was not only 
becoming more virulent but also was seldom absent from everyday life regardless 
of class or location. In addition to being endemic, there were an increasing number 
of particularly devastating epidemics which affected different locations across the 
country. The result was a growing sense of alarm, the likes of which had not been 
seen since the days of the plague. Using Bills of Mortality, Smith estimated that 
Smallpox mortality was one death in five to six cases,121 though emphasises that 
this is a cautious representation of a situation which was certainly far worse. What 
is undisputable is the fact that Smallpox had by this time become the most virulent 
and deadly disease of its age.  
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Set within such a context, it is therefore easier to understand why early attempts to 
control the disease have attracted such a heroic interpretation. During the 
eighteenth century, Smallpox was effectively transformed from the feared “angel of 
death” 122into a preventable infection. This was through two medical procedures 
known as inoculation123 and vaccination.124 Although Smallpox was not yet at the 
point of being eradicated, vaccination in particular saw a considerable fall in 
mortality rates. Moreover, these early attempts to control Smallpox were still 
significant in the way they represented a new paradigm in terms of replacing the 
traditional approach to treating illness to one of preventing its appearance in the 
first place. 
 In the current historiography, this continues to be described as one of the early 
successful examples to implement what can be claimed to be the first exercise in 
managing a person’s health. Also, the fact that this was also initiated by civilian 
medical practitioners lends itself to the persistent argument that all attempts to 
improve the way in which people lived was a success which lay firmly with the 
achievements of civilian society. The focus of this chapter and others contained in 
this thesis is therefore to redress this incorrect assumption not only from a factual 
perspective but by also establishing a definitive argument which sees commissioned 
medical practitioners as pivotal in the development of preventative health. 
Furthermore, the motivation which lay behind this was the understanding that 
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would not only help ensure a strong army and navy but also bring benefits to 
society at large.  
The process of inoculation was far from being a new way of controlling Smallpox. Its 
early history can certainly be traced to China and Turkey where it had become an 
indigenous method of Smallpox prevention.125 The process involved giving live 
Smallpox matter to healthy individuals in order to promote a mild but controllable 
outbreak of the disease. An informal description of inoculation first reached Britain 
as early as 1701, though it was to be fourteen years before a more formal account 
was sent to the Royal Society.126Since its inception in 1662, the aim of the Royal 
Society had been to create an institution where scientific knowledge would be 
promoted on Baconian principles.127 For this to be achieved, there had to be 
rejection of rhetoric in favour of experiment and verifiable fact, an aim firmly 
embedded in the Society’s own motto “Nullius in Verba”128. The Society’s interest in 
curiosities, particularly of a human variety, soon became an established part of its 
identity, although there were concerns that this was detracting from the pursuit of 
real science.129 The relative openness of the Royal Society in terms of general 
membership also ensured that a significant cross-section of society were 
represented. The emphasis on science and medicine also attracted members from 
the army and the navy at a time when there were few other similar forums for 
professional development. The respect given to these members was officially 
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acknowledged when John Pringle became President from 1772-1778130. Although 
he remains the only military physician to have held the title, the list of Fellows at 
this time include a significant number of commissioned members. 
However, it was more than a willingness on the part of the Royal Society to discuss 
the unusual, which made it such an ideal forum for introducing the idea of 
inoculation. The Society’s own publication, Philosophical Transactions, 131attracted 
a growing readership and was accessible to both members and a wider audience 
who were able to subscribe. It was here that the first accounts of inoculation were 
printed in 1714, and as such marked the formal affiliation between the Royal 
Society and the introduction of inoculation. However the initial response appears to 
have been little more than a curious interest, due in part to their association with 
“heathen” countries such as Turkey and China. Questions relating to racial 
differences and the problems arising from any clear understanding as to how 
inoculation worked effectively delegated it to being little more than an intriguing 
type of folk medicine. Were it not for the decision taken by the Fellows of the Royal 
Society to openly endorse inoculation, it is unlikely that the procedure would have 
been introduced into Britain and used as a viable method of controlling the ravages 
of Smallpox.132 
In attempting to understand why such an influential group were prepared to 
promote such a radical idea as inoculation, Risse argues that it should be seen as 
nothing less than a planned response to what many saw as an imminent 
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constitutional crisis following the Duke of Gloucester’s fatal attack of Smallpox in 
1700.133 Support for this interpretation lies in the fact that Smallpox showed little 
regard for social status and was as virulent at Court as in the homes of rural and 
urban settlements.134 Moreover, many fellows of the Royal Society relied on 
patronage at the highest level which had to be protected both in terms of individual 
careers and the reputation of the Royal Society at large. Therefore the fear 
generated by the exacerbated by the continued problem of Smallpox was sufficient 
to promote a reassessment of the potential value of inoculation and begin studies 
to assess the validity of the procedure.135 
Whilst inoculation purported to offer protection from the worst excesses of 
Smallpox, it was not lost on the very earliest of its supporters that it incurred 
significant risks, not the least the ethical dilemma that infecting a healthy person 
could result in fatal disease. Therefore, whilst fellows and members of the Royal 
Society might see the potential surrounding the introduction of using inoculation, 
until its safety could be assured there was little chance of further endorsement. 
Alongside a number of high profile public inoculations, the Royal Society chose to 
undertake a systematic programme of trials from April 1721 to March 1722. They 
were facilitated by Sir Hans Sloane who in addition to being President of the Royal 
Society, Physician-General to the army and member of the highly influential Court 
Whigs, was considered to be the most qualified to pass judgement on their success. 
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136The involvement of Sir Hans Sloane should also be seen in terms of presenting 
these trials as the first example of state-led medical intervention in Britain. Under 
the direction of a group of physicians representing the Royal Society, nine 
experimental inoculations took place on criminals, children and orphans. 
Considering the risk this involved, and the vulnerability of those selected, Wilson, 
who has made a detailed study of each case, claims that this was nothing less than 
State-endorsed human experimentation.137 Moreover the fact that these 
experiments were ordered to be carried out in public rather than within the relative 
privacy of a medical environment, can be taken as further evidence that inoculation 
was an initiative driven by political motive, in which the risks incurred by a few 
could be off-set by the benefits which would become accessible to the rest of 
society. 
The early introduction of inoculation was not always met with approval. One of the 
earliest opponents was Rev. Edward Massey, a leading theologian and well-known 
Tory, who denounced the procedure as an unholy attempt to intervene with the 
Will of God.138 Theological concerns were not unusual but when presented in 
conjunction with established Tory ideals, men such as Massey were considered to 
be far more of a problem, in terms of providing a vigorous and effective opposition 
to inoculation. In order to curtail such support, it appears that Massey himself 
became the victim of intense questioning regarding his personal loyalty to the 
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country which he addressed in the publication of an open letter. In this he 
denounced the fact that any questions relating to the morality of inoculation had 
become “a diagnostic of a man’s affection or dissatisfaction to the government”139 
and went on to condemn Dr. Samuel Brady, army physician to the garrison at 
Portsmouth, for accusing him of harbouring Jacobite sympathies. This was a serious 
allegation which if found to be true, was regarded as nothing less than treason.  The 
willingness to associate opponents with anti-loyalist affiliations was an 
unprecedented event in the history of medicine, though it supports the 
interpretation that inoculation was in the early days a politically driven innovation. 
As late as 1747, Dr Charles Perry140, a physician from Stroud, argued that the failure 
of inoculation to become standard practice across the country was the unfortunate 
outcome of the alignment of religion with politics, adding that whilst Dissenters 
continued to join forces with the Whigs in support of inoculation, there still 
remained those “on the other side of the question” who would continue to oppose 
the procedure on both religious and political grounds141.    
Despite such an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility, there nevertheless emerged a 
gradual realisation that issues surrounding the safety of inoculation could not be 
addressed through public spectacles but needed to be developed within the 
guidelines of empirical medicine.  Only then could there be any assurance as to 
whether inoculation could provide a level of protection with the potential to ensure 
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personal good health across all sections of society. Views such as these can be seen 
in an early publication, written by a London surgeon, Legard Sparham142. He refused 
to recognise public experiments as proof that inoculation worked and called for 
further evidence undertaken specifically by members of the medical profession. 
Furthermore, he argued that this would also ensure that the general population 
who were already disadvantaged by a failing economy, would also be protected 
from the “wrong-judged indulgence” of state endorsed inoculation.143 His concerns 
are seen by his use of a military analogy when he argued 
Would it not be egregiously absurd in a Soldier, whose Life perchance in a 
Battle might fall a sacrifice to his country, first to request his Comrade to 
season him against Powder and Ball, by making Experiments at him at some 
Distance?144 
 
The views of men such as Sparham play a significant role in presenting the 
complexities surrounding both the introduction of inoculation and accompanying 
issues related to rights, responsibilities and the role of the state. Preventative 
medicine was, as yet, without a definition in Britain. Throughout the eighteenth 
century models representative of early welfare systems appeared in Europe such as 
that of medical police145, but these generally found little support in Britain, unlike 
Prussia, Sweden and France. Here, the tensions which existed between the rights of 
the individual, commercial needs and fear of state control prevented any chance of 
a centralised approach, which were essential if diseases such as Smallpox and other 
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highly virulent pathogens were to be effectively controlled, particularly in the 
absence of effective pharmacology. This was understood by men such as Dr Charles 
Perry, who in 1747 wrote the first of two treatises discussing the nature of Smallpox 
and the effects of inoculation.146 Perry was representative of a growing number of 
physicians who acknowledged that changes taking place in medicine had the 
potential to benefit all communities, but remained unsure as to whether this was a 
decision which could be left to the individual. He therefore concluded 
This Practice of Inoculation is not only a Blessing and a Benefit to Individuals, 
and to particular Communities and Societies, but ‘tis also a benefit to the 
State. For ‘tis most certain, that if it was universally practised throughout 
the King’s Dominions, the Lives of many thousands of His Majesty’s Subjects 
would annually be preserved by it.147 
 
Perry was clearly exploring the idea of compulsory inoculation but as yet remained 
unsure as to just how far this should be imposed. The questions of free will and 
duty was attracting the attention of European philosophers such as Kant (1724-
1804) whose work attempted to reach definitive answers regarding this type of 
moral dilemma. Although he personally opposed inoculation, Kant eventually chose 
to endorse the procedure on the grounds that the danger it posed by potentially 
inflicting disease in a healthy body was offset by the fact that it lessened the 
chances of contracting the more dangerous naturally acquired version of the 
disease. Furthermore he argued that as this was too complicated to be understood 
by the individual, inoculation should become the sole responsibility of the state 
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which in turn exonerated a citizen from having to rationalise a choice which 
potentially could have a fatal outcome.148 Although Kant had little direct impact on 
the medical literature relating to the use of inoculation as a way to protect against 
Smallpox in a civilian context, the arguments he presented would eventually 
become directly applicable in relation to the introduction of compulsory use by the 
British army and navy. The eighteenth century witnessed notable changes in 
relation to the status of the soldier and sailor, closely linked to their increasing 
value as a highly trained commodity which was now recognised as being worthy of 
sustained investment.149 However even at a time when the army and navy 
functioned from the perspective of unquestionable obedience, few in the military 
and naval hierarchy were prepared to impose such a personal infringement of 
human rights, which came with the question of inoculation. It also explains the 
readiness of the army and navy to use vaccination as its safety as a prophylactic 
removed the ethical dilemmas of imposing a possibly fatal procedure on an 
otherwise healthy individual. 
The views of Kant were not the only discussions regarding the morality of 
inoculation. A vast body of literature appeared throughout Europe and America in 
response to the controversy it generated from ethical, religious and social 
perspectives.150 However in Britain, questions relating to the safety of Smallpox 
became less relevant during the 1730s due to the disease entering one of its less 
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virulent phases. The number of inoculations therefore fell in response to the danger 
of infection being considered an acceptable risk. However this situation was rapidly 
reversed from the 1740’s to the beginning of the 1760’s which saw some of the 
worst Smallpox infection rates on record.151 Inoculation was once again bought to 
the forefront of public attention in terms of offering a level of safety from the worst 
excesses of the disease and the first mass inoculation programme was officially 
sanctioned in 1743. The governors of the newly created Foundling Hospital in 
London announced that all children over the age of three would be inoculated for 
free unless they had previously contracted natural Smallpox.152 Whilst the disease 
had the ability to infect a person at any age, it had long been recognised that a 
particularly vulnerable group were the very young. Moreover, there was extensive 
evidence that children who survived Smallpox also showed signs of lifelong natural 
immunity. Nevertheless it is significant that this programme was performed on a 
group who were denied any right to object, being both minors and orphans. There 
is no evidence relating to mortality rates from inoculation carried out in the 
Foundling Hospital though it is likely that this was considered to be a success as 
three years later a second mass inoculation programme was launched in the newly 
opened County Hospital for the Small-Pox in London. As well as offering inoculation, 
the hospital was the first of its kind to offer in-patient care for those infected with 
the disease. Similar institutions quickly appeared across Britain providing a range of 
early specialist healthcare. Although the creation of many was seen as an example 
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of the new philanthropy which emerged as an integral part of Enlightenment 
thinking, there was also a growing appreciation that inoculation was both a moral 
and civic duty.153 
Mass inoculation programmes such as these were also significant in that they 
provided for the first time incidence rates for a defined population which could be 
monitored and measured. The importance of quantifiable and comparable analysis 
remained a central argument in the Royal Society’s continued endorsement of 
inoculation. Only by comparing the mortality rates from naturally acquired 
Smallpox as opposed to inoculation could the safety of the latter actually be 
proved. This is what made the work of men such as James Jurin (1684- 1750) so 
important.154. As a doctor and leading iatromathematician of the day155, Jurin was 
recognised as being eminently well qualified to analyse and reach conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of inoculation, although his biased views favouring the 
procedure bought into question issues relating to impartiality. In 1723 he 
announced that on the basis of reports received from physicians such as Thomas 
Nettleton (1683-1742), it was possible to prove that the risk of dying from 
inoculation was “one out of 91”.156 157Jurin also emphasised its value by making 
projections regarding the danger of dying from naturally acquired Smallpox at 
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different periods of life. Although Jurin believed that inoculation was the only 
option to protect society, his methodology attracted widespread criticism 
particularly from men such as Isaac Massey, who argued that it could only be 
meaningful if it included control groups, distributed equally with regards age, sex 
and circumstance.158 It was the absence of this type of detailed information which 
also made Jurin’s work ineffective in terms of transferability. It also explains why 
medical officers in both the army and navy when implementing empirical 
methodologies accepted that in terms of testing theories and interventions, they 
were having to create their own detailed records for analysis, particularly as their 
civilian counterparts were as yet practicing medicine without the benefits of their 
use. 
Whilst the possible opportunities afforded by inoculation continued to dominate 
discussions relating to ways of controlling Smallpox, there nevertheless remained 
many who firmly believed that the most effective form of prevention lay in finding 
the initial cause of the disease, with particular emphasis being placed on how and 
where societies lived. The often challenging and changing relationship between 
human habitation and the natural environment has been discussed at great length 
by Glacken, whose work has been so significant in illustrating the level of 
complexity surrounding this aspect of human history.159 Certainly, early 
practitioners such as Hippocrates were prepared to acknowledge the influence of 
land, air and water in terms of possessing both a positive and detrimental effect on 
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human health.160 Moreover, over the centuries ideas such as these developed in 
ways which allowed them to continue to influence discussions relating to matters of 
health and provide diverse explanations as to what might lie behind the cause of 
disease and poor health. Consequently by the eighteenth sophisticated discussions 
relating to aspects such as the varying state of the atmosphere gained considerable 
creditability amongst medical communities when trying to identify potentially 
harmful influences on human health. In the same way, the association between 
noxious smells and disease became a familiar source of concern amongst both the 
lay and medical populations, even to the extent of developing its own terminology 
of miasma and putrefaction.161 One such adherent of these ideas was Dr John 
Arbuthnot (1667-1735) who as early as 1733 wrote specifically on the likely 
interaction of air and disease.162 However, it can be argued that the significance of 
this work has all too often been overlooked, in terms of the way he developed what 
was by this time a well-established theory in order for it to be more easily adapted 
in order to effectively respond to the many unfamiliar changes taking place across 
eighteenth century Britain. Consequently Arbuthnot claimed that it was not only 
possible to argue that air differed according to location, but also stated that it had 
the ability to act in different ways depending on the physical state of any given 
population. This is significant in that Arbuthnot was constructing a case which 
allowed for precautionary measures be taken in order to actively protect the most 
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vulnerable inhabitants from the worst excesses of human habitation.163 Moreover, 
Arbuthnot should be recognised as one of the earliest physicians to actively 
promote a model of preventative health, which involved a sense of direct action.  
Although Arbuthnot did not specifically discuss the needs of individual occupational 
group’s soldiers or name specific locations, his work nevertheless was responsible 
in terms of promoting a sense of duty and common benefit in relation to 
successfully locating the cause of diseases and then acting upon the knowledge 
acquired. Such views inspired a Plymouth physician, Dr John Huxham (1692-1768) 
to try and identify the worst sources of disease within the town. He became 
convinced that it was the bad air coming from confined spaces, such as jails and 
ships hulks, which was particularly responsible for the high levels of sickness 
amongst those most acutely affected, namely the prisoners and sailors who were 
forced to inhabit such spaces. Moreover, Huxham noted that when the sick were 
taken on shore from the notoriously filthy holds of naval vessels, this often proved 
to be highly detrimental to the local population, as it was “from these a contagion 
being also spread among the common people, it caused most terrible havoc.”164 
Huxham was therefore one of the first civilian medical practitioners who recognised 
that the poor state of troops and sailors inevitably impacted on the rest of society, 
and as such could not be allowed to be seen as simply a military or naval problem. 
Furthermore, he was increasingly concerned that certain diseases seemed to affect 
troops in a far more virulent way due to their already weakened constitution. This 
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was, according to Huxham particularly true for Smallpox which he believed affected 
soldiers and sailors to a far greater extent than their civilian counterparts. In an 
attempt to understand why this should be so, he initially focused on the poor 
physical condition of troops as a consequence of the way in which these men were 
forced to live. However, he later extended possible reasons to include the poor, 
almost non-existent moral standards associated with both the army and the navy. 
With reference to the epidemic of 1738 he therefore felt compelled to argue 
The Small-pox more still epidemical, but in general sufficiently favourable; 
however it carried off a great many amongst the sailors and soldiers; 
whether this was owing to their Bloods being more acrimonious and putrid, 
from their bad Diet, and their swallowing down large quantities of burning 
Spirits; or to the scorbutic Contagion, nay, and to other Causes, and very 
often to its being polluted from the venereal disease. This indeed is 
constantly remarked that every epidemic Fever is more fatal amongst this 
kind of people, than it is amongst the Towns-Men or the Country-People.165 
 
As yet, the problems of urbanisation had still to reach the appalling state which 
characterised much of the nineteenth century, though even in relatively remote 
towns such as Plymouth, city living was not without its problems. From 1700 to 
1750 it has been estimated that the prosperity of the town as both a dockyard and 
centre of industry led to the population increasing from eight to fifteen thousand 
inhabitants.166  As a local doctor Huxham’s concerns are therefore of immense 
relevance in terms of comparing the state of health relating to the civilian and 
military populations, and the professional concerns he had in relation to the latter 
particularly in relation to their susceptibility to disease. Huxham’s medical 
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reputation also gave his views particular credence. Although he never left 
Plymouth, he wrote extensively on a range of medical issues with his work being 
read widely across much of Europe.167 The views of men such as Huxham is 
therefore significant in identifying signs of a  new sense of shared responsibility 
when it came to finding ways of improving the physical state of soldiers and sailors 
on the grounds that they retained the right to be seen as members of the society 
they were ultimately protecting. 
Despite Huxham raising concerns regarding the propensity of Smallpox amongst 
soldiers and sailors, no other civilian medical practitioner continued with this 
particular medical discussion. However, it can be seen as marking the point at 
which military and naval medical officers to begin to take specific responsibility for 
the care of those under their command, supported by a nascent specialism which 
was significantly different to their civilian counterparts. In particular, these medical 
officers 168began to develop an interest in finding ways of actively preventing 
diseases rather than often ineffective treatment, which began with their 
endorsement of inoculation. The first example of this was seen in the work of Dr 
George Cleghorn (1716-1789), a graduate from Edinburgh University who in 1736 
accepted a commission as surgeon to the 22nd Regiment of Foot, stationed in 
Minorca. 169During the sixteen years spent on the island, Cleghorn used the 
opportunity to study in detail the military population in the hope of understanding 
the cause of disease and identifying the most appropriate treatments. The type of 
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medical training he had received as a student would later become replicated in 
what was recognised as typical of the Scottish model of medical teaching and 
learning.170 However Cleghorn was one of the first army doctors to combine his 
study of botany, materia medica, chemistry and medicine in such a confined setting 
to analyse the influence of climate and environment on the health of troops. He 
also made use of the freedom to dissect humans and apes171 which provided him 
with extensive and accurate anatomical knowledge.172 
Cleghorn published his findings in 1751, based on an empirical methodology which 
was replicated in many subsequent military and naval medical texts of the age.173 
The diseases he discussed were those he found to be most common amongst the 
military population. Although there are no direct references to Arbuthnot, the 
influence of this work is seen in the way Cleghorn emphasised the dangers of 
unfamiliar environment and climate which he saw as being detrimental to the 
health of Smallpox soldiers stationed in garrisons away from Britain.174 In relation to 
the problem of, Cleghorn provided a study, the likes of which had as yet been 
notably absent in the inoculation debate. By recording in detail how the disease 
affected the island’s population through a series of epidemics, he was able to study 
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the transmission and treatment of Smallpox in particular detail.175He also made a 
study of inoculation which, after much consideration, he felt able to endorse on the 
grounds that it had proved itself to be safe for those who underwent the 
procedure.176  
The work of Cleghorn is therefore significant in the way it established military 
medicine as an emerging specialism in its own right aware that it required a distinct 
set of approaches in order to manage the many medical issues which continued to 
be found amongst soldiers and sailors. Furthermore, it defined the need for 
preventative medicine, aware that the only way illness could be effectively 
managed was by limiting the rate of incidence. However, what made Cleghorn’s 
views particularly significant in relation to this research was the way in which he 
promoted the belief that preventative intervention could only be sustained and 
effective if it were applied uniformly to not just military and naval populations but 
also the rest of society civilian health. This view is outlined in the Preface when he 
argued 
Would all who practice physic in our factories and colonies abroad embrace 
the opportunity which their situation affords, to make proper observations 
on the sick, and communicate them to the public, we should soon have a 
more exact and ample history of disease, than we are yet possessed of; and 
future practitioners would be enabled to shun the dangers into which many 
have fallen, and to conduct those committed to their care through the 
disorder to which they are exposed, with satisfaction and honour to 
themselves, and no small benefit to their country.177 
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The views of Cleghorn were of such validity that they considered as being worthy of 
replication by subsequent medical officers. Such men ensured that military 
medicine would, from this point, be increasingly defined as a commitment to 
preventative health, which in order to be fully effective, had to be applied to the 
British population in its entirety. This was far more than a response to the 
government of the day calling for troops to be cared for as a valuable 
commodity.178 Instead, it should be seen as a professional response by medical 
officers in both armed forces who intrinsically understood why the state of health 
of all members of British society was fundamental to securing the nation was to be 
maintained, and early colonial aspirations achieved. 
The commitment by medical officers to eradicating the worst excesses of disease 
was motivated by more than a commitment to an ideology. Disease amongst 
soldiers and sailors was a growing problem which had the ability to affect ever 
increasing numbers.179 One of the starkest examples of this occurred in 1740 when 
of the 6,000 strong  British force which set sail from Spithead, nine out of ten 
soldiers perished from disease, many of which were Smallpox victims.180 Not only 
was this unacceptable, it was also made worse by the fact that there had clearly 
been little progress since Admiral Hosier’s earlier disastrous expedition of 1726 
which saw the eradication of over ninety percent of the accompanying crews .181 
Britain’s commitment to the Austrian War of Succession (1740-1748) can therefore 
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be seen as marking a significant change in attitude regarding the inexcusable loss of 
thousands of troops to disease rather than battle. This is seen in the work of John 
Pringle, whose successful career as a military physician earned him the soubriquet 
“father of military medicine.”182 His work focused on the importance of 
understanding the cause of disease which he linked to the presence of different 
types of dirt.183 From these came what he termed pestilential or putrid fever, both 
of which was the cause of disease.184 To date, little attention has been paid 
regarding his views on the control of Smallpox. This is due, in part, to his limited 
discussion on the disease in “Observations.” 185However, the omission was likely to 
have been intentional as Smallpox was not particularly prevalent during the 
campaigns in which he served.186 However, in Pringle’s private papers, more 
commonly known as “Annotations”187 there is extensive evidence of his 
professional interest in Smallpox, which led to him collating a wide range of 
information in order to understand both effective treatment of Smallpox and assess 
the true value of inoculation. This was very much an extension of Cleghorn’s work, 
which Pringle credited and actively promoted.188 However, Pringle also recognised 
the need to expand on existing knowledge which involved communication with 
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medical practitioners both in Britain and Europe who were using inoculation in 
numbers which would facilitate a better sense of its true and lasting value.189  
Pringle’s approach to inoculation exemplified the importance of empirical medicine 
amongst a new generation of military and naval medical officers. His own influences 
came from a medical education shared between Leiden and Edinburgh, which 
played such a major role in forming his commitment to rational, scientific medicine. 
This is seen in the way he promoted the views of Dr William Hillary (1697-1763) 
who as early as 1735 had warned the medical profession against placing their blind 
faith in inoculation, on the grounds that as yet the procedure was based not on 
science but on “fictitious hypotheses, and false principles”.190 Pringle recognised 
the importance of this entreaty and therefore sought to understand why 
inoculation worked, an obvious question but one which had not yet been answered 
by civilian practitioners. To locate pertinent and specific information, Pringle wrote 
letters to Dr William Watson (1717-1787), physician at the Foundling Hospital, the 
institution which had first inoculated a large number of orphans. His concerns are 
reflected in the very specific questions he asked and indicate that it was not the age 
of the children which interested him but the issues surrounding uniformity of 
procedure when inoculating a large number.191 There is no existing evidence that 
confirms Pringle’s early plans to extend this type of medical intervention into the 
army, although it would have been in many ways a logical step for him to take. 
However, his former career as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh 
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University may well have continued to exert considerable influence in relation to his 
views on compulsory as opposed to voluntary inoculation, emanating from the 
rights of the individual. Only after considerable studies, was he prepared to publicly 
endorse inoculation on the grounds that it appeared to pose little danger to the 
lives of those who chose to undergo this procedure.192  
The extent to which military and naval medical staff such as Pringle considered the 
range of implications which accompanied new theories and practices, should be 
taken as evidence of a new level of training which originated in the universities. The 
combination of theory and the soon to be acquired practice acquired on the 
battlefield, resulted in a type  of medical officers who increasingly found 
themselves projecting the voice of authority in relation to the health of men placed 
under their care. However, their position and degree of authority within the regular 
army and navy remained ambiguous for much of the century and was only 
improved with a series of reforms. This question of status is significant in terms of 
understanding the extent to which military and naval medical officers considered 
themselves to be in a position to facilitate change in relation to both the military 
and civilian population. This has been briefly discussed by Rodger in terms of the 
situation in the navy.193 He presents the relationships of the Admiralty and Navy 
Board and the different medical corporations194 as a conscious attempt to 
undermine the civilian medical profession in order to gain a position of authority. 
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He also argues that this lay behind the decision taken by the Admiralty to allow 
naval medical staff to practice as “general practitioners” among civilian populations 
when not required for naval duties, even though some were likely to be without the 
requisite formal education.195 The situation with regards the army was made more 
complex due to the constant changes which took place amongst the notoriously 
fractious Army Medical Department.196 197However military medical officers also 
appear to have considered themselves well placed to enter into general medical 
discussions. Many also played an active role in civilian communities when not 
required or retired from military duties. To date, no significant research has been 
undertaken in look in detail at the interaction of medical staff beyond the confines 
of the ship or barracks. However, just in relation to the control of Smallpox, men 
such as Samuel Brady were known to promote inoculation as a medical practitioner 
in Portsmouth and later James Forbes proved to be equally enthusiastic in 
promoting vaccination in Chichester having overseen it’s seen its introduction as 
Inspector of Army Hospitals.198  
The high levels of disease during the Austrian War of Succession (1740-1748) served 
to reinforce the idea that the preservation of health amongst troops was of 
increasing importance. Diseases such as Typhus and Dysentery caused the greatest 
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number of deaths amongst the British army.199 In the case of Smallpox, the 
numbers were relatively low though the fear of contagion was never distant. The 
death of Emperor Joseph from the disease not only cost the Hapsburg dynasty the 
Spanish succession, but served as a timely reminder that it showed little 
discrimination regarding its victims.200 Britain’s decision to withdrawal from the 
War of Succession provided a timely and much needed respite. Pringle’s attention 
to removing what he considered to be causes of disease was certainly significant in 
helping keep the mortality rate from disease at an acceptable level. The sick and 
wounded admissions for the entire war were totalled 32,246, of which 2,563 
died.201 Although figures such as these were not excessive for the time, they were 
still far higher than the country could afford to ignore. Consequently the focus on 
implementing preventative health measures in both the army and the navy 
remained a priority. 
 The problem was exacerbated by the fact that within eight years the country was 
yet again preparing for war. Such a short interlude had not been sufficient time to 
restore the strength of the army and navy in terms of both equipment and 
manpower. Although the British army continued to rely heavily on mercenaries and 
recruitment parties to meet the numbers of soldiers constantly required, the varied 
success of both approaches increasingly showed the value of investing in the living 
conditions and health of serving soldiers, many of whom were highly experienced 
and difficult to replace. Chakrabarti argues that this significant change in attitude 
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arose from economic considerations, namely, that it was becoming increasingly 
cheaper to invest in the medical care of established, well-trained troops, than 
discard them when they became ill, only to be replaced by untested recruits202. In 
support of this view, one begins to see military and naval physicians being granted 
greater influence regarding matters of health, both on and beyond the battlefield, 
and were at the forefront of initiating change with the aim of maintaining a 
professional, cost-effective and physically able fighting force. Medical officers were 
also tasked with ensuring that all recruits met an agreed standard of health and 
physical well-being.203 In reality, this intention was more often honoured rather 
than implemented, especially when the numbers demanded by the army and navy 
always greatly exceeded those actually acquired from standard recruitment drives. 
Nevertheless physical examinations became increasingly common policy in military 
life, and included reporting if a recruit showed signs of previous infection of 
Smallpox through the tell-tale pock scars. This was always recorded as a favourable 
outcome, as it indicated immunity against further Smallpox infection.  
The army physician, Richard Brocklesby (1722-1797), wrote a highly influential text 
on the state of military hospitals and the diseases most commonly found amongst 
the troops .204 In this work he too recognised the challenge of maintaining the 
health of the army, particularly when it came to improving the general conditions 
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most soldiers were forced to endure. He was also concerned by the inequalities 
surrounding the preservation of health of soldiers stating  
Diseases of all kinds, in war time, commit greater waste on all those who 
follow an army, and rage continually with more desolating havock amongst 
soldiers, than amongst any order of men in civil society.205 
It is interesting to note the way in which medical officers were becoming 
increasingly open about the fact that, battle casualties aside, life in the army was 
clearly not conducive to maintaining a state of good health. Brocklesby emphasised 
this in relation to Smallpox when he wrote 
Small-pox is more destructive, in every army in England, than any other 
acute disease ; (considering the proportion of those who have it, after they 
enter themselves into it.) In short, by an estimate which I have framed, from 
the relations I have had from several regimental Surgeons, in the late war; 
the Small-pox carried off about one, out of a little more than four of those 
who were at any time seized with it, in the natural way, during our late 
encampments, and in winter quarters.206 
 
 Brockelsby therefore became increasingly attracted to the idea of introducing 
inoculation, though before he could openly promote such an intervention, he 
acknowledged the need to assess its impact and be assured of its safety. To achieve 
this within a feasible period of time, he avoided any detailed studies of regiments 
on the grounds that they were too large, but instead chose to focus on the militia. 
These were not only smaller units, but were generally found in rural locations and 
so were easier to assess. He therefore began to collate the detailed information he 
needed in order to evaluate the true worth of inoculation. On completing his study, 
Brocklesby confirmed 
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In some militia regiments, submitted to good notions of subordination, on 
account of the difference of the natural and artificial small-pox, near one 
third of the numbers such county regiments consisted of were inoculated; 
and out of one hundred and seventy men, so treated, in one regiment, only 
one was lost by this beneficial improvement.207 
 
This type of detailed, small scale analysis had already taken place in a civilian 
context through the work of Dr. Thomas Nettleton (1683-1742) whose studies of 
individual towns had been instrumental in providing Jurin at the Royal Society with 
the data he needed for his own quantifiable analysis.208 However, such an approach 
had not been repeated until the work of Brocklesby which enhanced the value of 
using specific groups in order to trial preventative strategies such as inoculation. 
It was particularly apt that whilst Brocklesby was attempting to gather further 
evidence relating to the safety of inoculation in Britain, the disease presented a 
series of unprecedented problems in North America. The presence of British troops 
was identified as being the source of contagion amongst local populations.209 
Moreover, the problem was exacerbated by the number of troops sent out to fight, 
who had not received inoculation, and had failed to contract Smallpox naturally. 
One of the most common reasons for failure to undergo inoculation was the 
personal expense, which remained high until the appearance of the Sutton family 
whose methods considerably reduced the cost.210211 A further problem arose from 
the unavoidable period of illness and contagiousness which followed all 
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inoculations. Whilst the British army facilitated the cost through payments to those 
regimental doctors who inoculated troops, the only way of limiting the spread of 
the disease was to find ways of isolating such men until they were fully recovered. 
However the problem as to why so many recruits had escaped Smallpox was more 
complicated. Brocklesby suggested that there were two reasons for this, namely  
the ineffectiveness of inoculation, and the moral status of troops which he believed 
was often so bad that this made some continuously predisposed towards all 
illnesses, and consequently unable to benefit from preventative interventions.212 
If medical officers called into doubt the value of inoculation based on inherent 
traits, 213the rest of the military infrastructure were far less willing to turn away 
from seeing the procedure as anything other than beneficial. Captain Bennett 
Cuthbertson argued 
Soldiers, who have not had the small pox, being subject to many distresses, 
by constant apprehensions, and the chance of taking it on a March, or at 
other times, when it is not in the power of Officers to extend their care, in a 
manner agreeable to their wishes, should have it strongly recommended to 
them to undergo inoculation, as a certain means of saving many lives, it 
being well known, that the unprepared state in which that distemper 
generally finds a soldier’s blood, renders the taking of it, in a natural way, 
too often attended with very fatal consequences, even though 
circumstances admit their being treated with the utmost tenderness.214 
 
The preference taken by the military authorities to rely on the moral imperative 
rather than make inoculation compulsory was considered to be the only option at 
the time in relation to controlling Smallpox. However in the second half of the 
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eighteenth century the ambivalent approach towards inoculation was increasingly 
questioned both in relation to the persistently high death rate from Smallpox and 
the fact that survivors were all too often economically unproductive. One area 
where this could be clearly identified was in the way that many of those who 
survived infantile Smallpox were affected in terms of stunted adult height. This had 
implications for military recruitment, particularly in response to the new emphasis 
being placed on physical standards. In order to see if this was so, evidence was 
collected by the Marine Society, established in 1756 by the philanthropist Jonas 
Hanway (1712-1786). He had initially created the Society as a way of offering 
unemployed or orphaned boys, once they reached the age of fourteen, training as 
servants to naval officers215 or given the opportunity to join either the Royal or 
merchant navy. Most of these boys came with little or no previous connection with 
the navy216 and were taken from the poorest sections of both rural and urban 
locations. In reality, the Marine Society also provided an opportunity for Hanway to 
promote his own extreme views regarding the benefits of inoculation especially 
amongst the poor217.  He directed the Marine Society to keep registers of the boys’ 
height and any previous history of Smallpox.218 Between 1770 and 1772, 638 boys 
were recorded in the registers with 610 marked as being victims of Smallpox. From 
1772 to 1778, registers also had additional columns for the specific purpose of 
recording those who had been inoculated. It is interesting that no existing register 
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contains evidence of this particular information ever having been recorded. An 
explanation for this is possibly found in Hanway’s own account of the Marine 
Society when he wrote that boys were offered inoculation which was performed 
once their consent had been given.219 Whether this was a somewhat questionable 
way of creating a way of encouraging young boys to agree to the procedure or 
simply a failure to collect additional information will remain unknown. However the 
records have since attracted contemporary research in an attempt to discover 
whether Smallpox was responsible for reducing the height of young males by one 
inch.220 This remains a fiercely contested area of social and epidemiological 
history.221 Nevertheless the relevance of this research is such that it adds to the 
complex history of Smallpox in the eighteenth century and illustrates the type of 
concerns voiced amongst both the military and civilian populations. 
Despite a general consensus regarding the growing threat of Smallpox, the overall 
rate of inoculations remained low. Donald Monro (1727-1802 had seen the 
devastation caused by Smallpox during his posting during the Seven Years’ War, and 
retained a sense of concern when he returned to his civilian post at St Georges 
Hospital, London. Aware of the need for further information regarding the safety of 
inoculation, he began a detailed communication with Dr John Quiers (1738-1822), a 
British physician working on the slave plantations in Jamaica. Quiers was 
responsible for maintaining the health of slaves working on the island, which 
involved overseeing compulsory inoculation. Recognising the unique opportunity 
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this provided, he took every opportunity to test inoculation on men, women and 
children in ways which could not have been done back in Britain.222 Despite the 
often graphic account of his experiments in letters he sent to Monro, these were 
still published in Medical Transactions, which appear to have elicited no adverse 
response from the readership223. In a modern context, Quiers’ work does raise 
serious ethical questions224, though he made no reference to the experiments being 
performed on slaves from what would be seen today as a racial and inhumane 
perspective. Instead he explained how he focused on the effects of climate and 
local environment and the ways it shaped the physiology of both slaves and 
indigenous populations in relation to medical procedures such as inoculation. This 
would have been recognised by Monro as being particularly significant in terms of 
Britain’s plans for colonial expansion, as well as providing further evidence relating 
to the safety of early attempts to control Smallpox prior to making it compulsory. 
Whilst the civilian and military population therefore continued to engage in 
inoculation, all be it in a piecemeal way, few were prepared for the way in which 
Smallpox would became a major issue, following Britain’s decision in 1775 to 
protect her colonial possessions in North America.225 Much has been written on 
Smallpox in the colonies prior to and during the war with Britain due to the extent it 
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affected both local populations and the British army.226 Infamous epidemics such as 
that in Montreal had earlier left the American army seriously undermanned, whilst 
British soldiers initially showed a marked level of immunity as recorded by men 
such as Dr Benjamin Rush and Dr Schoeff, Director of the Hessian Medical Services. 
227 This was certainly due to a large number being seasoned campaigners, who 
managed to avoid Smallpox either through previous natural infection or from 
inoculation. 228However as the war in North America gained momentum, army 
reports began to record a significant increase in the number of British soldiers 
falling victim to the disease. In places such as Boston, there were accounts of up to 
three British soldiers dying each day.229 Figures such as these prompted a rapid 
response from civilian and military sources. In Britain, the Gentleman’s Magazine 
called for a widespread programme of inoculation amongst the poor, stating that it 
was the only way of preventing further loss of life, either in a military or civilian 
context.230 Meanwhile British troops in North America were offered inoculation if 
they had not had Smallpox, whilst those who refused were removed from their 
Regiments and placed in quarantine until the state of their health had been 
determined. There is no evidence of punitive action being taken against those who 
refused, but the army had always been keen to find ways of introducing a 
programme of compulsory inoculation. As early as 1756 the First Regiment of Foot 
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had been inoculated and later in 1772 Brigade Orders for the Foot Guards issued 
the following: 
The men of the Several Companys who have not had the smallpox, to be 
asked if they chuse to be Inoculated and those Men absenting thereto, 
means will be used to have them Inoculated agreeable to their desire, such 
as do not chuse it will be at the same time signify it to the pay Serjeants of 
the Different Companys, and make reports to M gen (sic) Slater as soon as 
possible.231  
 
It is clear from this Order that the army still felt unable to issue notice that 
inoculation would become a compulsory procedure, even though the volatile 
nature of Smallpox played an immense role in the events of the American War of 
Independence. The disease was used not only as a form of germ warfare but was 
considered sufficiently important for George Washington to oppose Congress and 
order his army to undergo mass inoculation programmes as a way of limiting the 
number of soldiers lost to the disease.232However, the situation regarding the 
British army changed significantly during the siege of Boston.233The British army 
was desperately trying to hold the town when Smallpox appeared amongst the 
troops. This led General Sir William Howe to act promptly to halt the spread of the 
disease. His Orderly Book shows that between November and December, 1775, he 
gave orders for accurate numerical records to be made of all soldiers who had 
previously been infected with Smallpox.234 On receiving this information he gave 
                                                          
231 Brigade Orders 1769-1774. P.439 
232 Elizabeth Fenn, Pox Americana the Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (Stroud: Sutton, 2001). 
Chapter 2. In this chapter Fenn discusses at length the problems faced by a reluctance in the 
colonies to introduce inoculation which was regarded as an immense danger, alongside the need to 
provide the army and militias with a form of protection. The complexity of Washington’s ultimate 
decision is recorded in this work. 
233 Ibid. 
234 General Sir William Howe's Orderly Book at Charlestown, Boston and Halifax, June 17th 1775 to 
1776, 26th May,  (London: Benjamin Franklin Stevens, 1890). 
94 
 
unprecedented orders that all soldiers who had not been infected, should be 
inoculated with immediate effect. The compulsory nature of this intervention must 
have caused great concern, as only six days later the order was changed to one of 
now encouraging troops to undergo inoculation. Nevertheless, Howe still allowed 
self-inoculation235 amongst the civilian population of Boston, which he followed 
with an order for three hundred men, women and children to immediately leave 
the town236. Washington interpreted this as nothing less than an attempt to spread 
Smallpox amongst his own army and ordered that the same civilians were kept 
isolated from all military personnel. It is unfortunate that no official records have 
been found relating to Howe’s personal decision regarding inoculation. His 
leadership style was known to be autocratic and unpopular within the military and 
government, and disastrous events in Boston provided the government with the 
opportunity to call for his return to Britain. It is therefore reasonable to deduce that 
his actions relating to inoculation were untenable even in such extreme 
circumstances and failed to take into consideration contemporary and strongly 
entrenched beliefs relating to the autonomy of the lowliest foot soldier. 
When General Clinton took charge of the British army in North America, no further 
orders were passed regarding the control of Smallpox except for those posted north 
into Canada. Here, the army physician Dr Thomas Dickson Reide continued to 
inoculate any willing soldiers as well as loyalist families arriving from New York. The 
threat of Smallpox amongst civilians was now regarded as a major problem and 
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they were therefore kept segregated from military personnel.  Dickson Reide was 
also concerned by the spread of Smallpox to towns in Canada as well as amongst 
the settlements of native Indians. In order to overcome any financial concerns 
amongst such vulnerable people, he personally covered the cost of all inoculations. 
After the war Dickson Reide continued his interest in understanding the cause and 
effect of dirt and disease in a civilian setting. He argued that crowded, unplanned 
cities, unwholesome poor diet, unskilful treatment of the sick, filth and hazardous 
climatic conditions contributed to the cause and spread of diseases in ways which 
pre-empted the later Public Health movement.237 However not all of his work was 
valued by contemporaries, particularly with regards to his later views on Smallpox. 
He became an outspoken opponent of the idea that the disease spread due to it 
being infectious and returned to the idea of some people, namely the poorest, had 
an innate predisposition, although he believed that this could be offset by a more 
wholesome way of life. 
The war in North America in 1783 had not only been a disaster for Britain but also 
served as an unwelcome reminder that Smallpox was still one of the most 
dangerous threats to life. It had also shown the ineffectiveness of inoculation as a 
public health intervention, either in terms of being administered to sufficient 
numbers and in the fact that questions continued to be unanswered regarding its 
effectiveness. Medical officers had also been unable to reconcile moral, ethical and 
religious issues due to the conflict of rank and personal autonomy. As a result of 
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this, inoculation was never actively promoted amongst soldiers, although Smallpox 
continued to be monitored amongst all recruits.  
With an end to the war in North America, Smallpox returned to being a civilian 
concern as seen in the work of Dr. John Haygarth (1740-1827). Although he held no 
military or naval posting, like many civilian practitioners, he had been concerned by 
the high incidence of Smallpox during the war. However it was the return of 
soldiers to Britain and the state in which many existed which led to him studying 
the danger this presented to civilian populations. It was the poor state of army 
camps stationed outside of Chester, the town where he had been appointed as 
physician to the local infirmary which first attracted his attention.238The area was 
commonly used to temporarily house newly raised regiments and whilst there was 
no evidence that their state of health was significantly worse, the lack of discipline 
compared to established garrisons created an array of problems. Furthermore, 
many of the soldiers in Chester came from Ireland, and were greatly affected by 
diseases caused by the poverty they left behind.   Haygarth had been particularly 
concerned when he came into contact with one soldier suffering from Smallpox 
who had managed to escape the confines of the barracks. On making further 
enquiries he was concerned to find that soldiers in transit to different postings were 
generally left unattended and he concluded that this was a major cause of disease 
appearing in towns such as Chester.239 
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Haygarth’s response to controlling Smallpox involved establishing a medical and 
philanthropic society in Chester as well as writing two influential publications.240 
Using numerical evidence to prove that the disease was responsible for 
approximately one-third of all childhood deaths in the town,241 Haygarth believed 
that the only way to control Smallpox was to implement enforced programmes of 
inoculation, supported by policing and the use of fines. His plans received 
endorsement from the medical profession, though they did not attract similar 
support from the government. Lobo suggests that this was due to Haygarth’s 
association with Dissenters.242 However it is more likely to have arisen from his 
belief in compulsory and therefore expensive social reform at a time when the 
British government was now deeply committed to war against Revolutionary 
France. Furthermore it was generally seen as inadvisable to make inoculation 
compulsory at a time when the rights of the individual were so central to political 
ideology. In the same way that failure to support the early introduction of 
inoculation had been linked to Jacobite sympathies, so questions of compulsion 
were equally associated with despotic and undemocratic action and a threat to 
personal liberty. The plans of Haygarth therefore attracted no further support, even 
from the military and naval medical departments. Instead he joined forces with 
early sanitary reformers such as Percival243, and moved into ways of improving the 
living conditions of those in towns such as nearby Manchester.  
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In 1793 the war with Revolutionary France bought an end to the brief interlude in 
military and naval commitments. In the ten years since the defeat in North America, 
both the army and the navy had been left in a state of neglect, and the call to arms 
showed just how unprepared the country really was in terms of ensuring its security 
against foreign invasion. At the time it was estimated that there were only 15,000 
regular troops in Britain244 the rest being stationed in both the East and West Indies 
to protect the country’s growing colonial territories. To make up this deficit, 
attention turned to the local militia whose members were now forcibly drafted.245 
As part of the recruitment process, militiamen who had previously escaped 
Smallpox were quietly inoculated along with any new recruits rounded up for the 
army and navy. The high number requiring the procedure surprised military medical 
officers. Even Woodfall’s Register of 1793 announced that many Sussex militiamen 
were having to undergo inoculation, the same situation being true of Essex and 
much of Gloucestershire.246  The reality was that despite the cheaper methods on 
offer and local parish initiatives, the actual number who were inoculated in Britain 
remained comparatively small.247 The many advertisements offering inoculation 
which appeared in the provincial papers of the day suggest that inoculation was 
economically viable for doctors wishing to offer it to patients but there are no 
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reliable records as to how many people undertook this form of prevention against 
the ravages of Smallpox.248 
The 1790s was also significant in relation to the interest shown by the navy with 
regards inoculation. Although the disease was not uncommon amongst sailors, 
greater attention was paid to prevent its appearance once crews were at sea where 
the outcome would have been fatal. The common procedure of quarantining ships 
to avoid crews being infected by diseases was not always followed, but it was 
generally recognised by ships captains and crew as being a reliable way of ensuring 
the good health of all on board prior to setting sail on what were increasingly long 
journeys. This new interest in Smallpox was very much the initiative of Thomas 
Trotter (1760-1832) who was appointed Physician to the Channel Fleet in 1794. 
Trotter was particularly interested in Smallpox and discussed it in great detail in his 
work, “Medicina Nautica”.249 It was here that he acknowledged that the greatest 
danger to a ship’s crew came from new recruits, often described as “raw.” He also 
noted that many of these men came from rural settings and had not acquired the 
same level of immunity to diseases, such as Smallpox, as those who were recruited 
from urban populations. There was therefore a need to stop recruits being a source 
of contagion, which in the case of Smallpox, meant inoculation. Unlike his military 
colleagues, Trotter openly “admonished”250 those men who were reluctant to 
undergo inoculation, despite reassurance that the procedure was safe. Similarly, to 
those who opposed on religious grounds he added 
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We combatted this objection with the usual arguments, that Providence had 
put into our power the means of escaping a dreadful distemper by a trifling 
operation, and that it was impious in human beings to neglect it. They felt 
our advice more sensibly when they were told, that we considered it our 
duty to instruct them for their welfare, and that our only motive was their 
safety, for they were not to be compelled to undergo inoculation; but act as 
they pleased. 
 
The theological concerns regarding inoculation had been voiced from the very first 
days of its appearance in Britain, as seen in the sermons of Massey.251In the 
intervening years, religion had been replaced by politics in terms of presenting 
inoculation as an intervention which had the potential to affect the security of the 
nation. Yet from the 1780s, the Admiralty welcomed a renewed evangelical 
movement, led by a group of officers more familiarly known as the Blue Light, as 
part of a wider movement to bring about both moral and physical reforms in the 
navy. The importance of belief, either in the form of religion or superstition, was 
attributed by Blake as a way for sailors to deal with the isolation from their homes, 
often for years at a time.252The Admiralty had always appointed ships Chaplin’s, but 
unlike their military counterparts, they dealt with a very different set of 
circumstances. Trotter would have been aware of this and consequently framed his 
response to theological objections to inoculation with particular care, though not 
without reference to personal guilt and the personal duty to follow religious creed. 
Trotter was also aware of the danger of shore leave as an opportunity for sailors to 
be infected with any manner of diseases, including Smallpox.253 In works such as 
                                                          
251 Edmund Massey, "A Sermon against the Dangerous and Sinful Practice of Inoculation, Preach'd at 
St Andrew's Holbourn, on Sunday July the 8th, 1722," (London1722). 
252 Richard Blake, Evangelicals in the Royal Navy, 1775-1815: Blue Lights and Psalm-Singers 
(Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2008). P.6 
253 Trotter, "Medicina Nautica." P.386 
101 
 
Materia Nautica254 one finds him increasing identifying the greatest dangers faced 
by soldiers and sailors as those which came from the civilian population they were 
tasked with protecting. Such views are significant in that they indicate a reversal 
regarding the source of contagion since the concerns first raised by Huxham.255 
However, medical officers had little control over the interaction between sailors 
and civilian society, which often made preventative measures of limited value. In 
such a context, the events of 1798 with Jenner’s discovery of vaccination were 
therefore of immense significance in relation to finally finding a way to control 
Smallpox across all sections of society. Jenner used cowpox as a prophylactic 
intervention to prevent Smallpox in a procedure he called “vaccination.256 Despite 
his inability to prove how it worked, it nevertheless attracted considerable 
attention as it was considered to be both safer and more effective than inoculation, 
which was increasingly discarded. Although there were those such as the Anti-
Vaccination Society who demanded more research from Jenner in order to provide 
scientific proof that vaccination really did prevent Smallpox, the government did 
not share these concerns and rewarded him with two impressive financial grants. 
Trotter also became one of the earliest outspoken supporters of Jenner as well as 
being the first naval surgeon to trial vaccination when, in 1800, Smallpox broke out 
on three naval ships.257 Due to Trotter’s personal and professional endorsement, 
vaccination was rapidly used by one Surgeon Veitch on the crew of HMS 
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Magnificent. 258This proved to be successful and Veitch also announced vaccination 
to be a most valuable form of preventative medicine.259 In response to growing 
support by its medical officers, the Sick and Hurt Board called for further 
independent trails to be carried out aboard HMS Triumph, though in reality there 
was little interest shown by all naval staff in terms of waiting for the official 
findings, with vaccination already being made available to all sailors who requested 
it.260  
In addition to affording Smallpox protection amongst its crews, the navy also 
quickly organised a programme of mass vaccination on Gibraltar, which held 
significant strategic importance for both the British army and navy. This was 
considered so successful in controlling further outbreaks of Smallpox amongst the 
local population that it led Trotter to call for a subscription to purchase a gold 
medal to be awarded to Jenner in grateful thanks of his achievement. This was 
presented in 1801261 and was the first national recognition awarded to Jenner in 
acknowledgement of his discovery of vaccination. However the true extent of 
Trotter’s conviction was seen in February 1801. Concerned by the growing voice of 
civilian concerns regarding vaccination, Trotter requested official endorsement of 
vaccination by the Admiralty and official commitment that it would not revoke its 
policy of promoting vaccination.262 Trotter also emphasised the importance of 
vaccination by claiming that there were still 10,000 men in the navy who did not 
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know if they had ever been infected with Smallpox. It was therefore a medical 
intervention which would not only protect the army and navy but would benefit all 
of society. He also clarified that whilst it was important to eventually secure a 
sound understanding of how vaccination worked, this should not detract from the 
real value of what it offered on the grounds that 
it is not in the nature of medical investigation long to resist the evidence of 
facts; and it is far less the province of medicine to check the current of 
charitable feelings, or to circumscribe the duties of benevolence. We must 
therefore hope that, while the Liberal discussion it has undergone shall 
secure the suffrages of the enlightened mind, the love of offspring will 
confirm its favourable reception through domestic life.263 
 
Despite Trotter’s eloquent and enduring support of vaccination, the strongest case 
came from the naval physician, Sir Gilbert Blane (1749-1834). His appeal for its 
adoption across all of society was printed in Medico-Chirurgical Transactions264 with 
the aim of shaming the country into acknowledging and questioning why 
vaccination had not become as widespread as it should. Simultaneously he also 
called on Jenner to provide the much needed evidence to prove that vaccination 
really was safe. However the most significant aspect of Blane’s argument lay in his 
opposition to the continued use of inoculation. He emphasised that Smallpox has 
been the greatest destroyer of life and whilst inoculation had shown some benefit 
in terms of limiting the danger of the disease, it still created an infected person. 
Therefore it was only vaccination which could be tasked with removing the danger 
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of Smallpox once and for all. 265Furthermore, to prove that inoculation increased 
the mortality rate from Smallpox, Blane used evidence taken from bills of mortality 
which included four defined periods as well as including a period prior to 
inoculation. Whilst claiming that the death rate from Smallpox increased during the 
two periods covered by inoculation, which was an early form of a control group, 
Blane also attempted to evaluate the impact of vaccination by applying the concept 
of projecting death rates if vaccination had not been discovered. Blane’s use of 
quantifiable analysis was not without significant flaws but it was pivotal in creating 
a scientific case for the support of vaccination which up to this point had been the 
main concerns raised by those opposing Jenner’s discovery.266 
Jenner’s discovery was also quickly endorsed by the army. The events of recent 
wars had served as a constant reminder that those in command could not become 
complacent regarding the ever-present dangers of Smallpox. Therefore the Army 
Medical Board selected the 85th Foot based in Colchester and the Coldstream 
Guards in London as the first two units to undergo vaccination as standard medical 
intervention.267Jenner and his nephew administered the vaccination, though the 
actual number of soldiers who underwent the procedure was far less than 
anticipated due to a high number being diagnosed with the itch.268Jenner’s 
reluctance to vaccinate sick troops did not detract from the army’s plan to 
introduce vaccination, though this was instigated by the Duke of York269 who was 
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an outspoken supporter of Jenner’s work and gave the order of April 1801 that all 
soldiers were to be vaccinated270 
Whilst the army and navy were seen to openly promote vaccination, their medical 
officers retained some concerns regarding the continuing inability of Jenner to 
clarify major concerns such as the length of time vaccination remained effective. 
Jenner was increasingly unable to provide the evidence required and this explains 
why the medical officers of both services chose to carry out further studies 
regarding the effectiveness of vaccination on the islands of Minorca, Gibraltar and 
Malta.  In 1801 cowpox vaccine was taken to these islands, with the intention that it 
should then be sent on to all Mediterranean countries under British control. When 
the fleet was first stationed off the island of Minorca, Dr Marshall took the 
opportunity to conduct the first trials on the efficacy of vaccination outside of 
Britain271. The local inhabitants were eager to be vaccinated due to a particularly 
virulent Smallpox epidemic, so Marshall carried out the procedure on several local 
children as well as adult patients. He also ensured that this was carried out in the 
presence of physicians, surgeons and inhabitants of Mahon in order to gain popular 
support for the vaccination programme beyond Britain.272  
By the time the fleet had reached Malta, orders were already in place for the 
widespread vaccination of the British army. Dr Walker was given the task of 
overseeing this vast undertaking which he finally completed in Egypt. In order to 
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meet the demands of such a large vaccination programme, Surgeon General 
Thomas Keate liaised with the Vaccine Institute for the purchase of a constant 
supply of cowpox vaccine, at a fixed price of twenty-five guineas a year, the cost of 
which was to be met by the government. Finally Smallpox, which had been 
considered for centuries as the scourge of the army and the navy, could now be 
controlled by vaccination, and as such was considered to be nothing less than a 
prerequisite for success on the battlefield. The status given to vaccination in Britain, 
led Napoleon to issue orders in 1804 for all French troops to be vaccinated as a way 
of protecting them from the scourge of Smallpox.273 France, like much of Europe, 
had never accepted inoculation to the same extent as Britain and consequently 
Smallpox continued to ravage both rural and urban populations.274 Therefore 
despite the fact that both countries were at war when Jenner’s discovery was first 
published, copies of his work still managed to reach France, where they met with 
highly favourable official response. Moreover, in 1800 the first French clinical trials 
were established which ensured that vaccination had been suitably tested prior to 
being given to all soldiers and sailors. This type of extensive testing was not seen in 
Britain, where medical officers were as yet without the specialised medical 
infrastructure which was firmly established in France.275 Without scientific 
validation of the safety of vaccination the Admiralty proceeded with care in relation 
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to making it compulsory. It appears that all new marines underwent vaccination at 
Chatham.276 However for sailors, regulations still preferred persuasion by stating 
It being though proper that the practice of Vaccine Inoculation be extended 
throughout H.M Navy, you are to advise all such patients as you may think 
fit subjects for inoculation…to be inoculated…should any person, however, 
object to such inoculation, you are, with a view to overcome their prejudice, 
to present the harmless nature of the operation, and the subsequent 
advantage thereof.277 
 
Despite the military and naval endorsement of vaccination, civilian concerns 
remained at the forefront of contemporary discussions. The Anti-Vaccination 
Society continued to demand that Jenner should be called upon to provide answers 
relating to how long vaccination remained effective and how safe it really was when 
applied to all sections of society. Until such time these reassurances could be made, 
inoculation continued to be performed by civilian practitioners, though there are no 
known accounts of it taking place in either the army or the navy. Only after the 
devastating Smallpox epidemic of 1837-1840 was inoculation officially banned in 
the belief that it had been a major aspect in causing a mortality in excess of 12,000 
people. In 1841 a free civilian vaccination programme was introduced, to be 
administered by the Poor Law Boards. However there remained a high annual 
mortality from Smallpox, particularly among infants which led the Epidemiological 
Society demanding compulsory infant vaccination with centralised control and full 
registration. This became law in 1853 and despite its intention of eradicating 
Smallpox, the common response was widespread concern against what was 
perceived to be excessive state intervention in matters of personal health and a 
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denial of personal autonomy. Nevertheless, the control of Smallpox remained a 
matter of priority in the early days of state medicine and vaccination was the first 
form of direct medical intervention of its type, representing a new type of 
preventative medicine. At no time did the army or navy contribute to the 
discussions regarding the extension of the vaccination programme amongst 
civilians. However their absence was compensated by the views of civilian medical 
officers who actively supported an extension of a compulsory vaccination 
programme on the grounds that it was not only the moral duty of the state but the 
only way to ensure the ultimate safety and prosperity of the country. 
In conclusion, it is therefore possible to present the early attempts to control 
Smallpox as an intentional way to control the worst excesses of what was one of 
the most destructive diseases known to affect humankind.278 The introduction of 
inoculation was an initiative which was championed in Britain through the very 
public endorsement by the Royal Society and the medical profession represented 
by the Royal College of Physicians of London. Very few other European countries 
showed the same commitment to a procedure which offset extensive risks to 
personal safety with protection, which in the best outcome, offered a less severe 
case of Smallpox. Moreover even in Britain, the dubious medical and moral status 
of inoculation certainly played a significant role in motivating men such as Jenner to 
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find a more effective form of protecting against the disease, which came in the 
form of using a prophylactic which became known as vaccination.279 
However, to date all histories have failed to acknowledge the true extent of the role 
played by the medical officers in both the army and the navy in the way they 
influenced the application and introduction of both inoculation and vaccination. 
What began as a response to government concerns to improve the state of health 
of troops in recognition of the value of protecting the asset of a trained and 
established body of men, became an opportunity for the same medical officers to 
establish their own voice of authority in what was essentially a civilian initiative. 
The control of Smallpox should therefore be seen as the point at which military and 
naval staff identified that preventative medicine was a viable option which they 
could implement and adapt in order to effectively protect those under their 
command.  
For this to be achieved, medical staff increasingly identified the importance of proof 
and standardisation, if initiatives based on pathogenic control were to be adopted. 
The emphasis placed on early statistical analysis by men such as Jurin shows that 
civilian practitioners were equally aware of the need to develop an undisputed 
body of proof in relation to the use of inoculation, but were generally unable to 
collate such material. Consequently, the reports of medical officers such as 
Cleghorn were therefore welcomed by all medical practitioners, in terms of the way 
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they used controlled groups to develop an understanding of the benefits and 
limitations of medical intervention which could be applied to wider populations.  
The events surrounding the control of Smallpox were therefore representative of a 
collaboration between military and civilian medicine in recognition that 
preventative health was a universal benefit. Cleghorn’s early discussion of “public” 
utility280 should be seen in terms of realising that the distinction between the 
soldier and the citizen he was tasked with protecting was nowhere near as 
entrenched as one may consider. Brockelsby’s own interest in the militia also began 
an early debate regarding whether the rural idyll compared with the state of rapidly 
growing towns and cities really existed. Such was the value of these detailed studies 
in that they effectively called for questions to be raised not just in terms of the 
standard of future recruits, but how the same population would be able to meet 
the modernisation of the country and maintain the vast infrastructure required for 
Britain’s growing colonial aspirations. As will be seen in the following chapters, this 
discussion became increasingly pronounced, which ultimately gave medical officers 
in booth armed forces, the confidence to contribute to questions relating to the 
safety and standard of health of the population at large. Moreover, by being active 
in this way, the same military professionals must be recognised as establishing the 
need for preventative health which was undoubtedly the antecedent to the Public 
Health movement of the nineteenth century. 
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Finally, the events surrounding inoculation and vaccination played a major role in 
not just physically imposing preventative health on both the military and civilian 
population but for the first time raised ethical questions relating to rights and 
responsibilities. What is significant is the way in which both military and naval staff 
were more aware of avoiding transgressions when it came to the rights of the 
individual than their civilian counterparts. Whilst tasked with protecting the rank 
and file, medical officers increasingly became aware of a paradox in relation to 
going beyond what was defined as acceptable in how soldiers and sailors were 
treated and the conditions in which they lived whilst fighting for King and country. 
For men such as Pringle, the eradication of dirt in an attempt to prevent the worst 
excesses of putrid fever did not lead to the same ethical questions as those faced by 
Monro and Dickson-Reide, despite being contemporaries. This acknowledgement of 
rights and responsibilities also motivated the same medical officers for definitive 
proof relating to the safety of preventative health innovations but in the absence of 
this being found, interventions such as vaccination which was considered to be 
safe, was given careful consideration regarding the introduction of compulsory use.  
 The constant need by medical officers to identify the safest and most effective 
forms of military and naval medicine can therefore be said to help define it as a 
specialism in its own right. The requirements for this to also be successful 
increasingly lay in the type of training which medical officers received, most of 
which took place predominantly in the Scottish medical schools where a new model 
of medical theory and practice rejected centuries of traditional teaching in favour of 
a radically new approach. The early attempts by medical officers to understand 
ways of effectively controlling Smallpox were evidence of the success of such 
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innovation in the way they provided a structure to both the thinking and 
application of these new ideas. Whilst driven by a moral imperative to care for the 
soldiers and sailors under the command, the effectiveness of the achievements of 
the same medical officers relied heavily on the endorsement they received from the 
universities north of the border, where health was considered to be the rights and 
responsibility of the state and applicable to all sections of its society. 
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Chapter Three: The Scottish influence on the development of military and naval 
medicine 
 
In this chapter the main discussion will begin by identifying the way in which the 
medical faculty in Edinburgh University evolved over the eighteenth century in ways 
which rejected the long established theory which was taught in English universities 
on the grounds that it was outdated and failed to transfer to the needs of the 
rapidly changing British society. This will follow with how this transferred to 
meeting the needs of the medical officers in relation to the emphasis placed on 
preserving the health of soldiers and sailors both in Britain and from a global 
perspective, and which was increasingly identified as the Scottish medical model. 
Lastly, the association which developed between the Medical Faculty in Edinburgh 
and the medical officers in both the army and navy will be analysed from the 
perspective of evidence taken by the Royal Commission which illustrated a highly 
complex situation and growing disquiet on the part of all parties. The outcome was 
acknowledgement on the part of the army that it had to replicate the move already 
taken by the navy and establish military medicine within the confines of military 
institutions. This also served to effectively diminish the power of the medical 
officers in terms of directly influencing civilian preventative health. 
For centuries, disease had always been regarded as an inevitable aspect of life 
within the garrison and the fleet, and as such this was reflected in the relatively 
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lowly position held by military and naval doctors. 281Unlike surgeons, whose training 
was particularly aimed at dealing with wounds acquired on the battlefield, their 
more educated counterparts appeared poorly prepared to combat the vast array of 
illnesses which persisted in barracks and ports, targeting men who had been taken 
from the poorest section of society and as such were already suffering from the 
associated problems of malnutrition and poor health. 282This situation was 
exacerbated throughout the eighteenth century by increasing demands made on 
both the army and navy, with conflicts being fought over protracted periods and at 
increasing distances from Britain. This was typified by the strategic and highly 
valuable West Indies, where the brutal, unforgiving environment constantly showed 
itself to be highly detrimental for both the army and the navy. 283 However, 
regardless of location, the massing together of men in armies, contributed to a 
staggering array of diseases, often made worse by the generally poor health of the 
ordinary foot soldier and the speed at which even the most organised camps would 
become a breeding ground for many different pathogens. The fact that it was 
Pringle who suggested the ordering of purpose built latrines away from the camps, 
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shows how late improvements were introduced with regards ensuring the most 
basic standards of hygiene within the British army.284 
The types of diseases which inflicted soldiers and sailors are well known due to the 
fact that they were discussed at length in the vast library of medical texts which 
were being written by serving staff from the mid seventeenth century onwards.  
These became more prolific throughout the eighteenth century, appearing both as 
texts as well as articles for the rapidly expanding popularity of journals.285  The most 
common diseases found in the armed forces were the infamous fevers and fluxes, 
which included Dysentery, Typhus, Typhoid Fever, Syphilis, Scurvy, Malaria  and  
Smallpox, to name but a few. Without exception, they also known within the 
civilian population but often took on greater severity in the military and navy due to 
the particular situation.  In the absence of scientific medicine, correct identification 
remained a considerable problem, hence the reliance on broad terms such as “fever 
and fluxes” which in reality covered a broad spectrum of diseases.  As early as 1676, 
the English physician, Thomas Sydenham proposed that diseases should be 
classified according to their symptoms. Moreover, his early attempt to construct a 
“nosology” was significant in that it suggested that not only did each disease have a 
distinct identity, but this would also replicate itself in the same way regardless of 
the patient. 286 This type of discussion was particularly welcomed by military and 
naval doctors in that it prepared the way for standardised treatment which was 
essential for treating large numbers of patients, as in the case of sick troops. The 
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285 During the reign of George III alone there were twenty-six specific medical journals published on 
a regular basis 
286 Thomas Sydenham, "The Whole Works of That Excellent Physician, Dr Thomas Sydenham," 
(1734). 
116 
 
significance of Sydenham’s views are evident in the many references made to him 
in subsequent military and naval literature. Pringle was one such advocate and cited 
Sydenham on sixty-eight occasions in his own work. 287 However, it is interesting 
that Pringle personally failed to see the value of nosological classifications on the 
grounds that he believed that they prevented originality with regards innovative 
diagnosis.288 
However, the most significant problem facing all medical practitioners was 
understanding the initial cause of disease, as only then could effective treatment be 
applied.289The domination of metaphysical ideology and the construction of 
systems had defined medical thinking from the end of the sixteenth century. 
Although this promoted extensive discussion relating to the nature of illness, it 
reliance on increasingly obtuse theoretical frameworks did little to alleviate the 
problems associated with poor health. Therefore by the eighteenth century there 
was an increasing awareness across the medical profession of the need to reject 
speculation and replace it with a more substantive and useful ideology when 
looking for the cause of illness.290 This was empiricism, which can be defined by a 
growing commitment to observation and experimentation, which adapted a distinct 
methodology. In an attempt to summarise what it involved, Gefland focuses on the 
                                                          
287 Pringle, "Observations on the Diseases of the Army, in Camp and Garrison. In Three Parts.  With 
an Appendix Containing Some Papers  of Experiments Read at Several Meetings of the Royal 
Society." 
288 Craig, "Sir John Pringle Md, Early Scottish Enlightenment Thought and the Origins of Modern 
Military Medicine."  
289 Since the earliest records medical practitioners have all attempted to provide a model by which 
the cause of disease was explained although the most referred to was that of Hippocrates and the 
Hippocratic Corpus. 
290 Medical Empiricism and Philosophy of Human Nature in the 17th and 18th Centuries,  (Leiden: 
Brill, 2014). Chapter I discusses this in depth from a British and European perspective 
117 
 
way empiricism “militated against physicians’ claims to comprehensive knowledge 
based essentially on scholarship, rather than experience…utilitarian, technical, 
specialized skills increasingly took precedence over knowledge of the classics.”291 
More recently, Lindeman has emphasised the extent to which empirics could also 
be defined by their call for more restraint in the application of drugs and 
treatments available at the time, on the grounds that they were at best ineffective 
and at worst dangerous, and by doing so championed their replacement with 
regimen and hygiene.292 
It is therefore understandable why many medical officers were increasingly 
attracted to empiricism, as it provided an ideal structure in terms of both theory 
and practice when establishing medical care which could be standardised and 
applied to large numbers. However, its adherents faced extensive opposition, 
particularly from those who retained a commitment to traditional ideologies. 
Medical education in England was strictly controlled by the requirements of the 
Royal College of Physicians who remained the only licencing body which ensured 
professional advancement.293This however, required a degree from one of the two 
universities, namely Oxford and Cambridge, who in turn were committed to 
delivering a scholastic based syllabus. To date, Weatherall remains the only 
historian whose work significantly adds to this particular discussion. 294 Although he 
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does not dispute that the study of ancient texts remained central to the medical 
curriculum, he argues that it is incorrect to state that the value of innovations such 
as clinical diagnosis, which lay at the heart of empiricism, was not lost on 
Cambridge professors, many of whom actively encouraged their students to also 
study at places such as Leiden, where in 1701 Boorhaave (1668-1738) had first 
introduced clinical diagnosis as part of the syllabus for medical students. 295 What 
was far more intransigent was the restrictive religious entry requirement which 
excluded all students who were not Anglican, and were therefore forced to study 
medicine outside of England. 
The development of the Scottish medical schools was therefore highly significant 
not just in the history of medical education, but in the way they facilitated the 
training of medical officers who in turn would be able to respond to finding ways of 
improving the treatment of British soldiers and sailors. Although the five 
universities had a long, well established history, the Scottish Enlightenment had 
been particularly influential in relation to enhancing the type and standard of 
university education. At the heart of this lay a very open rejection in terms of trying 
to emulate the scholastic academic model found in England, but instead focus on 
modern, relevant learning particularly in the promotion of science and 
commerce296. In this environment of accountability and relevance, the Classics were 
taught, but alongside new subjects such as Chemistry, Geology, Botany, Midwifery, 
Economics, Geography to name but a few. All students were also expected to study 
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a wide range of subjects in order to demonstrate a breadth of knowledge, which 
was considered as being most appropriate education for all students. 
 Scottish universities also became increasingly popular when war effectively closed 
much of Europe for many students at the end of the eighteenth century.  In the 
decade 1790 to 1800 approximately 12,853 students enrolled in Edinburgh alone, 
of which 5,592 of these were in the medical faculty.297 The appeal for those wishing 
to study medicine went beyond being the only alternative option, but also was a 
result of a new, modern Medical Faculty in 1726, which modelled itself on facilities 
found in places such as Leiden.298 This commitment to innovation could be seen 
when Edinburgh’s Royal Infirmary opened in 1738. The idea was not only to provide 
hospital care for the people of the city but to help pay for its upkeep by allowing 
students’ access to patients in order to learn directly from clinical diagnosis, and for 
which they would be charged a regular fee.299 The benefits afforded by access to 
such innovative training, supported by a modern curriculum which included natural 
history, materia medica, anatomy and chemistry was quickly seen in the high 
standard of medicine available to Scottish graduates. Many also became adept 
specialists in a range of medical and surgical subjects which were offered through 
extra-mural classes, and taught by the leading names of the time. The Scottish 
medical model, as it soon became known, was soon associated with a standard of 
excellence and modernity. As the eminent Scottish physician John Gregory 
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acknowledged when defining the attributes of a good doctor, he emphasised to be 
“qualified for the practice of physic, a variety of branches of knowledge seemingly 
little connected are extremely necessary.” 300 The Medical Faculty in Edinburgh, 
followed by the other Scottish universities, successfully responded to this challenge, 
creating what Hamilton refers to as a “hybrid healer”, or what would be known 
today as a general practitioner.301 Moreover, the range of abilities the Scottish 
medical graduate could offer made them increasingly ideal candidates for the 
position of medical officers. 
Despite the growing reputation of Scottish medical education, this did little in way 
of challenging the power of the Royal College of Physicians of London. It also soon 
became apparent that the absence of College accreditation did not stop Scottish 
graduates from finding employment in situations where professional status carried 
little precedence over actual ability. Whereas the title of “physician” was a 
prerequisite for those seeking advancement in a medical career based in the 
increasingly prestigious hospitals, for those who were prepared to take 
opportunities offered by the expanding social institutions appearing across Britain, 
such association carried little weight. 302Life was particularly challenging for this 
type of salaried doctor who often endured long hours, poor pay and low social 
status which prompted many to accept a commission in either the army or the 
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navy.303 Throughout the eighteenth century, both the army and the navy provided 
all medical staff with regular pay, leave, and increasing support through affiliated 
rank. Moreover, as seen from the accounts of the time, a military or naval career 
did not exclude the possibility of success as a civilian practitioner. 
Whilst the Scottish medical syllabus therefore proved to be valuable in terms of the 
knowledge it provided, the universities north of the border, also played a pivotal 
role in developing a sense of duty in terms of the form and function of medicine. 
Originating with their formative European training, many of the early staff in 
Edinburgh and the other Scottish medical schools had been subject to new 
philosophies such as medical police. Although its origins can be traced back to the 
sixteenth century, its main proponent was Johan Peter Frank, a German doctor, 
who developed it in detail in his monumental work first printed in 1779.304 In 
general, medical police has failed to attract the research it merits by either social or 
medical historians, although the early work of Rosen, 305White306and Carroll307 
provide a highly informed analysis of this innovative health and social policy. Frank 
upheld that it was not only essential for a nation to maintain good health but in 
order for this to be achieved, it was the duty of the state to intervene in order to 
prevent illness at any stage in a person’s life. 308 At the heart of Frank’s model of 
                                                          
303 Although medical staff were without the privileges of rank for much of the eighteenth century, 
there was a medical hierarchy which allowed progression, as well as regular pay, leave and the 
opportunity to return to civilian practice at times when the requirements of the army and navy 
permitted medical staff to go onto half pay. 
304 Frank, "System Einer Vollstandigen Medicinischen." 
305 George Rosen, "Cameralism and the Concept of Medical Police," Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 27, no. 1 (1953). 
306 Brenda White, "Medical Police and Politics: The Fate of John Roberton," Medical History 27, no. 
04 (1983). 
307 Patrick Carroll, "Medical Police and the History of Public Health," ibid.46, no. 4 (2002). 
308 Frank, "System Einer Vollstandigen Medicinischen." p.82 
122 
 
medical police was the importance placed on controlling the environment and the 
removal of causes of disease, which in turn would be constantly monitored and 
investigated, whilst being evaluated by statistical analysis.309  
The idea of implementing standardised, state imposed health regulation and the 
advantages it offered was endorsed by philosophers including Pufendorf, Leibniz 
and Wolf, who also addressed issues relating to how it impacted on moral rights 
and responsibilities.310  The appeal of Medical Police led to its introduction in 
countries such as Prussia, Sweden and Scotland which can in part be explained in 
terms of providing evidence of the country’s cultural and intellectual ties with 
Europe rather than with England.311 Medical police was therefore taught to 
students at Scottish universities as a model of what modern society should strive 
for and how it could be achieved. It was first introduced by Gershom Carmichael, a 
lecturer on moral philosophy at Glasgow, who in 1718 published an annotated 
version of Pufendorf’s “On the Duty of Man and Citizen”312 George Turnbull also 
encouraged his students to think experimentally, not only in relation to scientific 
issues but also when approaching moral problems. As a leading theologian and 
educationalist, his endorsement of medical police as a type of social intervention 
was significant in terms of its reputation in the University. 313Consequently it was 
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relatively straight forward for Medical Police to be an accepted part of the medical 
profession. Dr Andrew Duncan Sn.  first introduced a course of lectures in 1795 on 
the importance of Medical Police in his role as Professor of the Institutes of 
Medicine a work he published for general readership six years later.314 He defined 
medical police as “the application of the principles deduced from the different 
branches of medical knowledge, for the promotion, preservation and restoration of 
general health.”315 
However, it was his son, Andrew Duncan (Jn.) who was granted the first joint Chair 
Medical Jurisprudence and Medical Police at Edinburgh in 1807. Whilst promoting 
the philosophy of Frank, he did not perceive the same level of need for direct state 
involvement and advocated private philanthropy with particular emphasis on the 
training of a medical profession to recognise the need to ensure health and well-
being at all stages of life.316 He also argued that once doctors were trained in the 
principles of medical police, they were then well placed to advise civil authorities on 
the optimum way of preventing disease.317 There is no evidence of Duncan 
discussing this in a military context, possibly as he had no direct involvement with 
either the army or the navy. The fact that medical police noticeably became 
absorbed into medical jurisprudence, indicates that the subject was considered to 
be increasingly redundant in the universities, although by this time this constituent 
                                                          
314 Andrew Duncan, Heads of Lectures on Medical Jurisprudence and Medical Police (Edinburgh: 
Adam Neill, 1801). 
315 "A Short View of the Extent and Importance of Medical Jurisprudence, Considered as a Branch of 
Education," ed. Edinburgh (1798). 
316 White, "Medical Police and Politics: The Fate of John Roberton." P.408 
317 Duncan, Heads of Lectures on Medical Jurisprudence and Medical Police.p.183 
124 
 
elements of medical police were being taught as an integral aspect of preventative 
health. 
Medical graduates therefore left Scottish universities with a commitment to 
meeting a duty of care which went beyond the more traditional definition of 
medical professionalism. They were supported in this by a modern curriculum 
which promoted empirical methodologies. The one area which endorsed this 
approach to maintaining healthcare was in the army and navy. Scottish medical 
graduates were considered to be particularly suitable candidates for the role of 
medical officer and were often specifically targeted in times of particular shortage. 
This was seen when war broke out against Napoleon, and recruitment posters were   
attached to the gates of the University.318 It is interesting that the actual 
completion of a medical degree was not considered as being a necessary an entry 
requirement and recruiters would actively encouraged students to leave the 
university prematurely, in the belief that they had acquired sufficient training in 
whatever brief time they had attended. McGrigor recorded in his autobiography 
that recruitment posters offered the enticements of regular pay, permanent 
quarters and any costs reimbursed arising from the journey for an interview in 
London without specifying the need for a degree.319 The high number of 
commissioned medical officers who returned to study after a military career, 
suggests that a significant number chose to leave Edinburgh prematurely, tempted 
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by the early career opportunities as a medical officer, as seen in the case of the 
naval surgeon, Thomas Trotter.320 
In return for accepting a post in either of the armed forces, the military and naval 
hierarchy increasingly acknowledged the value of university education, particularly 
those such as Scotland. The military physician William Turnbull explained  
In conducting the education of a naval Surgeon, it is perhaps of little 
consequence where his preliminary studies are entered upon. The schools 
of medicine are numerous, and the profession taught by many of the first 
abilities and experience in the healing art, both in the metropolis and in 
other situations of the empire. One advantage however attends a regular 
commencement of study at a university, namely that the student is there 
taught to entertain enlarged and scientific views of his subjects, which in the 
more confined situation of an inferior seminary, he has neither the 
opportunities to do, nor is he apt to imbibe them. It is for this reason that 
the University of Edinburgh has been so deservedly distinguished for the 
scientific acquirements of its medical pupils; and though in the metropolis, a 
great display of abilities prevails among the teachers, still the course of 
study is seldom so beneficial to the student from the want of that connexion 
among the different professional branches, which a university so happily 
possesses.321 
 
Specialist training was therefore increasingly recognised as the only way forward if 
medical officers were looking to be successful in finding ways of maintaining the 
health of soldiers and sailors under their care. In addition to universities providing 
medical education the Admiralty endorsed the idea of vocational training within its 
two new naval hospitals at Stonehouse and Haslar. However despite their fame in 
terms of innovative hospital design, it appears that the extent of formal teaching in 
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both was minimal.322 When Thomas Trotter took up his post at Haslar in 1793, he 
was concerned by the significant lack of training taking place for naval medical staff 
and called for the hospital to become a teaching and research centre.323 
Nevertheless, despite such shortcomings, the navy compared extremely favourably 
to the army when it came to providing relevant medical instruction in a hospital 
setting. This was only addressed with the creation of Netley Hospital in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. 
Therefore universities such as Edinburgh became increasingly important in meeting 
this type of training provision. Evidence of this can be found in two personal 
journals.324 The first belonged to Thomas Robertson, a naval surgeon from 1793 to 
1828, which provides a very detailed account of the type of medical training he 
undertook. He enrolled at Edinburgh for the degree in medicine where he studied 
for four years, completing classes in Anatomy and Physiology with Alexander 
Monro, Chemistry, and the Practice of Medicine. He also recorded that he attended 
clinics at the Royal Infirmary where he would have learnt clinical diagnosis.325 In 
support of McGrigor’s own comments relating to incomplete studies, Robertson did 
not stay to finish his degree but applied to the navy as a surgeon’s mate. In 1796 he 
sought promotion to the rank of Surgeon. This required attendance at Surgeon’s 
Hall in London for examination by the Sick and Hurt Board. This included being 
                                                          
322 The Healing Arts. Health, Disease and Society in Europe 1500-1800,  (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004). p.281 
323 Vale, Physician to the Fleet: The Life and Times of Thomas Trotter 1760-1832. p.94 
324 The journal of Ker is held in the National Library of Scotland whilst the papers of Robertson are 
recorded as being in a private collection which to date has not been located. It is therefore cited 
from the original article of W. Boog Watson. 
325 William N Boog Watson, "Thomas Robertson, Naval Surgeon, 1793-1828," Bulletin Of The History 
Of Medicine 46, no. 2 (1972). p.131 
127 
 
tested on the work of contemporary doctors relating to the transmission of 
infectious diseases. Robertson was not only successful in his naval career, but also 
developed a personal interest in the effects of different climates and diet as 
possible factors in the cause of disease.326 
The second journal was that of James Ker. He too studied in Edinburgh and also left 
without a degree, preferring to accept a post with the East India Company. Later he 
responded to a recruitment call for medical officers in the navy, having first passed 
the necessary examinations at Surgeons Hall. Ker’s journal is particularly useful in 
illustrating the attitude of the military examiners to the Scottish medical 
curriculum. It appears that Ker faced notable reticence from his examiners with 
what they saw as his lack of surgical experience. He had no London experience, in 
either a hospital or private anatomy school, and his evidence of attendance at the 
anatomy classes of Dr Monro in Edinburgh was initially taken as being 
insufficient.327Although this was eventually accepted by the examiners, he recorded 
that their concern arose from the belief that Scottish anatomy relied too 
extensively on comparative anatomy. Ker’s achievements regarding the exam in 
medicine were far more promising. His examiner, Dr Hussack, physician to the 
Greenwich Hospital “examined me on Physick, and gave me a qualification, as I 
found afterwards, for first rate. He paid a good deal of respect to my Education at 
Edinburgh and observed that I had been bought up at the feet of Gamaliel.”328 
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The written accounts of many medical officers in both the army and the navy 
throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are testimony to some of 
the finest examples of empirical medicine of the age. 329Moreover, the influence of 
university education, particularly in Scotland, was certainly noted as being 
important in terms of providing these doctors with relevant professional theory and 
a commitment to preventative health. However, despite the acquisition and 
development of specialist knowledge, the level of improvement amongst the health 
of soldiers in particular showed limited improvement. 330Unlike the experience on 
board a ship, life in barracks was not without significant dangers. As Trotter and 
other naval surgeons acknowledged, ships crews remained relatively healthy whilst 
at sea, until such time they came into contact with civilian populations. 331However 
for soldiers confined in either temporary or permanent barracks, the problems of 
avoiding disease was far greater in terms of the level of interaction and the 
difficulty of maintaining a healthy environment due to the massing of large 
numbers of soldiers in a fixed environment.  
As a result of these circumstances, the health of soldiers did not appear to 
significantly improve, and began to attract a new level of concern from all sections 
of society. In order to identify the cause of this major problem, a government 
enquiry was called in 1807 which tasked its commissioners with reviewing the 
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existing medical provision within the army in order to find ways of translating this 
into successfully maintaining the health of troops. 
 The publication of the commissioners’ findings the following year was entitled the 
Fifth Report.332 To date, attention has focused on seeing this as a very public 
condemnation of the failings to the Army Medical Board. However, it plays a far 
greater role in terms of finally providing explanations as to why the health of troops 
continued to deteriorate despite the advances which were being simultaneously 
pursued by many medical officers. The findings also help in terms of providing an 
explanation as to why the mortality rate amongst troops continued to rise despite 
the fact that the military medical staff were committed to implementing an all-
encompassing programme of preventative health.  
In 1794 when Sir Lucas Pepys began his tenure as Physician-General,333 he did so 
without any prior military experience, yet was now solely responsible for the 
organisation of the Army Medical Board with regards equipment, organisation and 
staff.334 Moreover his intransient belief in the superiority of civilian medicine, can 
be said to have defined his time in office, to the point of creating a highly 
detrimental position for the Army Medical Board and all medical staff relying on its 
actions. He was not averse to acting against army Regulations, as seen in the way 
he openly acted in defiance of direct Orders from the Commander in Chief which 
stated that whilst it was preferable for physicians to have either an English medical 
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degree or hold the status of licentiate from the Royal College of Physicians, other 
suitable candidates should be considered.335 Pepys however openly opposed 
appointing staff who did not share traditional credentials, which prohibited all 
serving medical staff for being considered suitable for promotion. Pepys argued 
that education, that is, actual experience, did little in terms of providing such men 
with the necessary “knowledge of principles” which still defined the traditional 
English medical profession.336 
This very open discrimination against military candidates became a major concern 
of the commissioners, arguing that “there would have been a convenience in 
selecting them from amongst the Regimental and Staff Surgeons who possessed 
actual experience in Army medical practice, both home and 
abroad.”337Nevertheless, it was Pepys’ decision to close Regimental hospitals and 
have all troops treated in large general hospitals which attracted the greatest 
condemnation. The Report argued that such places could not possibly 
accommodate the particular manners, habits and diseases that accompanied health 
problems in the army.338 They were also concerned by the fact that “the mortality 
which, whilst the sick remained with their regiments in the former year, had been 
trifling…became very great in the general hospital.”339 It was also agreed that 
general hospitals failed to meet the needs of the military because 
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The Regimental Surgeon, and the Officers whose duty it is constantly to 
inspect the Hospitals, are previously acquainted with the habits and 
characters of the patients, and have a superior interest in keeping up the 
effective strength of their corps; and that the patients have a greater 
attention shown by them of those belonging to the same Regiment than 
they probably receive in a General Hospital, and that their cure is promoted 
by it: and it is also said, that diseases are often acquired in the General 
Hospital, in addition to those which the sick carry with them.340 
 
Discussions relating to the value of general hospitals and the very real danger posed 
by the civilian population, were not without a marked degree of controversy. Whilst 
McGrigor called for the reinstatement of the Regimental hospitals, men such as 
Edward Bancroft (1772-1842) a highly respected military and civilian physician at St 
Georges Hospital, London, argued for keeping general hospitals on the grounds that 
unlike the standard military institution “general hospitals are not only on a larger 
scale, but directed by medical officers of superior ranks and abilities; and therefore 
much may be learned in them, and in much less time than the regimental”.341 
Certainly, the number of military and naval medical officers accepting civilian posts 
had always been considered to be an advantage on the part of all concerned, and 
with the creation of more hospitals, their presence amongst civilian staff was not 
uncommon. In view of such uncertainties, the commissioners therefore chose not 
to insist on changes, though in order to improve the health of soldiers, they now 
called for specific training for medical officers in the army prior to their first posting. 
They suggested that this could take place in general hospitals or in military 
establishments such as the York Hospital, Chelsea where newly trained medical 
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staff could be instructed in the ways of army life and deliver more effective medical 
care for the troops placed under their care.342  
It appeared that Pepys’ and the Army Medical Board had avoided irreparable 
damage following the 1807 Report, but any complacency was short-lived in light of 
the catastrophic events of 1809. The ill-fated Walcheren expedition saw over 4,000 
British soldiers lost to disease compared to the 106 who were killed in battle.343 The 
initial decision to send British troops into the Scheldt failed to receive endorsement 
on the part of either the army or the navy. The timing, environment and poor 
climatic conditions meant that despite British troops arriving on 28th July 1809, by 
mid-August it was agreed that Britain should withdraw as it became increasingly 
obvious that none of the military objectives could be achieved.344 Moreover, plans 
to send troops back to Britain were delayed due to poor planning which led to the 
full contingent being in the area when disease took hold in the British camp.345 The 
high mortality rates at Walcheren illustrate the reality that until the advent of 
scientific medicine, medical officers continued to be hampered by adverse 
conditions which negated any progress they may have made.  
A British disaster on this scale initiated a demand from the opposition for nothing 
less than a House of Commons Enquiry which took place in 1810. Despite 
accusations relating to the failure of the Amy Medical Board to protect troops from 
the worst excesses of disease, the members appeared to be exonerated by proving 
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that the call for additional medical aid had arrived too late and was yet another 
example of general poor planning. 346However, as Kelly has shown in her extensive 
study of these events, the reality of the situation with regards the status of the 
Army Medical Board had long been under question.347 Following a series of 
parliamentary reports and an often vitriolic pamphlet war were undertaken and the 
all-powerful Army Medical Board was unceremoniously disbanded in order to be 
replaced by what was hoped to be a more effective, modern structure.348 
Whilst these reforms appeared to address the problems of efficient medical 
administration, the questions relating to the continuing need of developing 
specialist training in military medicine remained unanswered at official levels. The 
idea of creating one school of military surgery had first been proposed in 1798 by 
the Edinburgh-trained naval surgeon John Bell, who presented the idea to Earl 
Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty349. When he failed to receive the expected 
response, Bell chose to publish both his concerns regarding the state of military and 
naval care, along with plans for improvement350. His objective was to create a 
school, under the auspices of a university, which would train specialist military and 
naval medical staff, and thereby ensure Britain’s status in terms of national security 
and commercial viability. Bell understood the importance of presenting military 
medicine as a specialism which would ultimately silence opposition. He therefore 
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produced a detailed syllabus which centered on promoting preventative health as 
the only effective way to limit the worst excesses of disease across all sections of 
society. Bell suggested that all training should take place in a specialist building, 
with dissection rooms, library, access to clinical training in a nearby hospital, but 
still be placed in the midst of a civilian university in order to ensure the sharing of 
teaching and learning to the benefit of all. Despite the extensive detail contained in 
the work, Spencer unsurprisingly chose to remain silent. With all expenditures 
being directed towards ensuring a British victory in the war with France, innovation 
on this scale would have stood little chance of success. However Bell continued to 
look for support, emphasising the poor standards of British military medical training 
compared to the situation in Europe, which, he argued led to far stronger armies.351 
Although Bell continued to be unsuccessful in gaining support for his military 
school, there was a growing acknowledgement of the need for additional training 
particularly in light of the continued problem of high morbidity and mortality rates 
among troops and sailors. Robert Jackson, who was an outspoken critic of the 
present state of military medicine, also suggested the creation of a training school, 
which was to be based either in London or on the Isle of Wight.352  Despite 
generating considerable interest, no sustained investment was forthcoming and 
both plans were forgotten. However with the renewal of hostilities against 
Napoleon, questions relating to the care and suitable provision of sick and injured 
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troops both on the field and back in Britain were once again raised as a priority. In 
1803 the Town Council in Edinburgh duly responded to such concerns by proposing 
a plan for the construction of a specialist military hospital in the city.353A local 
surgeon, Dr John Thomson, had already been requested by his patron, General Sir 
Thomas Maitland, to deliver a course of lectures for additional training on all 
aspects of military surgery and medicine which he gave at the university over the 
winter of 1803. In his biography it is claimed that due to the lack of adequate 
material which existed in Britain on these subjects, Thomson was forced to find 
authoritative material from French and German authors which he translated.354 He 
also believed that these lectures should remain accessible to Edinburgh students as 
they had little opportunity to travel to London for the additional training they 
would need once they had been called up to serve as medical officers in the army 
and navy.355 Thomson also took the decision to send the contents of these lectures 
as a prospectus to the army Surgeon General Thomas Keate. It is unlikely that any 
promise of endorsement was forthcoming and Thomson had to wait for a suitable 
opportunity to once again produce his plans. This appeared in 1806 when a change 
in government saw him successfully be granted permission to be made Regius 
Professor of Military Surgery at the University of Edinburgh. The army however 
chose not to endorse this new development. 
Although Thomson regarded this as a significant achievement for the training of 
military staff, the response from Edinburgh University was far from favourable. 
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Despite this being the first time that military medicine was to be taught as a 
discreet subject in a British university, the Medical Faculty announced that their 
position had not been taken into consideration and refused Thomson access to the 
teaching rooms. 356There was also a general feeling of disquiet amongst many 
university staff that it would have been preferable to create a new Chair in Surgery 
where both military and civilian needs could be addressed as a shared specialism. 
Despite this lack of support from the most influential groups, including colleagues 
at Surgeon’s Hall who noticed their exclusion in his plans, Thomson designed a 
course which he considered would provide the most relevant training to those 
students who enrolled. He also made a formal request that they should be given 
access to the military hospital in Edinburgh Castle in order to replicate the type of 
clinical training offered to civilian students in the Medical Faculty. The army 
rejected Thomson’s request as to be expected regarding a course that still held no 
official military status. 
Nevertheless Thomson continued to promote his subject. In addition to teaching 
medicine and surgery he also emphasised the importance of understanding and 
implementing preventative health across both the military and civilian 
populations.357Kaufman has found evidence that whilst the majority of Thompson’s 
students came from the army and navy, his course was open to civilian students, on 
the understanding that they may at some point pursue a commission. However the 
most important development which ensured that Thomson’s course remained a 
viable option within the university was official acknowledgement that students who 
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opted for and completed this specialism could on completion, transfer back into the 
Faculty to continue with their medical degree. Thomson’s position was never secure 
due to his inability to find a permanent role within a more established Faculty, 
although he managed to remain in post until 1822. This was undoubtedly due to his 
genuine commitment to military medicine, along with the popularity he retained in 
Edinburgh through his support of town initiatives such as the New Town 
dispensary358. He also continued to request access to the military hospital which 
was again denied. In 1811 he also wrote directly to the Army Board informing them 
of his decision to include additional lectures on diseases specific to different 
countries.359  
Thomson maintained a strong sense of commitment relating to the responsibilities 
of his role. Kaufman has estimated from various lecture records that after 1815 
over two hundred and fifty students regularly attended his lectures.360 The fact that 
these were free to commissioned officers would have been a significant factor in 
their appeal, though the numbers remained significantly high and continued to 
attract civilian students.361 In 1816 Thomson was finally given access to the military 
hospital, having been made Surgeon to the Forces the previous year. However, 
orders were rapidly issued which restricted this to only those students already 
commissioned in the army.  
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Attempts have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of Thomson’s role in 
relation to creating a specialism in military medicine.362 Class lists which survive 
from this time show that servicing medical officers formed the minority of those 
students who attended and there is no existing primary evidence relating to how 
this training transferred into directly influencing the medical care of soldiers and 
sailors. The limited success of his endeavours may have been the reason why n 
1822 Thomson chose to resign from his post.363 What is also significant is that his 
successor was appointed only eight days after his resignation, which suggested that 
the university authorities were already preparing for this decision.364 The 
appointment of George Ballingall as the second Professor of Military surgery was 
therefore announced without any opposition and who subsequently remained in 
post until 1855.  
Unlike his predecessor, Ballingall’s appointment was left to the discretion of the 
University, which may account for the ease of the transition. However the 
continued presence of military medicine remained a contentious subject amongst 
other faculties. The university was also becoming increasingly frustrated by its lack 
of autonomy from the controlling influence of the all-powerful Town Council. The 
growing antagonism between the two bodies escalated to an unprecedented level, 
with allegations of ineptitude and mismanagement being made on both sides. In an 
attempt to find ways of gaining full independence, in 1824 the Senate initiated legal 
proceedings against the continuing right of the Town Council to influence academic 
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affairs. Aware that this would not be given an impartial hearing in the Scottish 
court, the university directly petitioned the Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel, 
requesting a Royal Commission to enquire into the validity of their concerns. Peel 
responded to this request and on 25th August 1826 a Royal Commission received 
official status to report into the state of university education in Edinburgh, though 
Peel quickly extended the powers of the commissioners to review each of the 
Scottish universities.  The final report was published on 28th October 1830,365 in 
which the commissioners vindicated the grievances of the university and proposed 
the creation of a university court to oversee all academic affairs. However they also 
proposed far reaching reform throughout each Scottish university in response to 
what they saw as serious failings across all Faculties. Despite a first attempt to 
implement these reforms in 1836-37, the Scottish universities were not willing to 
replace their new found freedom with yet another form of centralised intervention, 
with the outcome that no significant changes were introduced in any Scottish 
university until forced to do so with the passing of the Universities (Scotland) Act, 
1858. 
The Report of 1830 has long been seen in terms of Edinburgh University 
establishing itself as an academic entity free from the politics of the all-powerful 
Town Council.366 However, it has yet to be studied from the perspective of being 
one of the most comprehensive official documents to assess the university’s 
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relationship and effectiveness in terms of providing the additional training 
recognised as being essential for both naval and military Medical Officers. Evidence 
was presented by both Regius professors of military surgery, the recently retired Dr 
John Thompson and Dr George Ballingall along with the evidence of other relevant 
academic staff and military personnel. Thompson and Ballingall each provided a 
detailed account as to how the course in military surgery had progressed during 
their tenures. The form and function of the course was also discussed with other 
medical staff in an attempt to evaluate whether there were any real advantages in 
maintaining a separate Chair in Military Surgery in addition to those already 
established, most notably the Chair in Surgery. Adding weight to this discussion 
were the comments of Dr. William Pulteney Alison. His reputation in Edinburgh was 
seen to provide a sense of balance when discussing the affairs of the University as 
well as the needs to facilitate innovation, particularly in relation to medicine. It is in 
keeping with Alison’s reputation that he acknowledged that for a specialist course 
such as Military Surgery, it was important to have a status within the main body of 
the university.367  
The commissioners also permitted the inclusion of evidence from both Sir James 
McGrigor and Sir William Burnett, the respective heads of the Army and Navy 
Medical Boards. Whilst both men praised the Edinburgh experience in terms of the 
type of medical education being offered, they resisted using the Royal Commission 
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as an opportunity to formally make a case for the training of military medical 
officers within a civilian, academic setting. Within the context of the time, the 
relationship between the civilian population and the military was increasingly under 
strain and both forces were keen to promote a level of autonomy in designing and 
delivering their own particular requirements in terms of medical intervention. 
However, when the commissioners interviewed university staff in relation to their 
own subjects and initiatives such as the Chair in Military Medicine, its presence 
along with that of commissioned students led to a generally favourable response, 
with no evidence of anti-military feelings.  
Any discreet attempts by the army and navy to promote Edinburgh as an ideal 
location in which to train was also recognised as being superfluous, as the diversity 
of courses offered by Edinburgh University became an attraction in themselves to 
those considering a military career. When Alison gave evidence regarding the type 
of education being offered to the undergraduate body, it is interesting that he felt 
justified in citing the Army Regulations for the Promotion of Officers (1824) where it 
outlined that suitable candidates were those offering a liberal education with an 
emphasis on science and professional experience – something which clearly 
Edinburgh was in a strong position to offer. Alison himself, whilst never entering 
into military medicine, also felt compelled to offer his support in ensuring the 
continued success of the Military Surgery Chair. He not only referred to the 
recommendations of men such as McGrigor but when questioned by the 
commissioners, openly supported the concept of having a medical military 
specialism which he felt would not be adequately covered if it were to be absorbed 
into the courses being offered in general surgery. Alison also considered the skills 
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and knowledge of military surgery to be such that it would benefit all medical 
students to participate in the course.368   
  When it came to assessing the impact of the new specialist Chair in Military 
Surgery, the commissioners also had the advantage of being able to interview both 
incumbents. Dr John Thompson took the opportunity to finally make public what 
had led to his own resignation, which he said was caused by the reluctance of the 
university to establish the necessary facilities his specialism required, despite the 
credibility it bought to the university from both the Army and Navy Boards.369 This 
included a failure to provide the specialist teaching rooms he had been promised by 
the Senate and which forced him to move many of his classes back into Surgeons 
Hall.370  Reading the evidence of both Thompson and Ballingall, it becomes 
apparent that whilst the military and naval medical officers who graduated from 
Edinburgh were at the forefront of implementing vast changes in preventative 
medicine, the actual role played by the university in these achievements was far 
less significant than is generally acknowledged. The Senate remained firmly under 
the control of established professors such as Dr Monro371 who openly spoke of his 
opposition to creating a specialism in military medicine, arguing that all its 
requirements could be met within general surgery classes.372 His antipathy towards 
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a military specialism also led him to refuse requests to extend his own surgical 
course of four and a half months to a period of six months, which was necessary in 
order to meet both the army and navy’s criteria regarding length of study.373 This 
type of very open intransigence led the commissioners to question why the 
university was not prepared to impose changes regarding length of study in order 
to comply with the needs of military students. In response, the Senate explained 
that should these changes be implemented, then Edinburgh University could be 
seen as creating a monopoly with regards the training of military medical officers 
and also impinge on the livelihood of the private schools which provided the 
necessary additional training currently being used.374  
From such a response, it is fair to suggest that the Senate was not prepared to 
increase or formalise the military association. The final Report of the Royal 
Commission provides two explanations as to why this happened. In the first place 
the course on military surgery was highly innovative for its time, but there were 
inconsistencies in terms of its relevance to the military challenges of the day. When 
Ballingall gave evidence he considered that there had been concerns regarding his 
predecessor’s tenure arising from his personal lack of military training with the 
consequence that it did not always receive favourable evaluation from those in 
attendance.  Considering the fact that during the early years of it being taught, 
Britain was at war, Ballingall was openly critical arguing that it  
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was not conducted during the war in such a way as to give it the status and 
consideration in the public opinion, to which I conceive it is entitled. Had Dr. 
Thomson been bred a Military Surgeon, and had he devoted the energies of 
his mind to that class alone, I think it would have held a different rank in the 
public estimation and in the university, from what it now does.375 
 
 Thomson did not attempt to conceal his lack of relevant experience to the 
commissioners, though he reminded them that his courses had elicited praise from 
the military boards.376 He also credited Ballingall with making the necessary 
changes to develop a direct relevance, particularly with regards the emphasis 
placed on aspects such as “Diseases of Warm Climates”, an area which continue to 
be increasingly needed in view of the military support of colonial expansion.377  
The second concern raised by the commissioners centered on the nature of training 
received by medical students at Edinburgh in terms of its long term relevance to 
contemporary military and naval challenges. Both McGrigor and Burnett 
acknowledged Edinburgh as being the first medical school in Europe. Burnett added 
for several years past it has been my duty… to examine candidates for 
admission into the Medical Department of the Navy, and all they are all 
young men of superior medical education, I can with the utmost truth 
declare, that those young gentlemen who have obtained the Degree of MD 
at the University of Edinburgh, are by far the best informed in their 
profession of any I have met with…378  
 
Whilst Burnett’s praise was genuine, he also made it clear that this referred to 
young medical officers at the start of their military career. For those aiming for 
promotion to the senior ranks, the initial education offered in Edinburgh was 
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insufficient to meet the range, depth and time of training the Commissioning 
Boards now demanded.379  This approach allowed the army and the navy to argue 
for the control and training of their own officers, without damaging the reputation 
of the Scottish medical model which had up till then had been so influential in 
promoting an ideology and epistemology which produced some of the most 
influential medical texts of the age. The innovation which had been so closely 
associated with Scottish medical training was now firmly recognised as good 
practice. Moreover it was being replicated in the new type of Medical Schools 
appearing in England which were affiliated with hospitals rather than with 
academia. Allison supported this evolution of needs, acknowledging that whilst the 
breadth of diverse scientific knowledge accessible for civilian and military medical 
students alike made them better medical practitioners, the fact remained that this 
did not directly help in finding a way of overcoming the university experience and 
the specific requirements of the Promotion Boards of both the army and the 
navy.380  
Edinburgh University was not adverse to what this ultimately meant in terms of 
drawing to a close their formal military and naval connections. Allison was 
representing the views of the Senate when he stated that the findings of the Royal 
Commission would hopefully allow Edinburgh to remodel itself with a more 
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traditional model of education, which required greater conformity with English 
universities, rather than continuing long established continental associations. Only 
then, it was argued, would Scottish degrees be able to offer graduates the chance 
to compete for careers in all professions within Britain. Allison also announced what 
he foresaw as an end to the military association when he announced 
the situation of the gentlemen at the head of the Medical Army Board, in 
regard to young men under them, is very different from our situation in 
regard to our graduates; for they have not only their education, but also the 
promotion of the young men in their power; whereas we have their 
education, but not in the least their advancement in the world under our 
control; and it seems to me that this  is the chief error committed by those 
who recommend to us so strongly, additional literary and scientific 
qualifications for our graduates. They argue as if we had in our power, at the 
same time, the advancement in the world and their education in the 
university. Their advancement in the world is no further in our power than 
as the regulations, which we lay down for their studies, correspond to the 
general demands of the public in regard to the education of the higher class 
of medical men.381 
Despite the relevance of Allison’s views and in a move unexpected by all, the 
commissioners declared that not only could they  find no reason for the military 
association not to be maintained in Edinburgh University but also promoted that it 
should be put on a more formal basis. Furthermore, they recommended that the 
university might look at ways of developing the existing medical curriculum in order 
for it to meet the more rigorous needs of the army and the navy.382 They also 
proposed that just as the military medical staff required specific training in areas 
such as Practical Chemistry, Surgery, Practice and Theory of Medicine, Mathematics 
and Natural Philosophy, such subjects might also prove to be beneficial to students 
in the Medical Faculty, and as such should become part of the existing medical 
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curriculum. This was an unexpected and unwelcomed criticism of both the standard 
of teaching and the quality of medical practitioners who to date had graduated with 
an Edinburgh M.D383 
The concerns raised by the commissioners relating to the quality of teaching and 
learning in the most established subjects, including Medicine, had never been 
expected and caused great concern.  In their final Report the commissioners 
reported on what they had found, and highlighted that the standard of teaching 
was far worse than had been expected. The implications of the Royal Commission 
findings were a significant setback for all Scottish universities and it would take 
many years for them to respond and introduce reforms which would allow them to 
offer a standard of education which matched other universities. With regards to the 
Faculty of Medicine the number of students fell considerably, especially with the re-
opening of the Paris teaching hospitals after the defeat of Napoleon and the 
reopening of Europe. In the case of the military and naval connection with the 
university, despite the findings of the commissioners, no further attempts were 
made to continue military medicine and with the death of Ballingall in 1855, the 
Chair of Military Medicine was left unfilled. Initially Peel made it known that it was 
his intention to appoint a third professor and in 1857 the Edinburgh Medical Journal 
announced that Surgeon-Major Matthew would be accepting the position. For 
unknown reasons this never occurred, which encouraged Dr T.A Wise to present 
himself as a suitable candidate. Despite possessing genuine credentials, his 
excessive enthusiasm for the post led to him privately publishing a book containing 
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twenty-two testimonials he had collected endorsing his surgical skills. Not 
surprisingly his application was unsuccessful and both the military authorities and 
the Senate took the continued vacancy as an opportunity to effectively remove the 
Chair of Military Surgery by default.384 In order to ensure that this would 
permanently be removed from Edinburgh, James Syme, Professor of Clinical 
Surgery, wrote in person to Lord Panmure demanding the removal of any future 
government funding, fully aware that the Senate would rigorously oppose any 
suggestion that they take over the funding of the Chair. Although Syme385 led an 
extremely vociferous campaign to have the Chair of Military Surgery permanently 
removed from Edinburgh, far greater damage regarding its reputation had been 
done through the actions of Ballingall in person. In an attempt to apportion blame 
for the failings of the Army Medical Department during the Crimea, Ballingall was 
cited, though much of it posthumously, as being responsible for the medical 
situation being so bad. He had certainly played a prominent administrative role in 
the Army Medical Department for much of the war, and with the publication of a 
new military handbook on the construction of hospitals, was considered to be an 
expert in preventative health.386 His death in December 1855 meant he was never 
able to respond to these allegations and the magnitude of the problems facing the 
British army in the Crimea was such that it was not so much due to the failings of an 
individual but was the result of an outdated system of medical care. However, the 
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association was not seen as anything other than damaging to the university and 
undoubtedly played a role in finally ending the military association. For the army, 
the losses in the Crimea were of even greater significance in terms of effectively 
removing its considerable history in initiating and implementing preventative health 
from the public conscience. 
In terms of retaining and developing a commitment to preventative health, both 
the army and the navy responded positively to replacing the formal association with 
Edinburgh by focusing on developing their own centres of training. Despite 
questions being raised over the standard of medical education in the 1820s, the 
early years had unquestionably produced a highly effective cadre of medical officers 
who benefitted from the Scottish medical model, evident in both the changes they 
attempted to bring to the health of soldiers and sailors and the continued belief in 
promoting change across all sections of society. It is also important to add that 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries over eighty percent of the 
medical graduates who accepted a medical commission had already received a 
degree from a Scottish university and at least half of these were from 
Edinburgh.387Therefore, from a quantifiable perspective alone the influence of 
Scottish education was immense. It is important to add that the same universities 
continued to produce medical graduates who were attracted to a military or naval 
career, and as such ensured that the reputation attached to the Scottish model of 
medical education did not disappear.  However, in both the army and the navy, 
greater emphasis increasingly being placed on developing their own type of specific 
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training in order to enhance the abilities of their commissioned medical officers. To 
this end, the Admiralty finally responded to the earlier suggestions of Trotter and 
developed Haslar both as a hospital and as a training institution with its own library 
and museum, and in doing so, made the Edinburgh experience redundant. The 
situation in the army was more ambiguous. Despite the increasing number of 
military hospitals and an extensive series of reforms instigated by men such as 
McGrigor, little could be centralised in terms of training until the completion of 
Netley Hospital in 1863. 388 However prior to its opening, the army, unlike the navy, 
did attempt in 1851 to once again establish a Chair in Military Surgery, though this 
time in Dublin.  On this occasion it was awarded to Dr Thomas Joliffe Tufnell who 
had established his reputation as an army surgeon at Chatham. In Dublin he taught 
a series of lectures on military surgery which were officially recognised by the army. 
However despite the popularity of the courses, his appointment was ended in 1860, 
in view of the plan to centralise all training in Netley.389 
The legacy of Scotland in relation to military and naval understanding of 
preventative health has for too long failed to attract the level of discussion it 
warrants. As seen from this chapter it provided not only a model of medical theory 
and practice which was prepared to overthrow centuries of traditional dogma, but 
also provided the moral imperative to do so. At its heart was an early form of 
egalitarian concept of good health for all which found a way to overcome the 
constraints of the medical establishment, fiercely endorsed by the Royal Colleges. 
Scottish medicine was therefore unique in Britain, although it had recourse to the 
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continental universities it sought to emulate. In many ways its achievements are 
easier to identify within the civilian world of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. The candidates for all public medical positions, other than the 
most privileged practices, all tended to be filled by the well-trained though poorly 
paid Scottish trained graduates. The same can be said of the first generation 
doctors who implemented the public health and sanitary movement of the mid 
nineteenth century, acutely aware of the growing dangers posed by urbanisation 
and industrialisation. However were it not for the precedent set earlier by their 
military and naval counterparts who extended the concept of duty of care and 
established an ideology and experimental structure to prove the association 
between environment, contagion and physical well-being, preventative health 
would not have been such an established indication of a civilised state.  
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Chapter Four: The role of military and naval medical officers in the development of 
quantifiable evidence. 
 
Following on from the discussion regarding the developments which took place in 
the Scottish medical schools and the way they defined military and naval medicine 
as a discreet specialism, this chapter will focus on illustrating how quantifiable 
evidence became increasingly important in terms of providing incontrovertible 
proof that advances in preventing disease were taking place. In addition to 
establishing what was meant by quantifiable analysis in an age prior to the 
appearance of modern statistics, there will also be a review of how this supported 
the call for an end to theoretical medical tradition, to be replaced by a 
methodology with the aim of using empiricism and observation to prove the value 
of a more modern approach. The third aspect of the chapter will be a study of 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century medical officers who used their postings 
to show in controlled settings the value of recording data which could be studied 
with the aim of identifying the greatest threats to all sections of society. Lastly, this 
material will be discussed in relation to how military and naval medical officers 
used quantifiable evidence to support their call for applying preventative health 
measures as a universal way of improving the health of the population and thereby 
ensuring the status of the country both in terms of its military commitments and 
plans for economic growth both in Britain and as a world power. 
In Britain, the idea that progress in matters of health could be measured and 
assessed in the form of quantifiable evidence can be traced back to the 
153 
 
seventeenth century when John Graunt developed the concept of “political 
arithmetic”, outlined in his work of 1652.390 Although his interests were mercantile, 
he recognised the importance of collecting accurate demographic information from 
Bills of Mortality in order to assess whether Britain’s economic and military status 
could be assured, according to the state of the population at any given time.391 This 
idea of the need to protect all sections of society through long term investment was 
further developed William Petty, an army physician and contemporary of 
Graunt.392He also argued that political arithmetic could be used to identify the most 
effective ways of introducing improvements regarding the conditions in which 
people lived.393The most cited example of this was the way in which Petty used a 
basic calculation to show how the cost incurred in raising a child to adulthood made 
the monies spent on preventing plague was a viable form of investment by the 
state.394 Such innovative rationalised thinking certainly arose through his own 
commitment to Baconian thought which even allowed Petty  to argue the case that 
preventative health was not only economically viable but also a moral duty of the 
modern, developing state. 395  
Political arithmetic, as developed by Graunt and Petty, also played a major role in 
terms of giving individuals a common, standardised value. As Porter claims, society 
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up to this time had largely been constructed in terms of estates. Whilst this gave 
individuals a sense of place, it did not permit them to be seen as individuals and 
therefore limited the type of improvements which were regarded as 
suitable.396However, from its earliest days, political arithmetic challenged this 
archaic view by placing emphasis on common value, rather than an association with 
one’s station in life. Such a fundamental change in relation to allocating a “worth” 
to an individual was part of the transition needed if Britain was to maintain and 
develop its military, economic and colonial status as a modern world power. 
Throughout the eighteenth century there was therefore a shift in how all individuals 
were perceived, regardless of class or status, in relation to a measurable set of 
criteria, many of which were perceived to be increasingly important. In such an 
atmosphere of change, preventative health also took on a new sense of worth, not 
only in terms of altruistic intervention, but also in the way it increasingly identified 
itself with maintaining the health of populations who were identified as being a 
highly valuable commodity. 
Petty is also significant in terms of being the first British army doctor who began to 
move away from merely treating the all too common diseases found amongst 
troops towards recognising the advantages of identifying cause in the hope of 
preventing its occurrence. Whilst stationed in Dublin, he therefore began to look 
specifically at the effects of climate and environment in order to see if there was 
any correlation with the types of illnesses frequently found amongst the troops.397 
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Despite its immense strategic importance, the conditions in the Dublin barracks 
were amongst some of the worst in the British army.398 Petty used his position to 
make the first official medical records to establish evidence of a connection with 
the conditions in which soldiers lived, and the high incidence of disease. Moreover, 
he was also the first physician to raise concern regarding  the potential danger 
posed by disease not only in terms of  physical well-being but also in the way it 
could be detrimental to a man’s general character. Petty argued  
For as much as Men, who are in a decaying condition, or who have but an ill 
opinion of their own concernments, instead of being (as some think) the 
more industrious to resist the Evils they apprehend, do contrariwise become 
the more languid and ineffectual in all their Endeavours, neither caring to 
attempt or prosecute even the probable means of their relief.399 
 
The views of Petty were therefore significant in establishing what can be argued as 
being an early model of preventative health. He not only identified how malignant 
external forces were responsible for sickness, but also outlined a moral argument 
for direct intervention by those in a position to bring about change for the good of 
all.  
However, despite the validity of Petty’s work, the idea that disease could be 
attributed to poor living conditions received no further attention.400 In a time prior 
to the certainties of scientific medicine, the need to try to understand both the 
cause of disease and the way it affected the human body led to the dominance of 
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many medical theories, and consequently this was viewed as being just one more 
example. 401Trohler argues that in the case of Petty, his own views on the 
importance of acknowledging climate and environment was rendered ineffective by 
the popularity of iatromathematics.402 Those physicians who defined themselves as 
followers of this particular school of thought were representative of a new way of 
thinking which challenged centuries of Hippocratic theory. Instead 
iatromathematics based its appeal on a rational, mechanical presentation, in 
keeping with Newtonian science. For this reason, the idea of what were then 
immeasurable concepts, such as climate and environment,  found little appeal 
amongst those who became converts to a much more rational way of 
understanding the failings of the human body. Moreover, Petty’s own position as a 
medical officer carried little weight when set against the powerful academic 
medical practitioners who dominated and directed the theory and practice of 
medicine from their positions in the great European universities. 
However, the idea that adverse factors such as the weather and inhospitable 
environments was not completely lost, due to the fact that one of the oldest, most 
deeply entrenched medical theories simultaneously underwent something of a 
revival. Galen’s non-natural model of illness and health had, for centuries, upheld 
the idea that illness was caused by six specific causes which could be broadly 
catagorised as physiological, psychological and environmental. By the seventeenth 
century non-natural theories had long been part of the standard medical syllabus 
                                                          
401 Andrew Wear, Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680 (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). P 
402 Trohler, Quantification in British Medicine and Surgery 1750-1830, with Special Refence to Its 
Introduction into Therapeutics, Doctor of Philosophy. P.20 
157 
 
found across much of Europe, but by the early eighteenth century were also 
attracting a level of revisionist interest. This can be seen in work such as that of the 
English physician George Cheyne (1671-1743). 403He reiterated the importance of 
preventing illness rather than trying to cure it, which he outlined in his most 
popular work “An Essay of Health and Long Life.” 404 Cheyne took each of the 
familiar non-naturals to build a case for actively controlling malign influences acting 
on the body, with suggestions as to ways these could be removed or limited in 
order to preserve good health. 
Although the work of Cheyne found considerable popular support, it did not 
present the non-natural model in anything other than the traditional paradigm, and 
as such limited its effectiveness in bringing about significant change. However, this 
was redressed in the work of Jean-Noël Hallé who held the Chair of Physique 
Médicale et de l’hygiène in the Faculty of Medicine in Paris. What was particularly 
important about his work was the way he purposefully chose to replace the 
traditional term “choses non naturalles” with a new term “matiere de 
hygiene”.405The significance of Halle’s action was that it not only created an 
association between the non-natural ideology and a new paradigm more familiarly 
known as “public health,” but also introduced the idea of civic duty when it came to 
removing the worst excesses in order to protect all of society.  
The idea that health was both a controllable aspect of everyday life, and as such 
was the most important aim of all modern states, became increasingly common 
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across much of eighteenth century Europe. In addition to Halle’s work in France, 
the earlier, highly ambitious plans of Rau for the creation of an early welfare state 
through medical police, were just two examples of a new, progressive attitude 
regarding the importance of implementing preventative health across all sections of 
society. In Britain, commitment to removing the worst excesses of poverty and 
destitution did not attract large state-endorsed schemes other than the early 
attempts to control Smallpox through the endorsement of inoculation. However if 
one takes examples which include the rise of the dispensary movement and the 
rapid growth of voluntary hospitals across the country, it would be incorrect to see 
Britain as altogether negligent in attempting to improve the daily existence for all 
members of society.406The extent to which this facilitated any long-lasting 
improvement in everyday life has attracted very different interpretations ranging 
from the early, very positive image presented by George407 to the more sceptical 
discussion promoted by Le Fanu.408More recently, Porter has shown a far greater 
diversity of healthcare available throughout the century, emphasising the 
importance of non-regulated provision which was widely used, even by those with 
access to trained doctors and physicians.409 
However, no eighteenth century study to date has considered in any depth how 
these improvements were directly influenced by medical officers in both the army 
and the navy, as part of their commitment to implementing preventative health 
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across all sections of society. In particular, the most important contribution at this 
time was the way in which doctors in both armed forces used the century to 
develop a body of results based on a specifically empirical methodology which 
would endorse the case relating to the value of avoiding disease rather than 
attempting to treat it, often unsuccessfully. In an age prior to the certainties of 
scientific medicine, the realisation by medical officers of the need to create bodies 
of evidence to show the dangers of dirt and disease, was an essential part of the 
history of public health, which has also until now, been neglected, and by doing so, 
fails to provide an accurate understanding of its true origins. 
The transition away from an unquestioning reliance on theoretical thinking towards 
an approach which sought to base decisions upon evidence which could be 
substantiated, was very much a feature of Enlightenment thought. 410One of its 
earliest supporters was the German polymath and physician Gottfried Leibniz 
(1646-1716) who prioritised the importance of experimentation which should also 
be formalised through the acquisition of recorded evidence. In 1714 he described 
ways in which this could be transferred directly to understanding and eradicating 
the cause of disease 
I would wish that greater attention were given to advances in practical 
Medicine, by distinguishing the simple hypothesis from the plausible 
conjecture, and the very likely conjecture from the factual certainty. But 
above all, that more attention were paid to making and recording 
observations411 
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As Rey has argued, the importance of such comments by Leibniz were highly 
significant in that they officially endorsed scientific experimentation and 
observation as the only way medical practice could advance beyond conjecture into 
the realms of actual practice.412 Such views, along with a growing commitment to 
empiricism, also provided those who were increasingly committed to proving 
preventative health to be an achievable target with the methodologies needed to 
finally establish their views as bone fide medical practice. However, the type of 
observations promoted by Leibniz could only take on any relevance if they took 
place within a defined and assessable context. Civilian societies were far from ideal 
as they were too diverse and generally unable to facilitate measurable 
experimentation. It was problems such as these which made military and naval 
populations far more appropriate in terms of being suitable for empirical studies, 
simply on the grounds that they were a fixed entity. 
Nevertheless, one of the first attempts to quantifiably assess medical progress did 
take place in a civilian setting. The physician, Francis Clifton,413 published two highly 
influential books in which he outlined ways in which quantifiable evidence could be 
used to measure the results of new medical practise.414 The first text “Tabular 
Observations Recommended as the Plainest and Surest way of Practising and 
Improving Physick,”415 is far better known as it introduced the concept of recording 
data taken regularly from patients in a tabulated model. Clifton’s aim was to bring 
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an end to archaic theories which he believed produced very little real medical 
progress, and replace them with detailed, factual summaries which would elucidate 
the true origin and nature of disease. To this end, he outlined the type of data 
which should be gathered, including information on type of disease and treatment, 
environmental factors and a range of personal facts, which would then be recorded 
on forms. To help with this process he provided sample forms which could be 
applied in a range of diverse settings as well as providing examples of how a 
completed entry should be presented.416 However it is only possible to understand 
the extent of Clifton’s radical ideas by looking at his second, much rarer publication, 
published in 1732. His  text “The State of Physick, ancient and modern, briefly 
considered: with a plan for the improvement”417 was written as a companion piece 
to explain in detail the methodology and structure which should be implemented in 
order to collate this type of quantifiable material. Clifton advocated the 
employment of salaried hospital statisticians to collect data from patients, who at 
the end of each year “would publish these facts just as they are, leaving everyone 
to make the best use of ‘em (sic.) he can for himself.”418 
Clifton’s work was highly innovative, not just in the methods he devised but the 
way in which he saw medicine and its practitioners as needing to emerge from a 
background of privilege into a position whereby issues relating to healthcare were a 
shared concern by all. His sense of pragmatism provided a model in which illness 
and its causes could be organised in a way which all those committed to rational 
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empiricism could also follow and adopt. His early death in Jamaica in 1734419 
remains unexplained although his legacy was assured by the way in which both 
military and civilian practitioners rapidly adopted the inclusion of tabulated 
material in their work. One of his most outspoken early supporters was the 
physician William Hillary (1699-1763) who argued 
…the great Lord Verulam having soon after that, detailed and exploded the 
Errors of the Aristotelian Philosophy, and shewed Mankind the right Way to 
arrive at the Knowledge of Truth, especially in all Philosophical, and 
consequently in all medical Subjects, by the Means of accurate 
Observations, just Experiments, and true inductive Reasoning…420 
 
For Hillary, inductive reasoning was the future for medical theory and practice. 
Despite having a successful practice in England, he accepted a post in Barbados in 
1752 aware of the unique opportunities it afforded him to study a range of 
different populations confined in one small area. In preparation for the type of 
evidence he was planning to collect, he took Fahrenheit’s mercurial thermometer, a 
barometer and a hygrometer with him in order to prove a direct correlation 
between weather and the outbreak of disease.421   
Although this was a civilian appointment, Hillary’s work extended to caring for 
soldiers and sailors stationed on the island. Due to the diverse groups he treated, 
his work became a valuable point of reference for all Europeans, military and 
otherwise, who were experiencing a tropical climate for the first time. Hillary 
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advocated that time should be  taken to adopt to a  new environment, arguing that 
the hot, humid climate encouraged the fibres in the body to break down and cause 
chemical changes which would then result in putrefaction. Hillary also introduced 
the term “torrid zone”422 which took on increasingly ominous significance 
throughout the century, especially in view of the fact that the mortality rate in such 
locations remained extremely high. Hillary’s claims that Europeans could eventually 
settle in such hostile areas, should be seen as highly significant in the wider context 
of affirming that Britain’s plans for colonial expansion, regardless of location, were 
achievable. 
The first military medical officer to engage in empirical research similar to that of 
Hillary, was George Cleghorn (1716-1794). 423Having graduated from Edinburgh, he 
accepted a commission as Regimental Surgeon to the 22nd Regiment of Foot who 
were stationed on the island of Minorca. As outlined in the Preface to his work, his 
major concern on first arriving was the apparent lack of existing medical knowledge 
regarding effective methods for the preservation of health for those troops under 
his care. He therefore began making a record of all factors which might affect the 
health of those living on the island in order to find the most appropriate treatment 
and whenever possible, avoid the initial point of contagion.424 What was 
particularly significant regarding the work of Cleghorn was his early understanding 
that the issues he experienced on one small island were directly transferable to 
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civilian life back in Britain, particularly in relation to the use of empirical methods in 
order to identify the most pernicious causes of disease and poor health. He 
therefore argued 
 Would all who practice physic in our factories and colonies abroad embrace 
the opportunity which their situations affords, to make proper observations 
on the sick, and communicate them to the public, we should soon have a 
more exact and ample history of diseases, than we are yet possessed of; and 
future practitioners would be enabled to shun the dangers into which many 
have fallen, and to conduct those committed to their care through the 
disorders to which they are exposed, with satisfaction and honour to 
themselves, and no small benefit to their country.425 
 
 Cleghorn’s work, first published in 1751, attracted a wide audience and was quickly 
reprinted on a further four occasions, including a fifth German translation and a 
separate publication in America. 426The response to Cleghorn’s work was significant 
in that it showed exactly how commissioned medical officers were in a unique 
position to provide a level of expertise which their civilian counterparts could not so 
easily replicate. For the thirteen years he was stationed on Minorca, Cleghorn 
collated daily climatic data from which he constructed highly accurate 
thermometric tables. 427 Although the information was basic and limited in relation 
to the variables he included, the material was sufficiently detailed to allow 
meteorological information to be standardised and comparative studies to be 
undertaken, reaffirming the danger certain weather and seasons posed to those 
who were unfamiliar with such extremes. As a military medical officer, he also had 
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access to the garrison where he studied the short and long term effects of those 
diseases most likely to affect troops, evaluating both old and new treatments, and 
implementing the latest treatments. However, as Cleghorn stated in his Preface, 
this medical progress meant very little unless it was transferred across all sections 
of society, military and civilian. 428Only in this context did he feel any information 
would truly benefit the nation by improving the general standard of living through 
closer attention to what constituted a danger to health. 
Although Cleghorn is regarded as the first medical practitioner to acknowledge the 
impact of environmental forces on the human body, his work was soon replicated 
as standard practice across a variety of locations.  This was due to the fact that 
many Scottish-trained medical practitioners were being taught to understand the 
importance of environment and meteorology as part of their medical education. As 
Alexander Monro (Primus)429 explained 
The Register of the Barometer, etc. will, we hope, not only be acceptable to 
all Lovers of natural Knowledge, but is absolutely necessary to be compared 
with the epidemical Constitution, in order to determine a Fact, concerning 
which two of the greatest and best Observations in Physick, Hippocrates and 
Sydenham, seem to differ; Hippocrates (a) appearing to assign the different 
manifest Constitutions of the Air as the causes of epidemick Diseases, and 
Sydenham (b) affirming such Diseases to depend on some undiscovered 
Quality of the Air, and not upon any of the sensible Changes in it.430 
 
 With such importance being placed on collecting and collating this type of 
information, both military and medical text books soon included basic pro-formas 
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as standard practice which could be adapted for any posting. One of the earliest 
examples of this can be seen in the works of Thomas Simes, whose work specifically 
included a large collection of standardised pro-formas431  including those for the 
monitoring of Sick Returns.432 As a regular serving officer of the Queen’s Royal 
Regiment, Simes was representative of a new generation of professional soldiers 
who were increasingly willing to be guided by the expertise of their medical 
officers, particularly in relation to locating the healthiest sites in order to prevent 
excessive cases of preventable disease, and order new standards of hygiene in the 
barracks. 
Cleghorn’s work marked the beginning of one of the most productive periods of 
early military and naval medicine, which included the celebrated achievements of 
John Pringle and James Lind as well as many others who did not attract the same 
level of popular appeal. The importance of Pringle’s work lay in the way it was 
extensively concerned with proving the danger of dirt and disease in the army 
which he illustrated through extensive in-text sources of significant figures relating 
to the increase in both morbidity and mortality. As he explained 
 Upon first being employed in the army, I soon perceived what little 
assistance I could expect from books, and therefore I began to note down 
such observations as occurred, in hopes of finding them afterwards useful in 
practice. And having contained this method to the end of the war, I have 
since put these materials into order, and with as much clearness and 
conciseness as I could, have endeavoured from my own experience to 
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supply, in some measure, what I thought so much wanting in this branch of 
medicine.433     
 
Pringle’s exclusion of recognisable quantifiable material in his best known work, 
was not so much an unfortunate omission but a recognition on his part that 
quantifiable assessment served little purpose when it came to prove that 
pestilential disease was directly associated with the environment in which troops 
were forced to live.  Pringle’s ability to present the strongest case for change was 
achieved through case studies, each of which was written specifically for a different 
type of military leader, and was subsequently highly successful in instigating major 
reforms. Only in his later work, more familiarly known as the Pringle papers, can 
evidence be found of him using a range of quantifiable evidence to promote a 
range of medical interventions.434 
In relation to advances in the navy, the emphasis was not so much on the living 
conditions aboard ships but on improving the actual physical condition of sailors, as 
seen in the work of Lind and his creation of therapeutic trials evaluating the 
effectiveness of citrus in treating and preventing Scurvy. 435 The achievements of 
Lind are significant in the way that like Pringle, he understood the importance of 
presenting incontrovertible evidence which would lead to wide ranging 
improvements. For this reason Lind relied on trialled therapies to show the most 
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successful treatment of Scurvy.436 This type of analysis and early projection 
regarding proposed outcomes was particularly advanced for its time, and despite 
the correct outcome, did little to overcome the Admiralty’s resistance to adopting 
citric acid as opposed to other foodstuffs. This led Lind to having to resort to 
simplified quantifiable evidence to make his case for ways of preventing future 
cases of Scurvy. As Chief Physician to Haslar,437 part of his role was to collate daily 
observations relating to the sailors who were admitted to the hospital. During the 
first two years of his post, he was therefore able to report that out of 5,743 
patients, 1,146 had Scurvy. He also recorded that during the Seven Year’s War it 
was not unusual for him to be presented with up to 400 “scorbutic”438 patients 
each day.439 In view of the continual problem of Scurvy, in 1772 Lind chose to 
publish a written account of his findings in the third edition of his work “A Treatise 
of the Scurvy in Three Parts.”440The very public declaration of the need and duty to 
improve conditions amongst sailors was yet another example of medical officers 
being increasingly convinced that it was possible to bring about reforms through 
the introduction of preventative health, which would also benefit the whole of 
society. 
By the end of the 1770s it had therefore become common practice for medical 
officers in both the army and the navy to facilitate change relating to the treatment 
of troops based on their personal observations and endorsed by carefully recorded 
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facts and figures. However there was a growing concern that there was a need to 
develop observational data into something which was not only far more rigorous, 
but could also lend itself to detailed analysis, through greater inclusion of 
mathematics. This call for change was led by an Edinburgh trained dispensary 
doctor, John Millar (1733-1805).  Not only did he keep detailed records of all his 
patients at the Westminster Dispensary dating back to its opening in 1774, but also 
published yearly returns. From these, Millar was able to report annual mortality 
rates which provided him with the opportunity to monitor the health of some of 
the poorest citizens in the area. Millar was also ambivalent about the claims being 
made by medical officers in relation to the scale of improvements they introduced. 
441In particular, he questioned the validity of returns submitted by the army 
physician, Donald Monro, on the grounds that his figures suggested a mortality rate 
which was better than the official figures held by the War Office. 442 
In what has become known as the Monro-Millar dispute, 443this became more than 
a question of irregularities in military reports but grew into far more serious 
allegations of professional incompetency. Millar continued to discredit Monro 
through a series of publications, the purpose of which was to repeatedly show how 
the army physician had entered false figures relating to the extent of fatal illness 
amongst the troops. In 1780 Monro took action by publishing his own account of 
the dispute, though this was not helped by his decision to be somewhat vague 
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regarding the use of official figures.444 However it did lead Monro to collate far 
more specific and accountable data when he was recalled to active service.445 
One of Monro’s more informative and successful medical engagements which he 
recorded in “Observations on the Means of Preserving the Health of Soldiers”446 
took place in England. Due to concerns that a Franco-Spanish invasion was 
imminent, plans were passed in 1778 for fortifications to be erected along the 
south coast of England, which were to be manned by local militia, as the regular 
army were heavily committed to fighting in North America. Between June and 
November 1778 Coxheath in Kent became the largest of these temporary garrisons 
covering over three miles and housing up to 17,000 militiamen and other troops447. 
The site quickly became a place of great local and national interest and found fame 
in Sheridan’s play “The Camp.”448 Monro devoted all of Part III of “Observations” to 
his time spent at Coxheath and made extensive reports relating to weather, soil, 
temperature and the outbreaks of the various diseases which affected the troops. 
Two of the most notable features of this work was the emphasis he placed on 
explaining that the slightest illness had to be reported, leading to far greater sick 
lists than was really warranted .449 This is a discussion which was never raised by 
any other military or naval medical officer of the time and suggests that it may have 
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been a form of reaction to Millar. He also made reference to the fact that he 
interacted with local doctors in Maidstone to improve his understanding of the 
location and its impact on disease.450 
Despite these efforts, Monro’s work was representative of a form of quantitative 
analysis which was increasingly showing itself to be dated. In the year prior to 
“Observations” being published, William Lempriere (1763-1834) had seen his own 
work in print which modelled what seemed to be a far more relevant level of 
engagement and analysis. Lempriere was typical of the many Edinburgh medical 
graduates of the time, who took a commission with the army, and quickly rose to 
the rank of Inspector General of Hospitals. Following a five year posting to Jamaica, 
Lempriere also published his extensive findings in 1799.451 In addition to the usual 
climatic and environmental studies, Lempriere injected a sense of urgency by 
arguing that soldiers were fundamentally a community which had temporarily been 
extracted from civil life. He also argued that unless due consideration was given to 
their very specific health needs, it was highly unlikely that any military presence in 
any foreign location would survive. Echoing the early case of political arithmetic, he 
also incorporated a question of economics, estimating that as the cost of raising, 
equipping and conveying a soldier “cannot be less than thirty pounds.”452 He added 
“At this rate, to supply the number of men lost to the service of Jamaica during the 
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above period, would require the sum of 69,960 (pounds).”453 For Lempriere the 
need for action was clear  
These strong and undeniable facts, cannot fail to impress the mind with a 
melancholy reflection, on the dreadful ravages to which our troops have 
been exposed in tropical climates; and as the impulse of humanity, the 
dictates of policy, and the necessity of economy, urge us to enquire, 
whether it be practicable to adopt such measures as may be the most likely 
to lessen an evil, so fatal to the population of the country, so destructive to 
our resources, and so repugnant to the humanity of the British nation.454 
 
Had this simply been a question of economics, then it is possible that Lempriere’s 
concerns not have attracted further attention. However, previously in 1791 Robert 
Jackson had used a similar posting as medical officer to look at the general standard 
of men in the Regiments sent out to the West Indies. He found the majority to be in 
an extremely poor state of health and stated that there was a twofold cause to this 
malaise. First, he identified that most British soldiers were recruited from unhealthy 
urban locations which affected the general health of the men, and secondly, he 
found that many had also been previously employed in the factories where the 
sedentary nature of the work carried out in an atmosphere of impure air created an 
environment where disease easily spread. 455 It was therefore inevitable that 
Lempriere’s economic argument created a third issue, namely that money was 
being invested in training recruits many of whom were physically and pathologically 
weakened even before their arrival in a hostile climate such as the West Indies, and 
as such were a financial loss. 
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Whilst this was representative of a new level of medical thought and engagement, 
the concerns it raised did not make it popular with either the military or civilian 
authorities. Questions were already being raised with regards how industrialisation 
and urbanisation were impacting on the general population, long before the era of 
Chadwick. In relation to the need to maintain a strong military and commercial 
presence in the West Indies, Lempriere was at least able to prove through highly 
detailed numerical and written accounts, including comparative studies with local 
settlers, that different parts of the island provided healthier locations for the 
troops. He also argued for the continuation of quarterly returns to ensure constant 
monitoring of the health of all regiments posted to the island.456 
Despite Lempriere posing solutions to finding ways of overcoming the very real 
health problems faced by British troops stationed in places like the West Indies, the 
mortality rates remained stubbornly high. This led the army doctor, Thomas 
Dickson Reide to continue to call for all medical practice to be applicable to the 
entire population, aware of the fact that preventative health could never be 
successful if it remained selective. Dickson Reide has, in the past historiography 
been incorrectly overlooked in terms of acknowledging the influence he exerted in 
developing early measures of “public health.”457He initially trained at the 
Westminster Dispensary under the guidance of John Millar, though left in 1776 
when he accepted a commission in the army. In the following years he was posted 
throughout Britain, North America and the West Indies. During this time he 
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developed an early interest in fever. Despite early nosological attempts to define 
different types, the term “fever” was widely and often inappropriately used. 
Diseases such as Typhus and Typhoid Fever were all too familiar in cramped, filthy 
housing and were as common in the cities as in the barracks. Dickson Reide became 
interested in finding ways of implementing a more efficient form of treatment for 
fever cases amongst the troops.458 The results of this extensive study was published 
in 1793 459  and whilst it represented a highly advanced example of quantifiable 
evidence and analysis, for the first time it prompted an unfavourable reaction from 
the military medical authorities. He stated in the work that in an attempt to save 
money, certain medicines were withheld for those diseases classified as incurable. 
The authorities attempted to suppress its publication and although this was 
unsuccessful, he was expelled from the Army Medical Service460. 
Dickson Reide had no personal issues with the army but more with the medical 
infrastructure contained within it. As seen from his obituary461 he continued to hold 
positions of responsibility in both the militia and the regular army and wrote a 
series of manuals aimed at improving military efficiency, though he never returned 
to the Army Medical Board which limited the changes he could realistically 
introduce. However he remained a fervent advocate of quantifiable evidence in an 
empirical setting and provided one of the clearest definitions of the time 
A practice founded on uncertain theories and opinions, unsupported by 
well-authenticated facts, is the cause of great mortality in public and private 
practice, particularly in the army and navy. Theory is a rock on which too 
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many practitioners split. A scrupulous attention to the division and 
subdivision of diseases occupies too much of their time, which might 
otherwise be employed in attending to clinical practice, and keeping proper 
registers of diseases. A physician, without the assistance of regular registers, 
can form no idea of the result of his own practice, much less of its 
comparative success. Partial registers are yet worse than none, as they are 
not only defective, but fallacious, leaving abundant scope for error and 
mistake, into which physicians must unavoidably be led by their prejudices, 
even though their intentions should be perfectly upright.462  
  
Dickson Reide, like other military and naval contemporaries increasingly recognised 
the need to avoid differentiating between the military and civilian population when 
it came to understanding, treating and preventing illness. Rather he recognised and 
promoted the idea that empirical medicine had the potential to create a safe 
system applicable to all, regardless of status. As he concluded in his work 
These records not only prove at one view the event of the practice adopted, 
but also afford materials from which intelligent statesmen, naval and 
military commanders, physicians, philosophers and mathematicians may 
form various calculations in political arithmetic, which may be of use in the 
deliberations of the Cabinet, in the direction of military arrangements, the 
practice of medicine, operations of finance, commerce, manufactures, 
agriculture, and in every branch of political Oeconomy; and may contribute  
effectively to eradicate obstinate prejudices concerning the invincible 
virulence of certain diseases, and the inevitable mortality of particular 
climates which have too long screened a destructive practice, and led 
unwary politicians into dangerous errors to the ruin of fleets and armies, the 
disappointment of the best-concerted and best-conducted military 
enterprises, the loss of many settlements and to the imminent danger of all 
our remaining colonies.463 
 
Dickson Reide is therefore central to emphasising the argument that the army and 
navy played a far greater role in establishing preventative health for all than as yet 
has been acknowledged. His understanding of the importance of quantifiable 
                                                          
462 Dickson Reide, "A View of the Diseases of the Army." Preface p. xii-xiii 
463 Ibid. p.334-335 
176 
 
evidence developed beyond the point of providing models for the identification and 
treatment of disease but focused on the wider issue of how all branches of society 
could benefit from this type of information. No other medical author of the time 
created such as all-encompassing argument for the maintenance of health to take 
on such a central role until the sanitary movement of the nineteenth century, and 
although Dickson Reide made no further contributions to this discussion, his work 
provided a significant point of reference to those who followed. 
Within the military setting, quantitative analysis was now an expectation of all 
medical staff who were required to record their daily practice, in order to 
accumulate a range of different statistics. In some cases these records were 
developed by men such as Dr John Rollo who was stationed for lengthy periods of 
time in the West Indies.464 Rollo was a prolific recorder throughout all his 
postings465  As well as documenting weather, geology and other physical entities, 
he altered the standard record sheets as he felt it was important to include the 
colour of the patient’s hair in order to understand their temperament. This early 
physiological interest was an extension of the wider discussion beginning to take 
place on whether human attributes could explain a proclivity towards certain 
diseases. Rollo also believed that social status played a significant role in making 
groups and individuals more vulnerable to particular diseases. He also claimed that 
the military structure enforced and even replicated social segregation, to the 
detriment of the rank and file.466  However Rollo himself appears not to have 
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suffered unduly from certain views and was made the first Surgeon-General of the 
Ordnance Medical Department, which allowed him to initiate a range of far-
reaching reforms regarding improving the health of garrisons, including hospital 
and healthcare administration. What is particularly significant is that when Rollo 
published his work outlining his plans for reforms in the army medical services, it 
was reviewed by the London Medical Review.467In addition to finding much to 
recommend, the journal emphasised that Rollo’s methods for collecting data were 
so valuable that it should be read and copied by all medical practitioners and 
administrators concerned with establishing or regulating an infirmary.468 
By the early nineteenth century, the inclusion of quantifiable material had become 
standard practice and was regarded as an indicator of professional scientific and 
medical achievement. Whilst the military and naval medical officers had tended to 
predominantly look at the problems of environment, climate and confined living 
conditions which matched their most pressing needs, civilian medical authors 
tended to focus more on specific diseases as typified by the control of Smallpox. 
Moreover, it is also possible to see that general discussions relating to how shared 
studies could benefit all sections of society tended to come from the military and 
naval practitioners. There were indeed very few reciprocal attempts from civilian 
doctors as to how general medical improvements could help the many thousands of 
soldiers and sailors who were engaged in what appeared to be a state of constant 
conflict. Civilian medicine, both in theory and practice therefore continued to 
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predominantly reflect the needs of the non-military sections of the British 
population. 
One of the most interesting discussions on the civilian/military divide at this time 
came from Dr Edward Bancroft (1772-1842) who had been central to the 
discussions surrounding the Fifth Report.469 Despite enjoying a highly successful 
military career, Bancroft was representative of a very different but equally 
significant group of medical officers who were trained in England, in his case, at 
Cambridge University. The predominance of Scottish graduates in the army and 
navy was accepted as accurate though it would be inaccurate to acknowledge that 
there were also a small but significant number who received their training in 
England. Bancroft was one such example and following many postings abroad, he 
became Inspector General of Army Hospitals.470 As with other medical officers of 
the age, he also held a civilian post as physician at St. Georges Hospital, London, 
which led him to state that not only did he believe civilian medical practitioners to 
be better trained to meet the medical needs of the army and navy, but also 
considered it to be incorrect to see military diseases as in some way different 
approaches to all others. 471He argued that those looking to prove the existence of 
this idea through either observational or quantitative methods were incorrect on 
the grounds that 
…believing, doubtless, that men who enlist as soldiers, thereby change their 
physical constitutions and become susceptible of diseases which do not 
exist in civil life; or that causes of disease operate on soldiers differently 
from what they do upon other men. How you come to adopt an opinion so 
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destitute to all solid foundation, I will not determine. Certainly you did not 
find it in the works of Sir John Pringle, or Doctors Cleghorne, Brocklesby, 
Donald Monro, John Hunter, and others, who have written professionally on 
the diseases most prevalent in armies.472 
 
Bancroft did not see what could be gained by understanding and responding to 
disease by relying on unnecessary divisions arising from aspects such as occupation 
rather than looking at ways of removing the primary causes. In this respect he was 
correct in citing men such as Pringle and other commissioned medical officers who 
from the earliest days, had promoted the importance of using preventative 
medicine to ensure a strong healthy society in its entirety, rather than focus on the 
most susceptible sectors. Despite the sophistication of Bancroft’s argument, no 
further discussion of this type took place, with events in Scotland establishing 
military medicine as the correct specialism to ensure the care of all soldiers and 
sailors. 
Despite the continued concern that disease remained a major problem amongst the 
ranks, military and naval medical officers continued to look for ways of 
implementing preventative health as an initiative for all, firm in their conviction 
that theirs was the correct approach. They also remained committed to an 
empirical methodology which was presented with increasingly more sophisticated 
numerical analysis. As the naval surgeon Gilbert Blane stated 
There is a great difficulty attending all practical inquiries in medicine; for in 
order to ascertain truth, in a manner that is satisfactory to a mind 
habituated to chaste investigation, there must be a series of patient and 
attentive observations upon a great number of cases, and the different trials 
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must be varied, weighed and compared, in order to form a proper estimate 
of the real efficacy of different remedies and modes of treatment.473 
 
Blane was not the only one committed to standards such as these. Throughout the 
eighteenth century fellow naval and military medical officers had established a level 
of excellence with regards collation of relevant quantitative material. However it is 
important to note that it still tended to rely on basic comparison between groups 
who were either sick or well which limited the value in terms of more detailed 
breakdown of information. It is therefore interesting to see that men such as Blane 
were beginning to acknowledge the need of more critical evaluation as seen by his 
use of the term “weighed” in the above quote. Unfortunately there was no attempt 
on his part to try to incorporate new methods of analysis, possibly due to his own 
limitation of mathematical knowledge.474 
Nevertheless Blane remained a staunch advocate of quantitative analysis, even at 
the most basic level on the grounds that 
It is only the matter of fact, as established by evidence, with which those 
civil and military authorities have to do, to whom is entrusted the sacred 
charge of public health. These authorities perceiving the jarring opinions of 
medical men, may, without deference or reference to them, undertake to 
judge for themselves, on a point to which any man of good sense and 
understanding is competent, as it hangs upon matters to be decided on by 
the rules of evidence, not involving professional knowledge.475 
   
Blane was fortunate in that his reputation ensured that his views carried far greater 
weight amongst both civilian and military communities than many of his 
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predecessors. Although his medical career had initially been with the navy, in 1783 
Blane was also elected to the staff of St Thomas’s Hospital476 where he met William 
Black. In 1785 the two men opened the Dispensary for Poor Married Women which 
gave him additional experience in understanding the needs not just of the poor as 
one vast collective, but also in recognising the needs of specific groups such as 
women and children, which he recorded in the form of detailed patient notes. This 
material was later presented during his term of office as President of the Medico-
Chirurgical Society of London in 1813 when he introduced fellow members to the 
value of comparative studies such as those used in the navy. 477 Blane also 
considered himself well-placed in order to attempt to provide an overview of the 
state of the nation in relation to specific aspects including food, habitation and 
occupation in relation to the effects they had on health and disease of the general, 
though predominantly working-class, population. With regards the state of 
Birmingham he wrote  
The operation in metals have been alleged as the cause of this; but it is 
much more probably owing to the want of attention to cleanliness and 
ventilation, particularly with regard to the streets, which are said to be very 
narrow and dirty.478 
 
Blane also commented on the state of Manchester in relation to the rate of urban 
sprawl and the deterioration of areas where the poorest sections of the town were 
found to be existing in increasing squalor.  However, he also directly commented on 
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the achievements of civilian doctors and the work they were undertaking to 
improve living and working conditions. Blane particularly admired the work of 
Thomas Percival who is credited with being one of the most influential empirical 
physicians of the age. As a result of his studies in the textile mills of Manchester, 
Percival led the demand for direct government legislation to control the conditions 
inside factories and mills.479 Blane, perhaps more than most, was particularly aware 
of the changes being imposed on the country through industrialisation and 
urbanisation, and saw this as not just a threat to the health of military recruits but 
in terms of how it was likely to affect the population in general.  
Throughout his life, Blane therefore exerted a considerable influence over many 
aspects of preventative health measures across all sections of society. However he 
never failed to recognise the need to improve the life expectancy of sailors in the 
navy. To achieve this he remained a staunch supporter of monthly returns which 
were sent to him by all surgeons in the fleet.480 However the one major change 
which he alone implemented was in finding the most effective way of assessing 
basic data in ways which gave it more meaningful results. Blane clearly understood 
that naval data on its own would reiterate the same response and he therefore 
decided to access insurance tables and population returns.481 He acknowledged 
that results taken from The Equitable Assurance Office were biased in favour of 
only the healthiest being offered insurance and so looked solely at population 
                                                          
479 Percival is recognised as the originator of occupational health in addition to publishing the first 
text book on Medical Ethics 
480 Blane, "Observations on the Diseases Incident to Seamen." See Preface. 
481 "Select Dissertations on Several Subjects of Medical Science." As taken from “The Health of 
Seamen. Selections from the Works of Dr. James Lind, Sir Gilbert Blane and Dr. Thomas Trotter” ed. 
C. Lloyd p.188-189 
183 
 
returns for 1811.482Whilst this gave Blane a point of reference that the mortality 
rate in the navy was higher than it should have been, it nevertheless showed him 
how inaccurate all records were in relation to providing reliable information. He 
even applied this to the navy, questioning what was meant by mortality in terms of 
whether it specifically applied to deaths in hospital or if it included fatalities whilst 
at sea.483 
Blane was keenly aware of the need to openly promote the improvements made in 
the navy regarding the health of the ships crews. Therefore in 1830 he published his 
findings for public readership in “Progressive Improvement of the Health of the 
Royal Navy” all be it aware that the information was not as accurate as it may have 
been. In a response which was reminiscent of the earlier Millar-Monro dispute, this 
time it was led by none other than  Thomas Wakely, editor of the Lancet who  took 
issue with what he perceived to be what he considered to be inadequate attention 
relating to the accuracy of such returns. Furthermore, he went on to exhort the 
medical directorates of both the Army and the Navy to issue standardised and 
tabulated returns annually.484 Wakley’s pro-military position should however be 
seen as part of his own radical politics which questioned the right of any part of the 
establishment to  inflict its actions on the under privileged, rather than directly 
endorsing the rights of the country’s armed forces to be credited with a level of 
protection which was denied the rest of civilian society. Moreover, what can be 
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seen in the views of men such as Wakley was an inherent distrust of military and 
naval intentions when it could not be directly controlled and monitored by society. 
Blane must have been aware of views such as these, though it did not stop him 
from actively promoting preventative medicine as seen in his endorsement of 
vaccination. He continued to promote this as what he saw as an example of 
excellence in relation to the benefits that it could bring to all sections of society and 
celebrated the fact that both the army and navy saw fit to enforce vaccination and 
berated the failure of those who were in a position to achieve the same 
intervention amongst civilian society.485 However Blane was convinced that this 
should be blamed on the actions of the press who he accused of “licentiousness”486 
and promoting “votaries of depravity and error” 487rather than being “advocates of 
truth”.488 
This level of investment in the importance of quantitative analysis to promote 
preventative health, continued in the work of Henry Marshall (1775-1851) who is 
generally acknowledged to be one of the army’s most important medical 
statisticians and reformers.489 Having graduated from Glasgow, Marshall originally 
accepted a naval commission but transferred to the army where he remained for 
the rest of his professional life. His extensive travels and interest in Botany were 
recorded in his extensive published works. However he became increasingly 
concerned about the state of health of those troops under his care, particularly 
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with regards to diseases such as Cholera. Following a series of international 
postings, Marshall returned home in 1821. Two years later he published 
“Observations of the State of Health of the Troops in North Britain.” This work was 
significant in a number of ways. To begin with, its title is somewhat misleading as 
Marshall had much wider objectives in mind. As he explained, the work had three 
main objectives. Not only did he wish to gather information which would show the 
exact extent of diseases in particular situations, but he also wanted to establish 
accurate ratios of fatality, and finally work out the proportional mortality among 
people within a certain district.490  However as he soon found out, it was a virtual 
impossibility to get a comparative set of data on civilian health as the structure for 
doing this was not present. He therefore resorted to using army medical returns as 
they “…possess a precision superior, perhaps, to all others on account of their 
exactness with which the (troop) strength may be ascertained.”491 
Marshall was, like all other military and medical officers of the time increasingly 
concerned by the continued, and in many cases, worsening state of the population 
in relation to meeting the needs of recruitment. It was therefore pertinent to these 
concerns that five years later he published “Hints to Young Medical Officers”. This 
work was primarily aimed at standardising the medical examination process as well 
as to provide advice with regards to identifying cases of feigned sickness.492What is 
                                                          
490 Henry Marshall, "Observations on the State of Health of the Troops in North Britain," The London 
medical and Physical Journal 50 (1823). p.275 
491 Ibid. p.275 
492 In most cases soldiers who were classed as no longer fit could leave the army with a pension. This 
led to a significant number attempting to feign a sufficiently dangerous condition. 
186 
 
particularly relevant was the concern shown by Marshall in relation to the standard 
of health of many potential recruits 
There is a very objectionable description of recruits often met with in large 
cities, namely, young men whose health has suffered from debauchery of 
various kinds. Their peculiar appearance is commonly well marked; 
complexion wan and colourless, doughy sodden look, tremulous lips and 
hands, clean teeth, breath and smell peculiar to spirit drinkers; often 
fullness of the belly and tendency to fatness ..I know of no species of 
recruits more unfit for service.493 
 
The problems which Marshall identified are interesting in the way they show a 
development beyond previous concern relating the unhealthy environment of 
urban living to something far more insidious, namely the moral degeneration of 
those who lived in such places. These were the type of men which Marshall did not 
regard as suitable either physically or mentally to be recruited as soldiers in the 
British army. The response to this publication by its civilian reviewer is equally 
informative.494  Reminding the reader that many who volunteered were acting out 
little more than boyish whimsical fancies495, the inevitable degradation and 
depravity was made to seem all the more indicative of the horrors of military life. In 
the post-Napoleonic era, publications such as Marshall’s achieved little in terms of 
showing the real dangers of urban living, but were increasingly being read in terms 
of military life being responsible for brutalising the innocent recruits who joined in 
the belief they were serving King and Country. 
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Marshall continued to attempt to improve conditions for all troops by focusing on 
detailed statistical returns.496 Having attempted to standardise medical practices in 
the army he returned once again to looking at the effects on climate upon troops 
and associated civilians. He also remained acutely aware of any scientific 
explanation as to why certain diseases affected some countries and not others. He 
also continued to study the health of Europeans in particularly hostile climates.497At 
a time when Britain’s colonial aspirations were gathering momentum, Marshall’s 
work was taking on a new level of significance and acceptability. When he further 
suggested that there should be an official study made of regular returns from all 
military posts across the Empire, the response was more than favourable.498 
Marshall acknowledged that what could be termed official military statistics dated 
back to the time of McGrigor, who introduced the practice in 1816. Twenty years 
later there were over one hundred and sixty volumes of numerical information 
relating different aspects of army health. The realisation that this served little 
purpose unless it was given a specific focus was finally acknowledged in 1835 when 
Earl Grey in his capacity of Secretary at war ordered Marshall and Tulloch to 
prepare a definitive statistical evaluation of the West Indies which would finally 
bring the area into a state of manageable control for civilian and military settlers 
alike. The success of this venture began a new era in military medical statistics 
which was defined by the commitment of Marshall, Tulloch and Balfour. Yet despite 
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the advances made with regards military health, no further attempt was made to 
apply the material to a civilian context. 
One of the most important reasons for this was the growing interest in statistical 
analysis by civilians and government departments. The first official quantitative 
material was produced in 1832 by the Statistical Office which had been established 
within the Board of Trade,  followed by the creation of the General Register Office 
in 1837, an establishment which created some of the most influential and reliable 
data. In addition to these public departments, there was also the private statistical 
branch of the British Association for the Advancement of Science as well as the 
Statistical Society of London with its own journal which became one of the most 
influential publications of the age.499 Yet regardless of whether it was a private or 
government venture, all groups with an interest in statistics shared the belief that 
only when complete sets of figures had been collated could attention turn to 
overcoming the many issues of the age. As the Council of the Statistical Society 
explained 
The science of Statistics differs from Political Economy, because, although it 
has the same view in end, it does not discuss causes nor reason upon 
probable effects: it seeks only to collate, arrange and compare, that class of 
facts which alone can form the basis of correct conclusions with respect to 
social and political government…like other sciences, that of Statistics seeks 
to deduce from well-established facts certain general principles which 
interest and affect mankind…but its peculiarity is that it proceeds wholly by 
the accumulation and comparison of facts, and does not admit any kind of 
speculation.500 
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Initially the aim of the journal was to provide a publication where papers read 
before the Society could be disseminated to a wider population beyond London and 
report on similar provincial meetings. However, it also became a valuable point of 
publication by military medical office who recognised the potential it offered with 
regards dissemination of information. As early as the third volume of July 1838, the 
lead article was a report on the lecture given by Tulloch he and Marshall had been 
ordered to write. The Editor personally acknowledged the importance of this work 
in relation to supporting the expansion of the British colonies, and considered it 
appropriate to remind the readership that such information had done much to 
improve the conditions of the British military, which played such a vital role in 
securing the prosperity of the country.  
The formal response, printed the following year501 was written by a civilian 
practitioner, Dr J W C Lever.  What is interesting about Lever’s article is the extent 
to which he critically analysed the findings of Tulloch’s report, bringing to the fore 
concerns regarding its basic statistical value as well as highlighting missed 
opportunities in relation to possible discussion in relation to wider societal issues.  
Lever was particularly interested in appraising   the state of health of the military 
but by re-establishing it within the context of the needs of society as a whole. He 
proposed that the general wellbeing of soldiers could only be measured effectively 
if it was compared against the health of other occupational groups found in London. 
Using the data available and working on the premise that during peacetime the 
soldiers living quarters and rations were certainly likely to be superior to civilian 
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counterparts, Lever argued that one should expect to see military populations 
showing an improved mortality rates compared to society in general. However 
Lever’s own analysis found that this was not the case. He therefore looked for other 
explanations and in doing so claimed 
This, at first sight, indicates that the military profession operates 
prejudicially on the health and constitution of its members; but it may in 
some degree be explained by the great difference between the mortality in 
the towns, where the troops are generally quartered, and that in the rural 
districts; in comparing, therefore, the mortality of military with that of civil 
life, it is necessary to take for our standard of comparison, not the average 
of the whole kingdom, but of those towns in which the troops are generally 
quartered, and where the density of the population is found to operate so 
prejudicially on health.502 
 
Lever is therefore particularly significant in that he was one of the first civilian 
medical practitioners to respond to military health issues in terms of presenting the 
relationship which existed between the state of the country, the standard of health 
of the armed forces and the impact of ongoing socio-economic changes. This was a 
concern long held by military medical officers but for the first time there were 
indications regarding a possible dialogue of shared responsibility with their civilian 
counterparts. However, any hope for this was short-lived and in the following years 
the emerging public health movement was defined as much by its concentration on 
the needs of society as by Chadwick’s personal influence which led to not only the 
exclusion of the military experts but also a large proportion of the medical 
profession of the time. Only with the demise of Chadwick and the introduction of 
the sanitary movement was scientific medicine permitted to directly influence 
decisions and policies affecting the health of the entire nation. But by this time both 
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the army and the navy had also withdrawn from any general concerns relating to 
the needs of society and were developing their own specialism of military medicine. 
Following the work of men such as McGrigor and Guthrie the military and naval 
medical services combined extensive statistical information along with a growing 
commitment to scientific studies centred within their own medical institutions, 
such as Haslar and eventually the hospital at Netley. Here the physical health of 
troops became the priority of the medical boards rather than relying on the initial 
state of health of recruits when they first enlisted. Although much has been written 
concerning the findings of the 1858 Royal Sanitary Commission and the decision to 
formally integrate medical statistics in order to bring about reforms in of the 
military503, in reality this was a process which had already been introduced by both 
the army and the navy dating back to the previous century, and had achieved 
considerable improvement in terms of proving the value of preventative health 
measures. 
In conclusion, quantifiable analysis therefore played a major role in the emerging 
specialism of military and naval medicine in terms of endorsing the importance of 
preventative health measures by providing a measurable set of criteria which not 
only defined specific problems but which also allowed early attempts at comparison 
which could be used to assess achievements or failures. Its adaptability in terms of 
the type of data it could accommodate made it an ideal model for both military and 
naval medical officers who in turn were some of the earliest practitioners to 
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promote its use when it came to illustrating both the state of health and the 
possible causes of disease amongst those men who were placed under their care.  
The importance of moving away from purely theoretical medicine towards practical 
models which recognised the value and scope of empirical methodologies, was a 
response which gained momentum during the European Enlightenment. The 
changing nature and demands of society, particularly in regards to matters of 
health, required a level of modernity which archaic, traditional thinking could not 
accommodate. Although this was not solely confined to medical officers in the 
armed forces, as illustrated by the events surrounding the early control of Smallpox, 
the distinct needs and characteristics of the military and naval health care provision 
created an ideal environment in which data could be collected, collated and 
analysed. As seen by the individual examples discussed in this chapter, the true 
potential of incorporating quantifiable analysis was therefore quickly recognised by 
those practitioners whose distinct postings provided an ideal study in which the 
early attempts to create preventative health as standard practice could be 
developed. This was also endorsed through the specific training many received in 
Scottish universities which encouraged experimentation and the facility to 
recognise cause and effect when attempting to understand the nature of disease. 
In an age prior to the advent of scientific medicine, it is also important to recognise 
quantitative analysis was the most accurate way of evaluating innovation. The 
increasing detail it demanded and the inclusion of concepts such as comparison 
also gave it a value, despite the fact that for much of the eighteenth century it was 
without the benefit of more sophisticated mathematical procedures. Nevertheless 
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the findings of both military and naval medical officers carried sufficient weight for 
the authorities to act accordingly and implement reforms. It is unfortunate the 
limited success of many of these has often been emphasised through reference to 
the fact that disease continued to be one of the main causes of mortality in both 
the armed forces until the second half of the eighteenth century. However had it 
not been for the adoption of quantifiable methods by medical officers, it is possible 
to argue that the state of health of soldiers and sailors would not have attracted the 
level of attention it did prior to the reforms of the later nineteenth century. 
Moreover, the evidence that the same medical officers collated also served to 
reinforce their belief that any attempts to implement preventative health measures 
could only be successful if they were applied to the British population in its entirety. 
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Chapter Five: The battle for supremacy regarding the control of Yellow Fever and 
Cholera. 
 
The aim of the following chapter is to illustrate the extent to which both the army 
and navy had, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, developed a level of 
specialism and expertise in relation to aspects of early preventative health which 
now surpassed that found in civilian medicine. The significance of this became 
increasingly apparent in relation to two diseases, both of which were initially 
regarded as solely the concern of the army and navy, now threated to affect the 
British population. In the case of both Yellow Fever and Cholera, their prevalence in 
the most remote but strategically important areas of British control led to extensive 
studies by medical officers which will be examined in terms of the empirical 
methodology which by this time defined the training of many of the medical 
officers. This also led to an increasing level of engagement with civilian bodies 
regarding the wider issue of how disease was transmitted. Therefore a second 
aspect of the chapter will also focus on the debate surrounding contagionism and 
how this affected controls such as quarantine. The third area of discussion will 
include a detailed analysis of the actions taken to prevent the appearance of 
Cholera which illustrate the extent to which military medicine in particular was 
increasingly being regarded as being at variance with civilian communities. This is of 
particular significance in terms of identifying the growing anti-military feelings 
which were taking hold across the country, and the long term effects this had in 
isolating military medical expertise in preventative health from becoming a major 
aspect in future civilian initiatives. 
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By the early decades of the nineteenth century military and naval medicine was 
sufficiently well established to be regarded as a discreet specialism in its own right. 
The expert knowledge acquired through modern and relevant studies, supported by 
a methodology which facilitated standardisation of treatment, ensured that 
increasingly larger numbers of soldiers and sailors were benefitting from 
preventative health in ways which their civilian counterparts rarely experienced. 
Yet for much of the period this difference in experience meant very little. Most 
military and naval medicine was delivered in a context which was increasingly 
removed both geographically and conceptually from the homeland. The diseases 
common amongst troops stationed in the East and West Indies meant very little to 
those who were not able to observe them at first hand.  Only if this experience was 
replicated back in Britain would it be likely that the highly specialised knowledge of 
commissioned medical officers might begin to bear any relevance to the general 
population. 
For much of the period under discussion, the diseases experienced by soldiers and 
sailors formed a lengthy and generally fearful list. Whilst there was no such entity 
as an illness which only affected these men, there were nonetheless, certain 
pathogens which showed a marked propensity towards military and naval settings. 
Hence Dysentery increasingly became the scourge of the army, whilst Typhus was a 
particular problem for the navy where the cramped, filthy holds created a near-
perfect environment for its transmission.  In the case of both of these diseases and 
many like them, it is important to emphasise that similar environments could easily 
be found in a civilian setting, not least the ever-worsening slum areas, packed 
workhouses and jails, but the numbers of those infected did not appear to match 
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the many thousands of soldiers and sailors who were infected time and time again. 
This was inevitable as military conflict by its very nature involved gathering large 
numbers of men, many of whom were already suffering from the effects of poverty, 
who were then confined in small, poorly equipped areas such as temporary camps 
or poorly built barracks. Consequently it not only exacerbated problems, such as 
the high incidence of disease, but also led weight to the idea that soldiers and 
sailors were more prone to illness, than those employed in non-military 
occupations. 504Added to this was the increasingly relevant aspect of location which 
lent itself to the additional problem of the unfamiliar, both in terms of physical 
environment and new types of disease, which had no point of reference back in 
Britain.505 
Throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century medical officers in both 
the army and the navy therefore increasingly became aware of the urgency to try to 
eradicate the cause of illness rather than rely on existing methods of treatment, 
many of which were generally ineffective.506 As seen in the previous chapters, 
medical officers increasingly used the unique opportunities which came about in 
their postings to understand through empirical methods how elements such as 
climate and environment negatively impacted on health. Moreover, the advantages 
of specific training in Scottish universities and a wealth of publications which 
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discussed the nature of disease and ways of preserving health provided medical 
officers with the confidence to talk as specialists not just in a military and naval 
context, but also in relation to events in the civilian world.  
By the early nineteenth century preventative health was therefore inextricably 
linked to the work of medical officers in both the armed forces. With the exception 
of early events surrounding the introduction of inoculation, civilian medical 
practitioners were rarely in a position to take on a similar role and looked to their 
military and naval counterparts to initiate change in relation to controlling the 
worst excesses of disease. This became particularly apparent with the appearance 
of Yellow Fever and Cholera, both of which had a reputation which instilled a 
genuine sense of alarm.507 Although each of the diseases had long been known to 
both soldiers and sailors, it was only when there appeared to be a very real fear 
that they could spread to Britain that the medical profession at large acknowledged 
a need to find ways of preventing this from happening. Consequently, for the first 
time one sees unprecedented involvement by medical officers not just working 
alongside civilian practitioners but actively taking the lead in response to the fact 
that they possessed the most appropriate knowledge to ensure that the British 
population would not fall victim to this very real threat to the country’s well-being. 
However, as will be seen in the following discussion, at the very point at which 
military and naval intervention was noted as being highly appropriate and 
transferrable, the same question of expertise also became a contentious issue, 
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primarily in the way that it was feared as being the point at which military medicine 
could effectively exert undue influence over civilian affairs. Unlike other European 
countries where militarism was an acceptable part of life, in Britain there was far 
greater reticence to granting more power to the military than was absolutely 
necessary. In the years following the defeat of Napoleon, the patriotic fervour of 
the previous century was replaced with the stark reality that military and naval 
victories had effectively ruined the economy both in terms of financial outlay and 
the social instability which followed in the wake of returning soldiers to 
communities which were increasingly unable to accommodate them. The sympathy 
and compassion for the ordinary soldier and sailor which Colley identifies in the 
eighteenth century was now replaced by mistrust and public rejection.508 Questions 
were even raised in parliament regarding whether it was appropriate to maintain a 
standing army.509 
The dilemma which accompanied the threat of Yellow Fever and Cholera was 
therefore extremely complex in relation to the realisation that the only way to 
protect society involved finding a balance between granting military doctors 
sufficient freedom to establish adequate control and the medical civilian body, 
represented as always by the Royal College of Physicians, from retaining some 
autonomy without placing thousands of lives at risk. In the early years, some 
common ground was possible through the common practice of quarantine which 
was first used as a method of epidemiological control when bubonic plague first 
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appeared in Europe from 1347 to 1352.510 The use of a physical cordon was for 
many years the only effective way of stopping disease from entering a town or port. 
The first quarantine of forty days was established in 1377 in Dubrovnik and 
remained the favoured modus operandi of dealing with epidemics of plague until its 
demise in the seventeenth century.511 The concept of quarantine was supported by 
the classical belief in the non-naturals which had as a central feature the interaction 
of air on an individual’s health. Despite the work of the Veronese physician 
Fracastoro (c1478-1553) whose work on contagion developed a more sophisticated 
model to explain how disease was transmitted, for centuries, quarantine remained 
the most common response to protecting populations from the most contagious 
diseases.512  
However, the actual act of restriction became increasingly unpopular, particularly in 
the way it adversely affected trade and were frequently broken. For this reason, 
quarantine regulations had to be enforced by public health officials or others who 
held some level of rank.513 The apparent reluctance to use the military in this role, 
certainly in the early period, says much about how societies across much of Europe 
viewed the function of the military in terms of being exempt from holding any 
policing rights within the civilian setting. Such conflicts of interest appeared to be 
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alleviated when plague disappeared from Britain in the mid seventeenth century. 
Nevertheless, few believed that this was permanent particularly in Britain where 
increased trade made ports vulnerable to a range of illnesses. Therefore throughout 
the eighteenth century quarantine was official status with no less than fourteen 
Acts being passed, four of which took place in 1721 alone.514  
Quarantine was in itself a complex process, as befitting an action which required 
effectively closing the country to the rest of Europe and beyond. Mercantile 
interests continued to campaign against it as did those supporters of 
anticontagionism who claimed that it served no purpose.515 Resentment was also 
mounting amongst staff in the Admiralty. The Quarantine Act of 1710516 now 
directly called on naval ships to provide a guard for quarantine stations, of which 
there were nine in England alone. This drain on resources was bitterly resented by 
the Admiralty, whose ships were not exempt from also being kept offshore if 
quarantine orders were imposed.  Booker discusses this  conflict of interest which 
became worse in 1721 when the country was also at war, and which resulted in the 
navy being significantly undermined by the demands of legislation.517 Furthermore 
the Quarantine Act of 1721 also extended a similar contract of duty to the army. 
Previously law and order in Britain came under the duress of the magistracy. The 
first Act (7 Geo 1, c3) stipulated that boundary lines around cities and the 
construction of trenches to prevent any movement between infected locations 
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should now be guarded by soldiers. This was not a popular decision particularly in 
light of the punishments which also accompanied any breach of orders. Therefore 
subsequent Acts throughout the year did not reiterate the military presence whilst 
simultaneously reducing the time limit of compulsory isolation 
Another group who began to doubt its use were the physicians. In 1694, parliament 
first chose to consult with the Royal College of Physicians as to whether quarantine 
would remain an effective way of preventing any further outbreaks of plague in 
Britain.518 This type of discussion required an assumption of expertise on the part of 
parliament that the medical profession was in a position to make informed 
decisions not just in relation to medical issues but also with regards framing 
national policy. The inability of the fellows to provide a definitive response possibly 
explains why further attempts at interaction were not repeated sixteen years later 
when the Quarantine Act of 1710 was passed without any external consultation.  
However, ten years later, when news broke that plague had not only appeared in 
Marseilles, but also spread through France and had reached St Malo, the 
seriousness of the situation again led to general agreement that medical advice was 
required.  This time, the Lords Justices approached the physician Richard Mead 
directly, asking for his views on contagion and the possibility of him personally 
outlining plans which would ensure effective quarantine.519 Mead was both a highly 
influential member of the Royal College of Physicians and a renowned expert on the 
subject of contagion. Mead therefore responded with one of his best known works 
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“A Short Discourse.” 520 Although this was effectively a government commissioned 
consultation, it appears that no attempts were made to prevent the publication of 
the work prior to the passing of legislation in 1721. The text itself was immensely 
influential and went through seven editions in the first year. Mead argued that 
whilst quarantine was an effective deterrent, it was also important to remember 
that the nature of contagion was highly complex and as such several approaches 
should be adopted.521He also advocated that control needed to be matched by 
compassion, and emphasised the importance of acknowledging the different needs 
of society. What is most interesting however was his reluctance to see the rural 
areas as being any safer than towns when he argued that “the Air of any one of our 
Towns shall be so corrupted, as to spread and maintain the pestilence in it, there 
will be little reason to believe, that the Air of the rest of the Country is in a much 
better state.”522 
The influence of Mead was in many ways pivotal to the development of quarantine 
in Britain both in terms of his own presence and in influencing others, which 
included medical officers of the day.  This included Pringle, who acknowledged the 
debt he owed to Mead in understanding the importance of preventative medicine 
to the extent that he dedicated his first book to him and included Mead’s own 
name in the title.523 It is also possible that in addition to providing Pringle with an 
understanding of contagion, which was increasingly important in a military setting, 
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Mead’s views on the sense of community may well have encouraged Pringle to 
establish a similar model when discussing the needs of the army and its interaction 
with society.  
Despite very real concerns, plague never reappeared in Britain. However as the 
eighteenth century progressed, one particular disease came very close to instilling a 
similar sense of impending pathological chaos, namely Yellow Fever.524 From its 
earliest days this disease instilled a genuine and lasting sense of terror. 525Various 
descriptions suggest that it had long been active across much of the world 
wherever its vector, the mosquito Aedes aegypti could colonise. It is possible that it 
arrived in the West Indies from Africa where it became the most feared of all 
diseases, particularly amongst the European troops who were posted there in ever 
increasing numbers as the conflicts of the eighteenth century spread westward. The 
climate and environment of the area became increasingly lethal for both troops and 
settlers who arrived “unseasoned” and were generally unprepared for the 
conditions they had to endure. One of the earliest indicators of how serious the 
situation could become was seen in the infamous events in Cartagena when forty 
percent of the British army and navy died from an epidemic of Yellow Fever. 526 
Amidst the many fevers and fluxes of the time, Yellow Fever was one of the easiest 
to diagnosis through the rapidly violent and distressing way it acted on the human 
                                                          
524 Yellow Fever was a relatively modern name for the disease which was known as the black vomit. 
525 Yellow Fever is known today as a viral haemorrhagic disease spread by mosquitoes which has no 
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body, giving rise to its more familiar name, “the black vomit”. 527The devastation it 
caused amongst all Europeans who contracted the disease initiated one of the most 
extensive epidemiological studies of the age, attracting the attention of medical 
officers such as Lind, Pringle, Hunter and Moseley.528 By 1764 a definitive diagnosis 
could finally be made through the work of James Makittrick Adair. As an army 
surgeon posted to the West Indies, he took advantage of the lack of legislation 
regarding morbid anatomy, which was not the case for civilian practitioners in 
Britain.529He submitted his findings as his MD thesis for Edinburgh University, which 
also provided one of the most accurate descriptions to date on the pathology of 
yellow fever.530 
This attention to detail was increasingly representative of the many naval and 
military texts of the time, written with the intention of finding ways of successfully 
preventing further outbreaks of Yellow Fever. It was generally agreed that the 
disease was a result of a particular set of environmental and climatic issues, and as 
such was not contagious in other locations which were unfavourable to its 
existence. This is seen in work such as that of the naval surgeon, Elliot Arthy, who 
was posted to both Africa and the West Indies. His text book was written in 
response to what he saw as a serious lack of suitably qualified medical staff and was 
therefore presented in a style which would be accessible to all, regardless of 
                                                          
527 There is no reliable record to date this term but it appears to have been widely used and refers to 
the darkening of the skin as the virus takes hold of a body. 
528 Harrison, Medicine in an Age of Commerce and Empire. Britain and Its Tropical Colonies 1660-
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professional background.531 However his analysis of the mortality rates from Yellow 
Fever called for a note of caution in response to the panic it generated 
In England, more persons are of opinion that the yellow fever is more 
violent in its nature and effects in the west Indies, during war than peace, 
which I conceive to have originated from our having in wartime a greater 
number of troops and ships of war in the West Indies, and from perhaps, 
many additional persons going there to transact either public or private 
business, whereby more deaths must consequently happen by the yellow 
fever, which through the medium of newspapers, and of private letters and 
persons, oftener engage the public as well as individual’s attention, and very 
naturally, excites a belief that the yellow fever is, at such times, unusually 
malignant, when infact, it is only the effect of an additional number being 
exposed to its influence.532 
 
This was a sophisticated concept in terms of understanding aspects such as 
proportion rather than reacting to a set of basic figures, which instilled a note of 
caution about over-reacting. Yet Arthy still remained very concerned that Yellow 
Fever was responsible for the deaths of over five thousand sailors each year and 
looked for ways of reducing it. He concluded that the only way to limit the worst 
effects of diseases like Yellow Fever was to look more closely at the initial state of 
health of all recruits coming from rural and urban locations across Britain, aware 
that this would also act as an indicator of how they would respond to adverse 
conditions and disease. 
Similar concerns could also be found amongst the army. Robert Jackson whose 
extensive career and expertise on the fevers of the West Indies made him a leading 
advocate of reform argued that whilst there was often considerable ill-placed fear 
of Yellow Fever, the poor quality of recruits did little to prepare them for foreign 
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postings. In the second of his two works, Jackson specifically argued that urban 
living and manufacturing created a class of workers who were physically unable to 
meet the demands of military life unlike those who were taken from rural 
settings.533 He also claimed that the same group of men had no sense of belonging 
and as such were unreliable when it came to defending their country.534 It was 
therefore likely that such men would be more susceptible to a range of diseases, 
including Yellow Fever. This certainly appeared to be the case when British troops 
once again failed to secure the key island of Martinique due to the unacceptably 
high incidence of disease among the soldiers. Therefore in 1759, Barrington acting 
in an unprecedented move as Secretary at War, approved the recruitment of 
American troops from the Colonies in the hope that they would offer some type of 
natural immunity. It was an unfortunate decision as it soon became apparent that 
even these troops showed no sign of greater resilience to tropical diseases than the 
British. Moreover the high levels of sickness and mortality recorded amongst the 
colonial regiments acted as a further source of discontent amongst those who 
questioned Britain’s imperial presence in the area.  
As the eighteenth century passed, there was a growing conviction that Yellow Fever 
was a disease which despite its ferocity, was at least reliant on a very specific set of 
environmental criteria. This related to the infamous “torrid zone” which covered 
much of the area identified as eminently suitable for colonial expansion. However 
mercantile benefits came at the price of a stubbornly high death rate for all 
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207 
 
Europeans whose constitution generally proved unable to adapt535. This was 
witnessed in 1796 when another severe outbreak of Yellow Fever led to the death 
of 14,000 soldiers, which equated to just under half of the annual number of  
troops sent out to maintain ownership of the West Indies.536 Despite this creating 
concern on a number of levels, there was still a sense that this was a military issue 
and should be treated as such. It was also geographically sufficiently removed to 
prevent it from becoming a public concern back in Britain. However in 1804 the 
British authorities were informed of an outbreak of Yellow Fever in Gibraltar, which 
raised concerns to an entirely different level.537 
Used extensively by merchants as well as the army and the navy, Gibraltar had long 
been a key strategic outpost for Britain. The news of Yellow Fever so close to home 
therefore caused an unprecedented level of alarm the likes of which had not been 
seen since the days of plague. The main difference was that this time there at least 
appeared to be in existence a vast library of information relating to all aspects of 
the disease, specifically been produced by generations of military and naval medical 
officers. However, rather than consulting this knowledge base, the appearance of 
Yellow Fever inadvertently led to one of the most fundamental medical questions 
needing to be answered, namely whether or not the disease was contagious. It is 
important to reiterate that the term “contagion” was not an early presentation of 
its modern use but instead promoted an archaic belief that illness resulted when 
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some chemical or physical material was passed from one person to another.538 The 
limitations of such an interpretation were not lost on those medical practitioners 
who were increasingly becoming aware that illness in any form could be 
transmitted through a variety of vectors, including climate and environment. 
Generally referred to as anticontagionists, many were military and naval medical 
officers, who cited empirical studies to illustrate the superiority of understanding 
the initial cause of disease and attempting to remove this at the point of source. 
Many also argued against quarantine, one of the most popular responses by those 
who believed in contagion, stating that this only served as a temporary response 
with little in the way of long term benefits.539 
The contagion debate dominated writing on disease transmission prior to the 
emergence of the germ theory. It became increasingly complex and often cut across 
professional affiliation. Not all commissioned medical officers condoned 
contagionism, with both Blane and McGrigor spending much of their professional 
careers supporting it both philosophically and practically. Moreover the most 
ardent adherents also acknowledged that certain diseases such as Syphilis and 
Smallpox could be explained by the contagion model. 540 However in the case of 
Yellow Fever, the general consensus amongst medical officers was that it was a 
disease which required very specific environmental conditions which promoted 
                                                          
538 Edwin H Ackerknecht, "Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867," Bulletin Of The History Of 
Medicine 22 (1948).  
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putrefaction and as such did not involve a specific contagion. The fact that many of 
these criteria could not be replicated beyond places such as the West Indies also 
added weight to those who supported the anticontagionist dogma. 
Back in London, the Royal College of Physicians remained committed to the 
contagionist argument. Whilst Yellow Fever remained a predominantly medical 
problem of the West Indies, there appeared little need for direct action. However in 
1793 the disease appeared in Philadelphia where over five thousand inhabitants 
died.541 Seven years later another epidemic was confirmed in Cadiz, where it rapidly 
spread around the Mediterranean. Notification in 1804 that Yellow Fever had also 
arrived in Gibraltar led to the Lords of the Privy Council urgently approaching the 
Royal College of Physicians for advice on how to prevent the disease from entering 
Britain, and what type of information should be made available to the public.542 The 
College responded with what it considered to be the most appropriate advice.543 In 
keeping with their traditional views regarding the transmission of dangerous 
diseases, the Fellows declared Yellow Fever to be contagious and a threat to the 
nation’s wellbeing. Moreover, they announced that only way of preventing its 
appearance in Britain was to ensure “the most rigid execution of the Laws of 
Quarantine”,544 which would protect London, major centres of trade and the naval 
arsenals.545  The Royal College also called for the introduction of a military guard to 
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enforce quarantine. If this was breached, martial law should then be established to 
isolate those already infected.  
The Privy Council accepted all these recommendations in addition to establishing a 
Central Board of Health to ensure that all preventative health measures were 
implemented. In order to monitor their success, the Privy Council also called for 
official notification from all Consulates in countries where the disease was active, 
which were to be collated by the relevant military medical officers.546 By April 1805 
the Board of Health had presented the Privy Council with the first of the five reports 
it would produce during the fifteen months of its existence.547 In the absence of 
Yellow Fever appearing in Britain, the fourth and fifth Reports chose to look more 
closely at the medical problems in the West Indies, where the mortality rates 
among the military stationed on the islands remained worryingly high.  The Board 
therefore proposed that for every Regiment sent out to the West Indies there 
should also be attached one or two black companies whose role would be to do all 
fatigues as well as guard the most inhospitable environments.548  In response to this 
Report, the Privy Council took the decision to Order the Board of Health to 
undertake a full enquiry regarding the state of health of the West Indies which was 
published in September, 1805.549  
                                                          
546 James Hervey, "Suggestions Respecting the Duties of a Board of Health and the Best Manner in 
Which the Board Can Be Constituted," ed. Privy Council (1805). 
547 As yellow-fever failed to appear in Britain, the Board of Health was dismissed on 14th August 
1806. 
548 "Fourth Report of the Board of Health. The Means of Preserving Health in the Colonies.," ed. Privy 
Council (1805).p.2 
549 The existence of this Order is contained in the Fifth Report of the Board of Health for Ascertaining 
What Are Healthy Stations in the West Indies. September 13th 1805. Sent to M.A.Cooke.  
211 
 
In 1806, following the death of Pitt, the Board of Health was disbanded. The actions 
it took throughout its brief but influential existence not only reflected the power of 
the Royal College but also the influence of individual members such as William Pym. 
His position illustrates most clearly how complex the question of contagion had 
become. As an army physician who had served in the West Indies, Pym like Blane 
and others remained advocates of contagionism, and could not be convinced that 
the Yellow Fever he witnessed was a product of the environment. Instead he 
argued that the disease he witnessed was a different type of fever and therefore 
should be treated through isolation.550 Despite being at variance with many army 
colleagues, Pym rose to be Inspector of Army Hospitals and continued to 
implement quarantine amongst infected garrisons throughout his career. In the 
case of the Royal College of Physicians, their involvement in preventing Yellow 
Fever from entering the country appears to have created more doubt than 
certainty. In an unprecedented step, the fellows acknowledged that many of their 
decisions had been based on a selection of reports, some of which were possibly 
questionable. They also emphasised that medical opinion was always in a transient 
state and as such their advice needed to be heard in a given context.551 The 
outcome of this admission was immense in that it resulted in the Privy Council 
effectively forgoing its historical association and reliance on the Royal College in 
relation to all medical issues, pertaining to the control of fever, and from this point 
                                                          
550 Both Pym and Chisholm claimed that this was bulam fever 
551 Statement of the Royal College of Physicians, 15 November 1815.”London Medical Repository” 
September 1816 
212 
 
onwards, now began to independently consult both the Sick and Hurt Board and 
the Army Medical Board. 
The threat of Yellow Fever only briefly re-appeared in the 1820s but did not attract 
the official response of earlier years. Quarantine remained an option should it be 
required, but even with men such as Pym promoting its introduction when and if 
necessary, there was a marked reluctance to see it used in anything other than the 
most extreme circumstances. One of the most outspoken commentators was 
Bancroft who not only argued that it was economically precarious to isolate a 
country which depended on foreign trade but also highlighted the immorality of an 
act which effectively imprisoned innocent men, women and children in a hazardous 
and often fatal conditions.552 However of all the opponents of quarantine, one of 
the most outspoken was Charles MacLean, a leading anticontagionist whose views 
exerted an unmatched influence regarding preventative health policy in the early 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
Maclean’s often erratic and confrontational life has attracted considerable 
biographical interest.553He held posts with both the East India Company and the 
British army and travelled widely through the opportunities presented to him. 
However he did not suit a restrictive military professional structure and had it not 
been for his outstanding two volume work554 on the transmission of disease, it is 
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possible that he would not have acquired the following he enjoyed. Maclean had 
first become interested in the issue of contagion having read Rush’s account of the 
1793 Yellow Fever epidemic in Philadelphia. Like other military and naval medical 
officers of the time, he believed that only a few diseases were contagious in terms 
of being passed from one person directly to another, whilst the majority of illnesses 
were the result of climate and personal predilection.  
Throughout his career, MacLean became increasingly determined to understand 
and promote the true cause of disease. This led him to becoming an outspoken 
supporter of John Brown who earlier had controversially proposed that there was a 
single cause of a disease to which a body responded.555 The Brunonian system had 
widely been dismissed by the medical establishment, though it found greater 
support in places such as Edinburgh where innovation was not regarded with such 
suspicion. Maclean even developed some of Brown’s ideas by arguing that the body 
also responded in a given way and as such medical theory could be presented and 
taught as “constant laws.”556 As part of his commitment to proving the superiority 
of empirical medicine, Maclean also became one of the most outspoken supporters 
of anticontagionism, arguing that those who believed otherwise were motivated by 
factors which took the needs of the common people. He proclaimed that in certain 
seasons, the air became pestilential and was able to exert a malign influence on the 
human constitution, resulting in disease. As Kelly has argued, it was therefore 
MacLean’s ability to promote controversy, and his reputation as a radical, which 
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generated such an unprecedented level of discussion by all sections of society 
regarding the continued use of quarantine as a viable way of protecting the nation’s 
health.557 
MacLean’s ability to politicise the validity of contagion and methods of control was 
highly significant from many perspectives. Kelly argues that leading these was the 
fact that contagion was now removed from the medical sphere, and as such 
threatened the authority of the Royal College of Physicians.558 The problem with 
this interpretation is that it implies that historically the fellows had exerted a 
greater influence in relation to establishing quarantine orders than actually was the 
case. Only since the fear of yellow fever entering Britain had the Royal College 
enjoyed the status of providing expert advice and even then, this had to be shared 
with military and naval authorities. Rather, one should emphasise that Maclean and 
other anticontagionists created a sense of uncertainty relating to preventative 
health which provided the government with the assumed authority to return to a 
position whereby they could act autonomously. This in itself is acknowledged by 
Kelly when discussing the two Select Committees of 1819 and 1824 and the 
noticeable lack of medical expertise559. 
The 1819 Select Committee560 was ostensibly called to discuss the issue of 
contagion with regards to the continued threat from plague which remained a 
persistent problem in Constantinople. Of the twenty-six witnesses called, three 
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were from the army amongst whom were McGrigor and Pym, recognised 
supporters of contagionism. Maclean was called twice, as the first and last witness. 
In his summary he attempted to explain the limits of contagionist thinking by 
providing an explanation of why it failed to provide a relevant model of disease 
transmission stating 
Contagious diseases are such maladies as are capable of being propagated in 
a certain succession, by means of a specific virus, by contact of a sick person 
with a person in health…the matter thus propagated from person to person 
is called “contagion”, (as in) the contagion of small-pox…An infectious 
disease is a disease capable of being propagated by means of a specific 
virus, whether by contact of persons, by the air…or by goods, wares or 
merchandise…but incapable of being produced by any other cause.561 
 
He concluded 
… the question of contagion in epidemic diseases, as acknowledged even by 
its advocates, is entirely one of fact, not of physic, of which all persons of a 
liberal education are as competent to judge as physicians.562 
 
This was Maclean presenting his views in the most succinct and informed way. The 
years of empirical methodology were finally encapsulated into a proposal which 
defined the need for modern thinking in relation to successfully protecting society 
from the worst ravages of illness. Although the Select Committee concluded that 
there was insufficient evidence to permit a change in professional and political 
thinking with regards the received doctrine of contagion, there remained dissent. 
This was led by none other than the Chair, Sir John Jackson563, who announced in 
the Commons that the level of expert testimony regarding the superiority of 
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anticontagionism was such that he could not bring himself to add his name to the 
final Report.564 
MacLean’s intentions of removing the influence of all medical practitioners, military 
and civilian, in relation to matters of contagion and quarantine can therefore be 
seen as something of a triumph for him both in relation to the 1819 and the 1824 
Select Committees. His commitment to anticontagionism continued by way of 
personal petitions which he made to the House of Commons, such as that made in 
March 1824 entreating that the “anti-commercial, anti-social, and anti-Christian 
quarantine laws” be repealed.565 
The latter was initially called to look at ways of improving opportunities for foreign 
trade though this could not be achieved without discussing ways in which this was 
affected, adversely or otherwise by quarantine. Therefore a second report was 
attached having called a selection of witnesses though none of these were tasked 
with discussing the question of contagion, on the grounds that it was considered as 
having been addressed five years earlier. The most eminent of these was Gilbert 
Blane who had long been concerned about anticontagionist views. In the 1819 
edition of “Medical Logick”566 he had emphasised the danger not only of what he 
saw as attacks on the medical profession but also by failing to present a united 
front, those in charge of public health would 
ask the assistance of some members of the bench or the bar accustomed to 
weigh evidence, and investigate facts, or even of such plain men as to 
                                                          
564 Hansard, 1st ser., vol.40. (1819), col. 1133-34 
565 Hansard, vol.12. p.993 
566 Blane, "Elements of Medical Logic." p.181 
217 
 
compose juries, than medical men, having so much reason to suspect that 
our minds are warped by prejudice.567 
 
The concerns of Blane were to an extent justified with the publication of the 
findings in 1824 and the legislation which followed. The Privy Council granted 
power to the Crown to adopt any measures it felt necessary to avoid the spread of 
contagious disease either from beyond the country or within.568This set a precedent 
which was used both in relation to the appearance of Yellow Fever on Gibraltar in 
1828 and most significant of all, in response to the arrival of Cholera in England in 
1832 when a Quarantine Act was not only introduced without recourse to the 
medical profession but also extended the following year.569 
The 1820’ was a difficult time for medicine in Britain. Internal arguments on the 
most fundamental aspects of aetiology, only served to place further strains of an 
increasingly fragile and disparate profession. In such an atmosphere of uncertainty, 
the government continued to distance itself from relying on medical expertise, even 
in matters as significant as ensuring the health of the nation. This in itself was 
significant as seen in the fact that it was only with the rise of the sanitary 
movement from the 1840’s onwards which was run by cohorts of highly efficient, 
knowledgeable medical officers, did the civilian medical profession manage to 
rebuild its reputation as being in a position to add to ways of preserving the health 
of the population in a consistently reliable way. However, until such time, a second 
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pathological disaster was noted as making its way across Europe, which would do 
more to fragment the medical profession than any other similar event. 
The appearance of Cholera in Britain presented the medical profession with a 
dilemma. There had long been a common gastric illness which was known by the 
various terms of cholera morbus, cholera nostra, autumnal cholera and English 
Cholera. Although it was rarely fatal, it attracted the attention of both civilian 
practitioners such as Sydenham and their military counterparts led by Pringle. At 
the time, there was common consensus that it was closely associated with climatic 
conditions and as such could be treated in the worst cases by the usual regime for 
disorders of this type. Later, in 1782 Charles Curtis, surgeon aboard the frigate HMS 
Medea gave a description of what he termed “spasmodic cholera” which had led to 
many cases from HMS Hero and  Superb being admitted to the Naval Hospital in 
Madras.570 
However in 1817, reports of a far more virulent gastric disease appeared amongst 
British troops stationed in Jessore, India.571 Medical staff of the East India Company 
who were stationed in the area, were the first to publish three highly influential 
reports in 1819,572 1820 573and 1824. 574 These provided the first detailed 
information on the transmission, symptoms and treatment of an illness which was 
temporarily called “Cholera” due to certain shared similarities with existing gastric 
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disorders. However there was little sign of initial alarm as this was considered to be 
essentially an Indian disease, and as such carried little relevance in places such as 
Britain, even though a large number of British soldiers were affected whilst posted 
in the country.575  
The complexity of Cholera also inadvertently led to an interesting development in 
the contagionist versus anticontagionist debate.  It became increasingly obvious 
that this was a disease which not only appeared to have different clinical 
manifestations, but was also requiring re-evaluation as to how it was transmitted.  
The answer lay in “contingent contagionism” which effectively could be presented 
as positioning itself between the two extremes of contagionism and 
anticontagionism. It was first promoted by a naval surgeon, James Johnson (1777-
1845). He had begun his career as a surgeon’s mate, serving on several ships. In 
1807 he published his first medical text on diseases common to the Far East, 
particularly Cholera and Malaria576. Five years later he published a work aimed for 
far wider readership and which established his reputation as an expert in tropical 
medicine.577 Johnson retired from the navy in 1814, and set up his own medical 
practice in Portsmouth. Whilst here he had become one of the editors of the 
medico-chirurgical Journal. In 1818 he decided to move to London and set up his 
own journal, The Medico-Chirurgical Review of which he was the first editor until 
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1831578. During this time he also gained his M.D from Aberdeen University in 1821, 
which allowed him to become a Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians.579 
To date very little consideration has been given to Johnson despite the influence he 
exerted at the time. Durey claims that he was responsible for calming the panic 
which arose when Cholera first appeared in Britain.580 This accolade is difficult to 
substantiate in terms of evaluating his actions. However Johnson was certainly 
important in calling for an end to the polarity which existed in terms of trying to 
explain why the disease was able to travel and affect populations in the way it did 
by combining all interpretations into what he termed contingent contagionism. 
Using his own journal, Johnson explained  
In epidemic cholera, as in most other epidemics, a poison or sedative 
principle, whether emanating from the earth, or engendered in the air, 
strikes a predisposing individual, and after an uncertain period of 
incubation… (produces the disease.)581 
 
Johnson also believed that contingencies were predominantly environmental rather 
than constitutional. Given the right conditions, he believed that 
Diseases arising from ariel or terrestrial influences, far beyond our control, 
have, in the hovels of the indigent, in crowded populations, in concentrated 
filth, and in the absence of ventilation, taken on a character of infection or 
communicability which they did not originally possess, and of which they are 
quickly deprived  under opposite and favourable circumstances.582 
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Johnson continued to argue that diseases such as Cholera and Typhus were 
therefore avoidable. His clear, unambiguous statement regarding the inter-
relationship of dirt and disease and methods by which they could be avoided, 
reached both a professional and general readership and in doing so revisited the 
earlier arguments presented by medical officers of the eighteenth century in terms 
of the importance of removing causes of disease as part of establishing lasting 
professional health. 
In the meantime, the lack of understanding regarding what was considered to be 
the inevitable arrival of Cholera into Britain briefly led to an alliance once again 
between the Royal College of Physicians and the Privy Council. By September 1830, 
“Asiatic Cholera” as it was now generally termed, had reached Moscow. The British 
ambassador in St Petersburg, Lord Haytesbury, not only recorded the spread of 
Cholera across the country but in official dispatches also emphasised how 
ineffective quarantine measures had proved to be. These were sent directly to the 
Privy Council who once again responded by temporarily imposing quarantine orders 
on all goods arriving from Russia.583The unpopularity of this type of action was not 
lost on a government already deeply immersed in the question of parliamentary 
reform. Moreover, as Greville noted, whilst the issue of public health had to take 
priority, the demands of trade and commerce had also to be seen as being 
protected.584 The Privy Council therefore acknowledged the need for definitive 
advice as to whether Cholera was contagious. Despite it being an almost impossible 
question to answer, the Privy Council opted to approach the Royal College rather 
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than military personnel, despite the fact that the latter had the most extensive 
knowledge and experience of the disease to date.  
Sir Henry Halford, President of the Royal College of Physicians, quickly responded 
by claiming that Cholera could not be spread by contaminated goods, but within 
the week the fellows overturned this response, arguing that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove this was the case.585 Aware of the validity of this concern, the 
Privy Council responded by sending two doctors  to Riga with the task of proving 
whether Cholera was infectious, whilst in Britain a Board of Health with eleven 
members was created. 586Six of these were members of the Royal College, with the 
army and navy represented by James McGrigor and William Burnett as well as 
Admiral Sir Thomas Byam Martin who was considered particularly suitable for the 
task due to his extensive prior knowledge of Riga.587 
The Board after due deliberation agreed that Cholera was contagious and called for 
a system of control which would be overseen by the police and the military, who 
would be responsible for the removal of the sick to lazarettos. The timing of these 
proposals could not have been more inappropriate for a government which was 
facing agricultural disturbances, the possibility of food shortages and violent public 
protest over the Reform Bill. Yet it was events in Wales which reinforced how 
precarious public order had become. Between 1st and 7th June, 1831, riots broke 
out in and around Merthyr in response to demands for far reaching reforms. The 
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government sent in two Regiments to restore order and it is estimated that 
approximately twenty people were killed in the fighting which followed. 
 Events such as these reinforced any concerns regarding excessive use of the 
military even in a civilian public health setting. Since the triumph of Waterloo, the 
army in particular had lost much of its public support, particularly with repeated 
use to quell what were seen to be genuine civilian grievances. The military was 
therefore seen to be representative of authoritarian, repressive actions which 
aimed to remove fundamental rights. Therefore whilst Cholera may have been 
causing untold distress across Europe, there were many in Britain who were 
prepared to take their chances with a disease which may or may not be worse than 
what was part of everyday life.  
With issues such as these needing to be addressed, the Privy Council chose to 
implement a far less restrictive code of action if Cholera should appeared in Britain  
and removed any mention of compulsory intervention. Simultaneously, the military 
role in securing the pathological safety of the country faded into obscurity. At the 
same time, the Board of Health organised a sub-committee led by Sir William 
Burnett, of the Royal Navy and aided by Dr Warren and Dr McMichael.588 All three 
agreed that the control of Cholera should hereafter become a civilian matter and as 
such have regulations implemented by local magistrates, which would also be an 
indication of responding to diverse local needs.589  
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In October 1831, news arrived in Britain that Cholera had broken out in 
Hamburg.590 As one of Britain’s most influential trading partners, few were now 
prepared to believe that this country would escape an epidemic. Ports were 
identified as the most likely point of entry, though as winter approached, the 
likelihood of this happening seemed increasingly unlikely until the following spring. 
However regulations remained in place to report any unusual cases of illness, and 
although the worst excesses of quarantine had been removed, a strict policy of 
isolation was made public knowledge. 591 
On the 27th October 1831, James Butler Kell, surgeon to the 82nd Regiment 
barracked within the town of Sunderland was called to identify an unusual death. 
Local doctors were unwilling to reach a diagnosis that this may be more than 
English Cholera, aware of its implications for a town which relied heavily on trade. 
However Kell had been stationed in Mauritius where he had overseen two Cholera 
epidemics and was in no doubt that he was looking at the first case of Asiatic 
Cholera. 592Subsequent histories of the event describe Kell notifying the Board of 
Health in London that the disease had finally arrived in Britain. Later in his own 
published account, Kell emphasised that he was fully aware of the precarious 
position he was in and was careful to adhere to the official protocol. This involved 
calling for the Reverend Grant to come to the victim’s house where Kell officially 
informed him that it was Asiatic Cholera. Grant was then instructed to visit Mr. 
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Robinson, the chief magistrate who in turn was ordered to inform Lord Melbourne 
in London.593 At all times Kell was clearly aware of being a military doctor acting 
within a civilian context, and as such needed to proceed with great care. 
 Kell was also aware that he was unable to act alone. In order to implement 
quarantine regulations he was joined on 6th November by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Michael Creagh who, as an officer in the regular army, was given charge of 
overseeing and implementing the fifteen day quarantine which was now to be 
enforced around Sunderland. If this was plague, the Privy Council was taking no 
chances of it spreading beyond the city and as such was prepared to contravene its 
own earlier decision to keep the military away from civilian problems out of fear 
that this could exacerbate tensions. As was expected, the news that Cholera had 
appeared in the town was met with extreme reactions, and even local doctors 
disputed the diagnosis. Yet Kell’s initial diagnosis had by this time been endorsed by 
a second army physician, Robert Daun (1785-1871) whose extensive medical career 
with the Indian Army had also provided him with first-hand experience of 
identifying and treating Asiatic Cholera. He endorsed Kell’s findings without any 
hesitation and sent two separate Reports to the Board of Health confirming that 
this was without question the first mortality from Cholera.594  
Despite the number of Cholera cases which followed in rapid succession, the 
Sunderland Herald responded with claims that this type of mortality was simply a 
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normal state of affairs for the poorest section of the town.595 Creagh, realising the 
implications of what was being said, ordered the immediate cleaning of the 
streets.596 He along with Daun were said to have been appalled by the state of the 
town and both men were quick to see the association between dirt and disease.597 
All three men were shocked to find such poverty and filth, noting that in thirty 
residences only two blankets were found.598 Yet despite attempts to remove the 
worst excesses, the cases of Cholera continued to rise, leading Daun to begin 
officially recording all mortalities and make plans for a Cholera hospital to take in all 
victims. Such actions continued to be met with hostility but Daun chose to stay in 
the town until such time the number of Cholera cases had been controlled.599 By 
December 1831 there had been three hundred reported cases of Cholera in 
Sunderland with an estimated fourteen new diagnoses each day.600 Although Daun 
retained his strong faith in anticontagionism, Kell became increasingly convinced 
that Cholera was both infectious and contagious. His work also illustrates an 
increasing frustration that the disease could have been avoided had basic 
interventions been followed for ships arriving in port from foreign locations.601 He 
also added that once the disease was under control it would at least “operate as an 
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additional inducement to the lower classes to submit with alacrity to the 
regulations prescribed or imposed as to cleanliness, temperance, etc.”602 
Of all the three military personnel involved with the Cholera outbreak in 
Sunderland, Kell appears to have attracted the most vocal opposition from the local 
people. He therefore decided that once systems were in place, to return to the 
barracks where he ordered a state of quarantine for all troops and their families. 
This ensured that Cholera was kept at bay until such time the threat had passed. 
However Kell was aware that this would prove to be unpopular for all concerned 
and therefore ordered that sports such as quoits, football and cricket and theatrical 
performances were made available for the three months the barracks isolated itself 
from the rest of the area.603 
The involvement of the army in Sunderland was significant on a national level as it 
showed that military intervention was an inadequate response to stopping the 
spread of Cholera across the country. Moreover, whilst medical officers were 
officially required to report all cases of Cholera they were called to attend, there 
was little support amongst them as a professional body to oversee any type of 
civilian isolation.604  Following the creation of a new board of Health in November 
1831, hereafter known as the Central Board of Health a decision was reached that 
the policing of any restrictive action was considered untenable and should 
therefore cease.605  Yet Medical officers like Kell and fellow Indian Army doctor, 
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William Twining606 were becoming increasingly concerned by the lack of medical 
knowledge seen amongst civilian practitioners in terms of identifying and treating 
Cholera victims. The Central Board was also considered to have failed to recognise 
the need to provide specialist care in view of the fact that all existing hospitals 
refused to admit a patient suffering from any form of infectious disease. To try and 
meet such an obvious need in the time of what was clearly a Cholera epidemic, the 
Navy began to establish specialist wards for Cholera victims in its own institutions. 
At the Royal Naval Hospital all Cholera victims amongst the naval communities 
were offered admission though in reality few were prepared to risk admittance for 
fear that their illness would worsen607.  
An account of the way in which the army dealt with Cholera can be Somerville’s 
“The Autobiography of a Working Man.”608 This is the only known existing narrative 
of the disease written by a soldier and recounts the appearance of the disease in 
Brighton. The local barrack was clearly concerned by the arrival of recruits travelling 
from Scotland, aware that it took them through cities where the disease had 
already appeared. On reaching Brighton, all new troops were forced to forfeit 
clothes and possessions for fear that they were contaminated. These were then 
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burnt609 under the supervision of the hospital doctor to ensure “that the work of 
purification by fire was effectually done.”610 Somerville comments on the 
unjustness of such actions, along with the fact that he was detained for fourteen 
days in the Cholera ward, especially created within the hospital, where he and the 
other new arrivals acted as nurses to Cholera sufferers 
In this the patient Miller 611had been placed, and in the same ward with him, 
he writhing in agony with cramps all over his body and raving in delirium, we 
were placed, the door bolted upon us, and orders given through a window, 
that we were to employ ourselves in heating flannels, and rubbing liquids 
with the hot flannels on the cholera-stricken patient.612 
 
As the number of Cholera cases continued to rise, particularly amongst the civilian 
population, the Central Board underwent a series of changes, particularly in relation 
to membership. By February 1832, it comprised not just medical staff but 
predominantly those connected with both the army and the navy. In the same 
month the first Cholera Act was passed which finally gave the Board greater 
jurisdiction it needed to be effective.613Although legislation was now in place, the 
reality of the situation was that by the end of 1832 Cholera had all but disappeared 
from Britain. The much feared epidemic was never as widespread as initially feared, 
although over thirty thousand victims died in the first epidemic and the disease 
created a genuine sense of panic. However Cholera had played a far more 
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significant role in terms of showing just how pronounced the inequalities of life in 
Britain had become. As Greville commented 
The disease spreads gradually in all directions in town and country, but 
without appearing like an epidemic; it is scattered and uncertain; it brings to 
light horrible distress. We, who live on the smooth and plausible surface, 
know little of the frightful appearance of the bowels of society.614 
 
Cholera also reaffirmed the idea that there was a connection between dirt and 
disease which posed not only a medical problem but also an increasing sense of 
social injustice. Although the disease appeared to have run its course, there was an 
innate concern that its return was inevitable. James Kay Shuttleworth, an Edinburgh 
medical graduate who had left medical practice to follow a career in medical 
journalism, reiterated these views. In 1832 he published a tract calling for wide 
scale reform of the way the lower orders were allowed to live. 615 This work was 
written as a result of Kay-Shuttleworth’s personal intervention in dealing with 
Cholera whilst working for the Manchester Board of Health. He became convinced 
that the circumstances in which the poorest sections of society were forced to live 
was responsible for their susceptibility to disease as well as encouraging a tendency 
towards hypochondria.616 However the worst problem exacerbated by squalor was 
the gross dehumanisation, vice and immorality, which in his opinion was becoming 
the standard by which most people were living.  Kay-Shuttleworth identified these 
problems as cumulatively being responsible for “the enfeebled constitution” of the 
working classes. Despite providing such a detailed study, it is interesting that Kay-
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Shuttleworth made no reference to any military expertise, as either theory or 
practice which had long known of the connection between dirt and disease. This 
was, in itself, an indication of the increasing disassociation on the part of civilian 
practitioners to distance themselves at every opportunity from any type of military 
or naval medical expertise, even though it was often detrimental to large numbers 
of people. 
Despite the significant influence of kay-Shuttleworth, it was the views of Thomas 
Southwood Smith, another Edinburgh doctor, who exerted the greatest influence in 
framing the sanitary ideas which were recognised and implemented by Edwin 
Chadwick. 617His extensive medical career as physician to the London Fever Hospital 
provided him with opportunities to understand that dirt not only caused disease 
but was, in his view, responsible for the moral corruption which appeared to be 
prevalent amongst the lower classes. Southwood Smith remained the only civilian 
sanitary physician to acknowledge the earlier work of military doctors. In his most 
popular work, “Treatise on Fevers” he even acknowledged the importance of 
Pringle, particularly in the way he linked environment to outbreaks of various 
febrile illnesses.618However Southwood-Smith refrained from any discussion on the 
way the health of the nation impacted on the needs of either the army or navy, and 
may no reference to the influence of medical officers from either service in terms of 
the way they had already promoted a model of preventative health applicable to all 
sections of society. 
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In 1848 Cholera appeared in Britain for a second time, Lord Morpeth introduced a 
Cholera bill on 10th July 1848, which on 31st August entered into the statute book as 
the Public Health Act. 619Morpeth had already persuaded Lord Lansdowne at the 
Privy Council to transfer any plans for the future control of Cholera to a General 
Board of Health. The action, which was reminiscent of the events surrounding the 
control of yellow fever in 1805 was also similarly ineffective inasmuch as the Board 
was also denied power to legally enforce decisions. It was also the first gathering of 
medical experts who were taken entirely from civilian medical practise, bringing to 
an end the input of military and naval medical officers in relation to their expertise 
in matters of preventative health.  Instead, the Act set a precedent in placing 
environmental control within the remit of local government, and in doing so 
marked the beginning of the public health and sanitary era so long associated with 
nineteenth century Britain. This transference also led to the sanitary movement 
becoming associated with medical officers of Health such as Snow and Simon. 
Under their aegis, public health became a defined scientific intervention, staffed 
solely by members of the civilian medical profession. The events of the 1840s were 
therefore significant in not only defining public health as civilian society’s own 
responsibility, but by doing so, bought to an end to nearly a time in which military 
and naval medicine actively influenced the way in which disease amongst the 
population of the country as a whole,  was both  defined and treated.  
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The 1840s is generally regarded as marking the origins of the public health 
movement in Britain, initiated by Edwin Chadwick’s Report of 1842.620 The 
combined efforts of legislation at both central and local level gradually began to 
improve the state of Britain, though the debate as to what caused disease remained 
a constant source of contention until the appearance of scientific medicine in the 
1860s. In towns such as Portsmouth, Cholera continued to as an impetus in order to 
motivate the town authorities into not only removing the worst excesses of dirt and 
contamination, but also identify areas of habitation in the town where disease was 
particularly rife. When the government inspector, Robert Rawlinson (1810-1898) 
made his first visit to Portsmouth, he described in detail the worst areas of the 
town. This made for difficult reading, and yet it is pertinent that he directly 
commented that the town’s position as both a leading garrison and port was 
sufficient reason to improve general conditions.621  
It is unfortunate that the achievements of Robert Rawlinson has failed to attract the 
research it credits with regards the history of preventative health. One reason may 
well lie in the fact that he was neither medically trained nor officially connected to 
the Amy. However, his training as an engineer, combined with his personal 
commitment to implementing sanitary measures aimed at improving the conditions 
in which people were forced to live, made him ideal for the role of Commissioner to 
the General Board of Health. Later in 1855 his reputation in identifying ways of 
implementing change also led to him to becoming a member of the Sanitary 
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Commission sent out to report on the conditions which had proved so detrimental 
to the British army in the Crimea. The findings of this particular group left the public 
readership in no doubt that the lives of British soldiers were made worse by an 
inept, failing army medical service which was not only unable to provide the most 
basic medical care, but also seemed incapable of recognising and acting  in ways 
which would ensure the most basic standards of hygiene. The events in the Crimea 
therefore initiated a demand for wide reaching reforms, particularly within the 
army, including the creation of an efficient, modern medical department. There was 
no recognition of the extensive body of knowledge which medical officers from 
both armed forces had previously created in relation to the theory and practice of 
preventative health and the projected model of excellence was one entirely based 
on civilian initiatives. 
In relation to events of the nineteenth century the relationship between medical 
officers and the civilian population became notably complicated. The theories and 
practices relating to implementing the most efficient forms of preventative 
medicine increasingly faced opposition from commercial interests, as seen in the 
question of contagion. Furthermore, the medical profession also underwent a 
series of reforms, beginning with a new modern identity which emerged from the 
new teaching hospitals622 and legislation which created a regulated profession with 
increasingly clear roles and responsibilities.623 With such changes, there also came 
opportunities for practicing medicine which no longer involved having to accept a 
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commission in the armed forces who in turn increasingly removed themselves from 
public view and focused on developing military and naval medicine within their own 
institutions such as Netley and the Haslar. 
Even in response to the continued threat of Cholera, which continued to affect 
Britain until 1866, there was far less discussion with military medical officers 
despite their continued expertise in dealing with these types of diseases in the 
ever-expanding British Empire. Diseases such as this were therefore significant in 
terms of identifying the point at which preventative health became a priority of 
society but in doing so, also marked the point at which military expertise was no 
longer seen to be required. The legacy of ways in which it had aimed to create an 
earlier version of universal application was also forgotten, which is particularly 
significant in light of the way it has been perpetuated in subsequent research 
relating to understanding the history of public health in nineteenth century Britain. 
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Conclusion 
 
In 1772 the eminent Scottish physician and professor, John Gregory published a 
highly influential series of six lectures, entitled “Lectures on the Duties and 
Qualifications of a Physician.”624 He dedicated the work to none other than to Sir 
John Pringle, explaining the relevance of this action on the grounds that 
There is, besides, a peculiar propriety, in addressing to you the following 
lectures, intended for the use of the young students in physic, as it affords 
me a very proper occasion of pointing out to their imitation, a Gentleman, 
whose honour and probity, whose genius and learning, have done so much 
credit to the profession, and whose ardent zeal and unwearied labours have 
so much contributed to its advancement625 
 
As a young man, Gregory appears to not have shown any personal ambition with 
regards pursuing a medical career in either the army or the navy, preferring instead 
to remain in Scotland. The decision was a wise one, as he went on to pursue a 
highly successful careers as one of Scotland’s foremost medical educators of the 
day. Therefore his very public endorsement of Pringle’s achievements is particularly 
interesting as it derived not only from what was a genuine appreciation of his work 
aimed at improving the health of the army but also in recognition of what this 
meant in terms of advancing medical knowledge and treatment to all sections of 
society and the benefits which would follow.626  
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This action of Gregory is also particularly relevant in terms of providing additional 
evidence of the type and extent of professional dialogue which clearly existed 
between military and civilian medicine from the eighteenth century onwards. To 
see the two groups as separate entities co-existing within the medical profession is 
not only inaccurate but fails to take into consideration the complex, and often 
progressive relationship which gradually emerged. This is not surprising if one 
considers that military and naval medical officers had never been purposefully 
excluded from civilian life. They also frequently returned to an urban or rural 
practice when they were put on half pay during times of peace and needed to 
supplement what little money they received. The same was true for those who 
were retired from both services having completed their commission. For many this 
was still at a relatively early age which meant that many military and naval doctors 
were effectively given access to a second, often highly successful civilian medical 
career. In the same way civilian physicians were in no doubt of the fact that they 
could gain much from engaging in dialogues with their armed services colleagues. In 
places such as Portsmouth and Plymouth local medical societies continually 
provided an ideal forum for shared debate at their regular meetings throughout the 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the same way, the growing number of 
medical journals remained a favoured route for advancing new ideas regardless of 
their point of origin. 
However the most significant discussion led by military and naval medical officers at 
this time was that pertaining to the need for all members of the medical profession 
to fully understand the relevance of connecting factors such as environment, 
climate and filthy conditions to the cause of disease. Moreover, it is also important 
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to recognise that it was the same medical officers who became increasingly aware 
of the fact that the only way they could hope to implement successful and lasting 
preventative health measures amongst the soldiers and sailors under their charge, 
would be through implementing radical changes which extended beyond the 
garrison and port, into the very societies from which recruits were taken. This is 
where the true significance of what Pringle and other medical officers really lay, as 
they were calling for a universal approach to preventative health long before the 
more familiar initiatives of men such as Chadwick, Snow and Simon. 
Furthermore, for such efforts to be successful, the same military and naval medical 
officers went one stage further by identifying that their own plans for introducing 
preventative health required an entirely new understanding of the nature of 
disease which also involved rejection of centuries-old medical knowledge. This was 
not only a major break with tradition but also challenged the very core of 
established medical professionalism. The concept that disease was very much a 
personal emanation had long defied any attempt to modernise medical treatment 
such as classification or standardised treatment. It was also completely 
unsustainable in relation to treating the ever increasing numbers of sick soldiers 
and sailors. Out of expediency, medical officers such as Pringle and the others who 
followed him, therefore recognised the need to commit themselves as a profession 
to a new paradigm which would facilitate a greater level of success in relation to 
meeting the medical demands increasingly being made of them. 
The advances in preventative health led by both military and naval medical officers 
were indeed far more than a series of sporadic attempts to remove the worst 
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excesses of dirt from garrisons and ships. At the heart of these endeavours lay 
radical ideologies which were increasingly tested through the adoption of empirical 
methodology which made it essentially very different to what was being 
experienced in the civilian context. This approach also led the same medical officers 
to recognise the need to actively promote the idea that preventative health was not 
just about ensuring a healthy army and navy, but also had to be extended to all 
populations if the long term security and prosperity of the nation was to be 
assured. 
The origins of these military and naval achievements undoubtedly arose from the 
close association with the Scottish universities where the teaching of a modern 
curriculum ensured that medical students were provided with knowledge and 
practice relevant to the health of society at large. Furthermore, the type of training 
offered north of the border not only provided innovation in terms of theory and 
practice, but also increasingly provided generations of doctors with a moral 
justification in relation to what was perceived to be an increasingly intrusive level of 
intervention when it came to controlling disease. This can be seen from the earliest 
actions of men such as Pringle whose early introduction to European philosophy 
and ethics which endorsed state intervention in matters of health certainly 
influenced his later medical career. In the same way, even McGrigor felt justified in 
openly claiming that until such time all disease could be overcome, every aspects of 
a soldier’s professional and personal life should come under the sole command of 
those whose role was to ensure the physical well-being of all troops.627 
                                                          
627 McGrigor, Medical Sketches. P.43 
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Yet despite the meaningful intention of this type of medical officer, the idea that 
the way in which all people lived could be controlled by those in authority was 
never going to find wide-scale support in eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
Britain, regardless of the rationale which motivated thoughts and actions. This can 
be clearly seen with early initiatives such as Medical Police which failed to gain 
anywhere near the same level of popularity in Britain, compared to many other 
European countries.  In the same way, there was no attempt to introduce public 
health initiatives as part of early urban reform such as those seen in late eighteenth 
century France. The intricacies of civilian initiatives as a way of ensuring the health 
of the French population has been analysed in depth by Garrioch. 628Whilst it is 
significant that the bureaucratic model along with the public and professional 
response initiated a complex response particularly by the urban population in 
places such as Paris, there is no evidence that this informed either informal 
discussion or formal government policy back in Britain. It is however interesting to 
note that public health initiatives in both countries throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries continued to attract a sense of distrust amongst the 
populations most in need to improvement, be it in response to the urban planning 
pursued in France629 or the attempt to introduce mass vaccination programmes in 
Britain which would be responsible for wide scale protest amongst many of the 
working classes who resented government intrusion into what was felt to be 
private matters. 
                                                          
628 David Garrioch, The Making of Revolutionary Paris (Berkely: University of California Press, 2001). 
P.231 
629 Ibid. p.235 
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Therefore, even in the armed forces, medical staff when promoting standardised 
preventative health measures remained wary of acting in ways which could be seen 
as undermining the rights of the individual, even when they involved the most 
humble members of the rank and file. Due to this fear of infringing personal liberty, 
it became increasingly necessary to focus on factors such as climate and 
environment as these gave medical staff a less controversial position when it came 
to arguing for the implementation of preventative health measures as opposed to 
actions of a more personal nature. However the benefits of taking such an 
approach rapidly took on greater significance when it was acknowledged that the 
environmental conditions could readily be transferred beyond the port and 
garrison, into society at large. This can be seen in the early work of Cleghorn who 
was one of the first military medical officers to use the term “public “to 
differentiate from military populations, but who also argued that only by providing 
both groups with the same level of consideration in relation to removing the worst 
excesses of dirt and disease, could the standard of health of either group be 
ensured. Moreover, the continued use of ideas such as these ensured that the term 
“preventative health” came to mean more than an act of “preventing” disease or 
poor health in relation to the needs of an individual or a relatively small group. 
Rather it increasingly associated itself as being an imposed action on the part of an 
external agency, all be it at this time military and naval, which was increasingly seen 
as relevant to improving the health of all sections of society. 
The route which medical officers in both the army and navy pursued in order to 
create the specialist knowledge required in order to identify and remove the cause 
of disease, has been the focus of each of the previous chapters, as has aspects such 
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as training and the early use of methods such as quantifiable analysis. It can also be 
said that the inclusion of case studies involving the control of diseases such as 
Yellow Fever and Cholera provide a framework in which these advances could be 
more accurately assessed. However the need to commence this research with 
attempts to control Smallpox has major significance to the argument outlined in 
this thesis. It was this disease in particular which created a point of entry for 
commissioned medical officers in relation to understanding how their intentions 
compared to their civilian colleagues, as well establishing some of the most basic 
parameters in terms of implementing wide-ranging change.  
Early attempts to control smallpox, in the form of inoculation, was very much a 
civilian initiative first led by the Royal Society and the Royal College of Physicians of 
London, and only later did it begin to attract military and naval interest. The idea 
that a disease could be actively controlled through direct intervention was a 
concept which was without precedence.  Inoculation also provided the first 
opportunity to discuss ethical considerations in terms of imposing on an otherwise 
healthy person, a process which involved receiving a mild, yet sometimes 
potentially fatal dose of smallpox. Less easy to define but in many ways more 
complex, was the problems surrounding moral obligation, which was inherent in 
the decision as to whether a person should receive inoculation in order to protect 
those around them. It was this particular problem which the army and navy 
experienced to the greatest extent, as opposed to the civilian population where 
compulsory inoculation rarely became an issue until compulsory vaccination 
programmes appeared in the mid nineteenth century. However when it came to 
being used by the armed forces, inoculation particularly became a more complex 
243 
 
problem as seen in the case of the British army in North America. When General 
Howe issued orders to carry out compulsory inoculation on all troops who had not 
had smallpox, it not only initiated a response from the highest level of command 
but also led to his own loss of office. Therefore in an age when the rights of the 
common soldiery were at best described as minimal, and the dangers of smallpox 
were far from being exaggerated, the medical officers of both armed forces were 
acutely aware of the complexity regarding what could be feasibly introduced even 
in the name of  preventative health. 
Nevertheless, both the Admiralty and the War Office allowed medical officers to 
continue to look for ways of limiting the incidence of smallpox amongst its soldiers 
and sailors, and as a result of this action smallpox certainly played a major role in 
some of the first discussions relating to the increasingly poor physical state of 
civilian society and how this could negatively impact on meeting the needs of the 
armed forces. The constant demands made on both the army and navy throughout 
the eighteenth century led to an unprecedented call for a constant flow of new 
recruits taken from both rural and urban locations. Whilst the fact remains that the 
number shown to be physically unfit for any type military duty did not come close 
to the crisis which accompanied events leading up to the Boer War, there was an 
unprecedented and increasingly ominous sense of urgency that the changes arising 
from urbanisation and industrialisation, were not as benign as generally believed. 
Hence commissioned medical officers were amongst the first professional group to 
identify and promote ways of maintaining a level of good health across all sections 
of society. To this end, naval surgeons such as Gilbert Blane and Thomas Trotter not 
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only supported inoculation but as products of their training and experience, were 
also able to recognise the superiority of vaccination, which they publically 
endorsed. The army was also quick to follow this trend by initiating the first 
compulsory vaccination programme amongst its troops in order to finally try to 
eradicate smallpox in all regiments. However, within the civilian population, 
government legislation to implement a similar level of control was viewed with far 
more reticence with the outcome that vaccination not become compulsory until as 
late as 1853. This disparity in approach meant that smallpox remained a major 
public health issue and in many ways, negated the advances achieved in the army 
and navy as both rural and urban locations continued to record a significant level of 
mortality directly attributed to smallpox. Moreover the threat of smallpox did little 
to offset the greater fear posed by compulsory intervention which continued  to be 
seen by many people in Britain, particularly the working classes in terms of 
representing yet another infringement on personal liberty. When set against the 
wide scale demands for reform in political, social and economic affairs, few 
governments were therefore prepared to risk social unrest, even when set against 
matters of health. 
The sense of certainty which defined the theory and practice of military and naval 
medical officers in their support of preventative health was indisputably linked to 
the training many received in universities north of the border. The role played by 
universities such as Glasgow and Edinburgh was immense in terms of not only 
providing what became known as the Scottish model of medical education but also 
in the way it facilitated an entirely new specialism which was designed solely to 
meet the needs of troops and sailors alike. It is important to note that Scotland’s 
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universities were not only an overt expression of the Scottish Enlightenment, but 
were purposefully created in rejection of traditional English scholasticism, 
preferring instead to align themselves to the modernity and freedom of continental 
universities. In terms of medical education, Scottish graduates were therefore 
taught a curriculum which introduced and welcomed innovative approaches such as 
clinical diagnosis, along with range of associated subjects which were all designed 
to enhance the core of modern medical knowledge. As a result of this, and set 
within a framework of empirical enquiry, the purpose of medicine gradually 
emerged into a model which focused specifically on finding  ways of preventing 
illness rather than just relying on inefficient and outdated  therapy. 
Nevertheless the real influence of the Scottish universities lay in the vast numbers 
of medical students they trained, and who in turn disseminated this new approach 
to medicine across an increasingly wide field. It is interesting that the restrictive 
practices exerted by the Royal Colleges continued to have little effect on those who 
were prepared to forgo privileged private practice. Instead, large numbers of 
Scottish graduates filled the rapidly increasing number of vacancies which arose in 
places such as dispensaries, workhouses, factories, friendly societies and a range of 
other institutions, all of whom were prepared to pay for the services of a trained 
doctor. Although many such posts were salaried, the demands were onerous with 
little security of tenure. Such a situation made the growing opportunities in both 
the army and the navy increasingly attractive particularly as medical officers 
enjoyed a range of significant privileges. From 1789 to 1814 the number of doctors 
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needed in the Army Medical Department alone increased from 152 to 1,274.630 The 
demand for suitably qualified staff was therefore continuous and whilst doctors had 
to acclimatise to lengthy postings in unfamiliar and unaccommodating locations, 
they could rely on status conferred by rank and the opportunities and freedom to 
engage in types of medical study which were not so accessible to their civilian 
colleagues.  
Yet despite the level of innovation and growing professionalism which came to 
define medical staff, even the most impressive reforms could face fierce, illogical 
opposition from the archaic Army Medical Board. Its members for the most part 
had little relevant experience to hold the posts they were awarded and it was facts 
such as this which were increasingly perceived as being responsible for the 
continuously high rates of disease common amongst troops. In comparison the 
navy had already undergone its own internal reforms beginning with the creation of 
the Sick and Hurt Board, with the outcome that the general health of sailors 
showed a marked improvement which was not seen for many years in the 
regiments. Only with the publication of the damming Fifth Report on the State of 
the Army were events put into action beginning with the radical reorganisation of 
the medical services which were protected by formalising the association with 
Scottish medical education. This also marked the official period of military medicine 
in Edinburgh as dating from the publication of the Report in 1806 to the death of 
Ballingall in 1855. Furthermore with the creation of a Chair in Military Medicine, the 
                                                          
630 Marcus Ackroyd, Brockliss, Laurence, Moss, Michael,  Retford, Kate,  Stevenson, John, Advancing 
with the Army: Medicine, the Professions and Social Mobility in the British Isles 1790-1850 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). P.44-45 
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aim was to give the subject a permanent status. However, the fact that this was a 
Regius Chair, gave the academic community the opportunity the perfect 
opportunity not to extend this into being a permanent feature of the senate, with 
many staff remaining openly concerned by such an overt association with the 
British army. 
In many ways, events in Scottish universities such as Edinburgh replicated the 
growing distrust on the part of the civilian population in response to the increasing 
levels of military and naval involvement in matters perceived to be beyond their 
jurisdiction. Even though the Royal Commission on Scottish universities highlighted 
the success of military medicine as one of the most significant achievements of 
Edinburgh University, and proposed that it remain integral to the teaching and 
learning offered to students, the Chair was eventually disbanded after only two 
appointments, with the Senate taking direct action to halt all future funding as a 
way of ensuring that no further appointment would be made.  However the real 
legacy of Scotland lay not so much at the official level but unquestionably in the 
type of training it afforded its growing number of medical graduates. Even without 
the recognition of an academic Chair, many young doctors on completion of 
training continued to pursue a military or naval career and in doing so ensured that 
the emphasis in preventative health remained at the forefront of medical 
intervention. Such was the value of this type of medical curriculum that it was 
replicated both in the naval hospital at Haslar, followed by the creation of the army 
training hospital, Netley, opened in 1856. In such institutions, along with similar 
training opportunities afforded by organisations such as the East India Company, 
the control of the environment was considered to be one of the most important 
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factors in maintaining the health of those who came under the care of the 
continually specialist medical staff, most of whom continued to maintain a strong 
link to the now famous Scottish model of medical thinking. 
For much of the period under discussion the successes of medical officers in 
promoting preventative health models meant an increasing reliance on quantifiable 
evidence quite simply in order to substantiate the claims being made regarding the 
importance of introducing preventative health measures as opposed to relying on 
ineffective treatments. For much of the eighteenth century there were significant 
mathematical limitations, though the approaches used were still able to provide 
tangible and substantial evidence to show the success of an empirical approach 
towards identifying and understanding the cause of disease. The mathematical 
techniques heavily relied on the collation of raw data and extremely elementary 
levels of analysis. However, even the most basic use of quantifiable methods still 
constructed a standard which could be used by medical staff to illustrate what was 
acceptable or not in relation to the way in which soldiers and sailors were living. 
Towards the end of the period, this was greatly enhanced by the introduction of 
probability which became widely used and was particularly useful in terms of 
projection, and establishing targets relating to health. Doctors such as Thomas 
Dickson Reide typified the type of military medical practitioner who understood 
and promoted the importance of conclusions drawn from data which could be 
analysed and given values in ways which helped create specific domains within the 
rapidly increasing library of material relating to preventative health. The trust 
allocated to quantifiable analysis therefore not only grew but also illustrated the 
potential to damage the most illustrious careers, as seen in the Millar-Monro 
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argument. Only with the introduction of statistics could new standards of 
interpretation be verified, a fact recognised by army physicians such as Henry 
Marshall, whose work led to many of the military reforms of the mid nineteenth 
century. In a similar move, the growing army of civilian medical officers also 
recognised how this type of evidence was one of the most effective ways of 
removing the very worst excesses of poor conditions across much of the country. 
Despite such innovations, diseases continued to endanger the state of both the 
army and the navy, with some of the highest mortality rates resulting from 
Dysentery, Typhus and Typhoid Fever. As a consequence of their severity, matched 
by an all too frequent appearance, disease was therefore met with a degree of 
inevitability particularly during periods of conflict where makeshift garrisons 
exacerbated problems which rapidly became a health hazard. At least in peacetime, 
the rates of illness began to fall, due to the continuing advances bought about 
through the programme of modernisation in many of the garrisons where 
increasing attention to cleanliness became standard military and naval practice. 
This was particularly evident on ships where modifications relating to ventilation 
such as that designed by Stephen Hales and the recognition of the need to improve 
all ships quarters resulted in a marked fall in the number of cases of the worst type 
of contagious diseases. 
However, the fact remained that there was an association of certain diseases within 
a military or naval context, which even today is still incorrectly cited by those who 
argue that preventative health was not a concept which existed in the British army 
until the shameful events of the Crimean War forced the War Office into 
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implementing wide-scale reforms across all aspects of military life.  Even within 
civilian society certain diseases were presented as primarily a military problem, 
seen in the events surrounding the imminent threat of Yellow Fever and Cholera. 
Both diseases were generally unknown in Britain, though held a frightening 
reputation in countries where the climate and environment provided ideal 
conditions. Yellow Fever had long been regarded with great fear amongst troops 
stationed in the West Indies where it was one of the leading causes of morbidity 
and mortality. In the same way, Cholera was associated with India and the East 
where it was known to be an indigenous disease though many worryingly noted 
ways in which it appeared to affect more and more European troops stationed in 
the most remote locations.  
Hence, both diseases became the main priority of military and naval medical 
officers as seen in the vast library of material written with the purpose of 
attempting to understand both the modes of transmission as well as identifying the 
most effective forms of treatment. Yet what is most significant was the way in 
which this work illustrates the more complex challenge medical staff embraced in 
relation to the question as to whether such diseases were contagious. As seen in 
chapter 5 this willingness to enter into one of the most complex medical concerns 
of the age illustrates the way in which military and naval medicine had grown in 
confidence, not only in relation to methods used but also in the way they were 
prepared to challenge the very core of established medical thinking. Moreover the 
debate surrounding the terms “contagionism” and “anticontagionism” did more to 
illustrate the level of modernity in relation to the advances made by medical 
officers in the army and navy compared to their civilian colleagues. What is 
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interesting is the way in which the willingness of many military medical staff to 
support the anticontagionist view drew directly from what was now years of 
experience in specifically looking for the actual cause of disease, as opposed to 
continual reliance on the merely theoretical argument. This should also be seen as 
one of the most significant endorsements by military and naval medical staff 
regarding the need to improve the state of well-being for all, based on the way 
people lived and the particular state of all locations, which could only be assured 
through the implementation of wide-scale preventative health interventions. 
The threat of Yellow Fever appearing in Britain never materialised though the same 
could not be said for Cholera. Despite evidence of the chaos and fear it created 
across much of Europe, before reaching Britain via the port of Sunderland, the 
British government chose to turn to the Royal College of Physicians for advice 
regarding the most suitable course of action as opposed to accessing the extensive 
military expertise which was already to hand. The very lengthy and complex 
reasons for this have been previously discussed though it is important to avoid 
seeing this in terms of simply mistrusting military medicine when applied to a 
civilian context. The medical profession at the time remained fully aware of the 
existence of specialist knowledge acquired by army and naval medical officers, and 
the fact that it was more accurate than that recently gathered in a sense of urgency 
by civilian practitioners was also noted. However, it was more a question of how 
and to what extent could this be applied in a public setting here in Britain, rather 
than an explicit rejection of military intervention, borne out of misplaced distrust. 
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Furthermore, the events surrounding the early control of Cholera serve greater 
purpose by emphasising the fact that that Britain in 1831 was a country driven by a 
very different set of needs to those of the previous century. With her military and 
naval status secure, attention increasingly turned to protecting the needs of 
colonialism and trade. Nowhere was this more evident than in the powerful and 
highly vocal objections to the introduction of possible quarantine, particularly the 
disruption to trade which came with it, even when set against the likely appearance 
of a disease as deadly as Cholera. Consequently, the authorities in Sunderland did 
not call into question Kell’s ability to identify the disease but were motivated by the 
very real concern that his subsequent actions would bring to a halt the continued 
working of the port, so threatening the prosperity of the area. Military intervention, 
even when representing the most constructive form of protecting society at large, 
could no longer be accommodated in ways which previously had previously 
attracted little concern, even when the health of the nation was under threat. 
There was also the undeniable fact that the unprecedented levels of urbanisation 
and industrialisation continued to have an immense impact across much of the 
country, not only in terms of physical changes but also in bringing an end to a way 
of life which no longer could be maintained. The social problems and the way in 
which all sections of society were affected was without precedence. Nowhere was 
this more obvious than in matters relating to the health of the nation, which was 
deteriorating at a rate never previously witnessed. Despite the subsequent 
attempts to restore a level of humanity through the aims and intervention of both 
the public health and sanitary movement, the sheer scale of dirt and disease across 
the country was such that the early efforts of bureaucrats such as Edwin Chadwick 
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were rapidly overtaken by nothing less than a new type of army comprising medical 
officers typified by Snow and Simon who talked openly on waging a war against dirt 
and disease, and the need to be victorious in the battle for ensuring the nation’s 
current and future health. 
Set in such a context, military and naval medical officers therefore found 
themselves to be increasingly without any defined role when it came to adding 
their support in the control and treatment of disease and issues relating to 
preventative health. Their early advances, which had been considerable, now 
appeared to have little in the way of sustained or transferable value either in terms 
of acting in an advisory capacity or directly influencing decisions regarding 
treatment. It is this particular situation which in the past has all too often led 
histories of the public health and sanitary movement to see the absence of armed 
forces medical staff as evidence that they were totally absent. However, as this 
particular research has illustrated, whilst the events of the nineteenth century were 
very much about responding to the county’s rapidly deteriorating state of health, it 
must be acknowledged that the concept of preventative health, whereby the threat 
to wellbeing was seen as essentially something which could be avoided at the 
outset, not only had its origins much earlier in the eighteenth century but was, in 
the most part, initiated by military and naval medical officers. As has been shown, it 
was they who, having been initially charged with the task of improving the state of 
health of the men under their control, were amongst the first of their profession to 
appreciate that this had to be extended to include all of society, firm in the belief 
that this was the only way to ensure the security of the nation. Furthermore, by 
developing such an ideology, the same group of practitioners were also establishing 
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the concept of preventative health as being the right of every individual, regardless 
of their rank, status or class.  
As nineteenth century Britain emerged under a barrage of filthy conditions, poor 
standards of health and a rapidly increasing population which only served to 
exacerbate these problems, attention increasingly turned to an eclectic group of 
social reformers who came from a variety of backgrounds including the medical 
profession. However, military and naval medical officers continued to find 
themselves being distanced from playing an active role when it came to matters 
relating to the health of civilians. They therefore took the opportunity to step back 
into their own institutions and hospitals, where they continued to develop many of 
the specialisms relating to improving an understanding of preventative health. As in 
earlier times, medical staff were once again tasked with maintaining the state of 
health of troops now needed to support Britain’s vast imperial expansion, though 
there was now a notable absence of any discussion as to how this might also be 
applied to a civilian context. However it is important to acknowledge that this sense 
of distance was something which had certainly not defined the very early 
achievements of military and naval medical officers. The immense influence they 
exerted in understanding the dangers posed to all of society by dirt and disease 
were introduced with the specific goal of improving all sections of society, not just 
those men under their command. Moreover, considering what the same 
practitioners accomplished, as illustrated by this research, there is without question 
a case to be made for extensive further academic study to redress the many 
continuing misunderstandings in relation to the early role played by both the 
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military and naval medical officers in laying the foundations of preventative health 
in Britain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
256 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources: 
 
Magazines and Periodicals: 
Bell, John. "Memoir on the Present State of Naval and Military Surgery. Addressed to the Right 
Honourable Earl Spenser, First Lord of the Admiralty." 1798. 
———. "Memorial Concerning the Present State of Military and Naval Surgery. Addressed Several 
Years Ago the the Right Honourable Earl Spencer, Firts Lord of the Admiralty; and Now 
Submitted to the Public." 1800. 
Klebs, Arnold, C. "The Historic Evolution of Variolation." The Johns Hopkins Hospital Bulletin, 1913, 1-
67. 
Quier, John. "Chapter Xix : An Account of the Success of Inoculation for the Small-Pox at Jamaica." 
Medical Transactions, 1772. 
 
Newspapers: 
Anon. Diary or Woodfall's Register, 1793. 
 
Parliamentary Papers: 
Chadwick, Edwin. "Report on the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain." 
London, 1842. 
"Evidence, Oral and Documented Taken and Received by the Commissioners Appointed by His 
Majesty George 1v,  July 23rd 1826; and Re-Appointed by His Majesty William Iv, October 
12th 1830. For Visiting the Universities of Scotland." London: W Clowes, HMSO, 1830. 
"The Fifth Report of the Commissioners of Military Enquiry." London, 1808. 
"Fourth Report of the Board of Health. The Means of Preserving Health in the Colonies.". edited by 
Privy Council, 1805. 
Hervey, James. "Suggestions Respecting the Duties of a Board of Health and the Best Manner in 
Which the Board Can Be Constituted." edited by Privy Council, 1805. 
Rawlinson, Robert. "Report to the General Board of Health  on the Drainage and Water Supply of 
Portsmouth." 1850. 
"Report from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider the Validity of the Doctrine of Contagion 
in the Plague." 1819. 
 
Printed books: 
"Annals of the Royal College of Physicians." London: Royal College of Physicians, 1805. 
Arthy, Elliot. "The Seaman's Advocate." London: Richardson, 1798. 
Bacon, Francis. "Novum Organum: Or, True Suggestions for the Interpretation of Nature.". London: 
William Pickering, 1620. 
Ballingall, George. "Observations on the Site and Construction of Hospitals." Edinburgh: Maclachlan 
& Stewart, 1851. 
Bancroft, Edward, N. "Letter to the Commissioners of Military Enquiry Containing Some 
Animadversions on Some Parts of the 5th Report." London, 1808. 
Baron, John. "The Life of Edward Jenner, M.D, with Illustrations of His Doctrines, and Selections from 
His Correspondence." London: Henry Colburn, 1827. 
257 
 
Blane, Gilbert. "Elements of Medical Logic." London, 1819. 
———. "Observations on the Diseases Incident to Seamen." London: Cooper, 1785. 
———. "Select Dissertations on Several Subjects of Medical Science." London: Underwood, 1822. 
Brocklesby, Richard. "Oeconomical and Medical Observations, in Two Parts. From the Year 1758 to 
the Year 1763 Inclusive." London: T.Becket & P.A De Hondt, 1764. 
Cheyne, George. "An Essay of Health and Long Life." London: G Strahan & J Leake 1724. 
Cleghorn, George. "Observations on the Epidemical Diseases in Minorca, from the Year 1744 to 
1749." London: Wilson, 1751. 
Clifton, Francis. "The State of Physick, Ancient and Modern, Briefly Considered: With a Plan for the 
Improvement of It.". London: W.Boyer, 1732. 
———. "Tabular Observations Recommended, as the Plainest and Surest Way of Practising and 
Improving Physick." London: Brindley, 1731. 
Cuthbertson, Bennett. "A System for the Complete Interior Management and Oeconomy of a 
Battalion of Infantry." Bristol: Rouths & Nelson, 1768. 
Dickson Reide, Thomas. "A View of the Diseases of the Army." London: J.Johnson, 1793. 
Dr Alexander Monro, Primus, (ascribed). "Medical Essays and Observations; Published by a Society in 
Edinburgh." Edinburgh: Hamilton, Balfour and Neill, 1752. 
Duncan, Andrew. "A Short View of the Extent and Importance of Medical Jurisprudence, Considered 
as a Branch of Education." edited by Edinburgh, 1798. 
Frank, Johan P. "System Einer Vollstandigen Medicinischen." Mannheim: Schwam, 1817. 
Gregory, John. "Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician." London: W. Strahan & 
T.Cadell, 1772. 
———. "Observations on the Duties and Offices of a Physician." London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell, 
1770. 
Hamilton, Robert. "The Duties of a Regimental Surgeon Considered." London: Johnson, 1787. 
Hanway, Jonas. "Virtue in Humble Life." London: J Dodsley, 1774. 
Haygarth, John. "An Inquiry How to Prevent the Small-Pox. And Proceedings of a Society for 
Promoting Generl Inoculations at Stated Periods, and Preventing the Natural Small-Pox in 
Chester." Chester: J.Monk, for J.Johnson, London & P.Broster, Chester, 1784. 
———. "A Sketch of a Plan to Exterminate the Casual Small Pox from Great Britain; and to Introduce 
General Inoculation." London, 1793. 
Hennen, John. "Principles of Military Surgery: Comprising, Observations on the Arrangement, Police, 
and Practice of Hospitals, and on the History, Treatment, and Anomalies of Variola and 
Syphilis." Philadelphia: Carey & Lea, 1830. 
Hillary, William. "An Inquiry into the Means of Improving Medical Knowledge, by Examining All 
Thiose Methods Which Have Hindered, or Increased Its Improvement." London: Hitch and 
Hawes, 1761. 
———. "Observations on the Changes of the Air and the Concomitant Epidemical Diseases in the 
Island of Barbadoes." London, 1759. 
———. "A Rational and Mechanical Essay on the Small-Pox." London, 1735. 
His Royal Highness, Frederick, Duke Of York And Albany. "General Regulations and Orders Relative to 
the Duties in the Field and in Cantonments." Whitehall: Egerton, 1798. 
Huxham, John. "In Two Volumes. Vol.1, Containing Observations on the Air and Epidemic Diseases." 
London: W.Bent, 1788. 
———. "Observations on the Air and Epidemic Diseases from the Brginning of the Year 1738 to the 
End of the Year 1748 (Volume Two)." London: J.Hinton, 1738. 
Jackson, Robert. "An Outline of the History and Cure of Fever, Epidemics and Contagion, More 
Especially of Jails, Ships and Hospitals and the Yellow Fever. With the Observations on 
Military Discipline and Economy, and a Scheme of Medical Arrangements for Armies.". 
Edinburgh, 1798. 
Jameson, j. "Report on the Epidemic Cholera Morbus as It Visited the Territories Subject to the 
Presidency of Bengal in the Years 1817,1818, and 1819." Calcutta, 1820. 
Kay-Shuttleworth, James. "The Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes Employed in the 
Cotton Manufacture of Manchester." 1832. 
Kell, James Butler. "On the Appearance of Cholera at Sunderland in 1831; with Some Account of That 
Disease." Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1834. 
258 
 
Lempriere, William. "Practical Observations on the Diseases of the Army in the Jamaica During the 
Years 1792-1797." London: Longman & Rees, 1799. 
Lind, James. "A Treatise of the Scurvy in Three Parts." London, 1753. 
Maclean, Charles. "Results of an Investigation, Roespecting Epidemic and Pestilential Disease: 
Including Researches in the Lavant, Concerning the Plague." London: Underwood, 1817. 
Massey, Edmund. "A Sermon against the Dangerous and Sinful Practice of Inoculation, Preach'd at St 
Andrew's Holbourn, on Sunday July the 8th, 1722." London, 1722. 
Massey, Edmund, (Rev.). "A Letter to Mr Maitland, in Vindication of the Sermon against Inoculation." 
London, 1722. 
Mead, Richard. "A Short Discourse Concerning Pestilential Contagion, and the Methods to Be Used 
to Prevent It.". London: Samuel Buckley, 1720. 
Monro, Donald. "Observations on the Means of Preserving the Health of Soldiers and of Conducting 
Military Hiospitals." London: Murray, 1780. 
Perry, Charles. "An Essay on the Smallpox.With Regard 1st, to Its Specifick Cause. 2dly, to Its True 
Nature and Essence. 3dly, to the Best Methods of Curing It. Also Seasonable Reflections and 
Considerations on the Modern Practice of Inoculation." In Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online Print Editions. London, 1747. 
Petty, William. "  Observations Upon the Dublin Bills of Mortality London ", 1683. 
Pringle, John. "Annotations." In The annotated Papers of Sir John Pringle: Royal College of Physicians 
of Edinburgh. 
———. "Observations on the Diseases of the Army, in Camp and Garrison. In Three Parts.  With an 
Appendix Containing Some Papers  of Experiments Read at Several Meetings of the Royal 
Society." London: A.Millar, D.Wilson & T.Payne, 1752. 
"Reports on the Epidemic Cholera Which Has Rages Throughout Hindostan and the Peninsular of 
India, since August 1817." Bombay, 1819. 
Rollo, John. "Observations on the Diseases Which Appeared in the Army in St Lucia." Barbados: 
Orderson, 1780. 
———. "Observations on the Means of Preserving and Restoring Health in the West-Indies." London: 
Dilly, 1783. 
———. "A Short Account of the Royal Artillery Hospital at Woolwich: With Some Observations on 
the Management of Artillery Soldiers, Repecting the Preservation of Health.". London: J. 
Mawman, 1801. 
Scot, W. "Report on the Epidemic Cholera as It Has Appeared in the Territories Subject to the 
Presidency of Fort St. George." Madras, 1824. 
Simes, Thomas. "A Military Course for the Government and Conduct of a Battalion." London: Private, 
1778. 
Sparham, Legard. "Reasons against the Practice of Inoculating the Small-Pox." London, 1722. 
Sydenham, Thomas. "The Whole Works of That Excellent Physician, Dr Thomas Sydenham." 1734. 
Trotter, Thomas. "Medicina Nautica." 1803. 
———. "Medicina Nautica." 1797. 
Turnbull, William. "The Naval Surgeon; Comprising the Entire Duties of Professional Men at Sea." 
London: Richard Phillips, 1806. 
 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 
Books and Journals: 
Ackroyd, Marcus, Brockliss, Laurence, Moss, Michael,  Retford, Kate,  Stevenson, John. Advancing 
with the Army: Medicine, the Professions and Social Mobility in the British Isles 1790-1850.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Agnew, L, R,C. "Scottish Medical Education." In The History of Medical Education, edited by C.D O' 
Malley. Berkley: University of California Press, 1968. 
259 
 
Anon. Biographical Notice of John Thomson, Md, Frsl&E.  Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1859. 
Bancroft, Edward, N. An Essay on the Disease Called Yellow Fever.  London: T. Cadell & W.Davies, 
1811. 
Barrington, William. An Eighteenth Century Secretary at War ; the Papers of William, Viscount 
Barrington.  Vol. 4, London: Bodley Head, 1988. 
Black, Jeremy. "A Military Revolution? A 1660-1792 Perspective." In The Military Revolution Debate, 
edited by Clifford Rogers, J. Oxford: Westview, 1995. 
Blair, John. Centenary History of the Army Medical Corps (1898-1998).  Edinburgh: Scottish Academic 
Press, 1998. 
Blake, Richard. Evangelicals in the Royal Navy, 1775-1815: Blue Lights and Psalm-Singers.  
Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2008. 
Bonner, Thomas Neville. Becoming a Physician: Medical Education in Britain, France, Germany, and 
the United States,1750-1945.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 
Booker, John. Maritime Quarantine. The British Experience, C.1650-1900. Routledge, 2007. 
Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1782.  Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990. 
Brown, John. The Elements of Medicine.  London: W. & D. Treadwell, 1783. 
Buckley, Roger, N. The British Army in the West Indies: .  Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1998. 
Cantlie, Neil. A History of the Army Medical Department. 2 vols. Vol. 2, New York: Longman, 1974. 
Chakrabarti, Pratik. Medicine and Empire 1600-1960.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 
Chaplin, Arnold. Medicine in England During the Reigh of George Iii.  London: H. Kimpton, 1919. 
Charters, Erica. Disease, War and the Imperial State: The Welfare of the British Armed Forces During 
the Seven Years' War.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
Cipola, Carlo. Cristofano and the Plague. A Study in the History of Public Health in the Age of Galileo.  
London: Collins, 1973. 
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. 
Companion Encylopaedia of the History of Medicine. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Comrie, John.D. History of Scottish Medicine to 1860. Research Studies in Medical History.  Vol. 4, 
London: Balliere, Tindall & Cox, 1927. 
Cooter, Roger. "War and Modern Medicine." In Companion Encyclopedia of the History of Medicine, 
edited by William & Porter Bynum, Roy, 1536-73. London: Routledge, 1993. 
Creighton, Charles. A History of Epidemics in Britain.  Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965. 
Curtis, C. An Account of the Diseases in India.  Edinburgh: Laing, 1807. 
Dow, Derek A. The Influence of Scottish Medicine.  Carnforth: Parthenon, 1988. 
Duncan, Andrew. Heads of Lectures on Medical Jurisprudence and Medical Police.  Edinburgh: Adam 
Neill, 1801. 
Durey, Michael. The Return of the Plague. British Society and the Cholera 1831-2.  Dublin: Gill & 
Macmillan, 1979. 
The Eighteenth-Century Town 1688-1820.  London: Routeldge, 1990. 
Favret, Mary, A. War at a Distance: Romanticism and the Making of Modern Wartime.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010. 
Fenn, Elizabeth. Pox Americana the Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82.  Stroud: Sutton, 2001. 
Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaelogy of Medical Perception.  London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1976. 
Fracastorius, Girolamo. De Contagione Et Contagiosis Morbis Et Eorum, Libri 111.  1546. 
French, Roger "Sickness and the Soul: Stahl, Hoffmann and Sauvages on Pathology." In The Medical 
Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, edited by Andrew & French Cunningham, Robert. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Frey, Sylvia, R. The British Soldier in America. A Social History of Military Life in the Revolutionary 
Period.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981. 
Garrioch, David. The Making of Revolutionary Paris.  Berkely: University of California Press, 2001. 
Garrison, Fielding H. Notes on the History of Military Medicine.  Washington: Association Of Military 
Surgeons, 1922. 
General Sir William Howe's Orderly Book at Charlestown, Boston and Halifax, June 17th 1775 to 
1776, 26th May.  London: Benjamin Franklin Stevens, 1890. 
George, M.Dorothy. London Life in the Eighteenth Century.  London: Harmondsworth, 1925. 
260 
 
Glacken, Clarence J. Traces on the Rhodian Shore. Nature and Culture in Western Thought from 
Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1967. 
Graunt, John. Natural and Political Observations Made Upon the Bills of Mortality. 1662. 
Hamilton, David. The Healers: A History of Medicine in Scotland.  Edinburgh: Cannongate, 1987. 
Hamlin, Christopher. Cholera: The Biography.  Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press, 2009. 
———. Public Health and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
Harries-Jenkins, Gwynn. The Army in Victorian Society.  Trowbridge: Routeledge, 1977. 
Harrison, Mark. Contagion: How Commerce Has Spread Disease.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012. 
———. Medicine in an Age of Commerce and Empire. Britain and Its Tropical Colonies 1660-1830.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
———. Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventative Medicine, 1859-1914.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
The Healing Arts. Health, Disease and Society in Europe 1500-1800.  Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004. 
Heitman, Kristin. Systems Science and Population Health.  New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
Hempel, Sandra. The Medical Detective. John Snow and the Mystery of Chiolera.  London: Granta 
Books, 2006. 
Hippocratic Writings.  Harmondsworth: Penguin books Ltd., 1987. 
Hoare, Philip. Spike Island. The Memory of a Military Hospital.  London: Fourth Estate, 2002. 
Hopkins, Donald, R. The Greatest Killer. Smallpox in History.  Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1983. 
J, Brewer. The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783.  London: Routledge, 
1989. 
Kaufman, Matthew H. The Regius Chair of Military Surgery.  New York: Rodopi 
2003. 
Kelly, Catherine. War and the Militarization of British Army Medicine, 1793-1830. Studies for the 
Society of the Social History of Medicine.  Vol. 5, Oxford: Routeledge, 2016. 
Land, Isaac. War, Nationalism and the British Sailor, 1750-1850. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Lane, Joan. The Making of the English Patient.  Stroud: Sutton, 2000. 
Letters on the American Revolution, 1774-1776.  Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1925. 
Lindeman, Mary. Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
Lloyd, Christopher & Coulter, Jack, L.S. Medicine and the Navy :1200-1900. Volume Iii, 1714-1815. 
Medicine and the Navy:1200-1900. 4 vols. Vol. 3, Edinburgh: Livingstone, 1963. 
Lobo, Francis M. ""John Haygarth, Smallpox and Religious Dissent in Eighteenth-Century England" ". 
In The Medical Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, edited by Andrew and French 
Cunningham, Roger, 217-53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
Marshall, Henry. Hints to Young Medical Officers of the Army.  London: Burgess & Hill, 1828. 
Mathias, Peter. "Swords and Ploughshares:The Armed Forces, Medicine and Public Health in the Late 
Eighteenth Century." In War and Economic Development:Essays in Memory of David Joslin, 
edited by Jay Winter, 73-90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
Mauduit, Israel. Considerations on the Present German War.  London: Wilkie, 1760. 
McCrae, Morrice. Saving the Army: The Life of Sir John Pringle.  Edinburgh: John Donald, 2014. 
McGrigor, James. Medical Sketches. 
———. The Scalpel and the Sword. 
McLean, David. Public Health and Politics in the Age of Reform: Cholera, the State and the Royal 
Navy in Victorian Britain.  London: Taurus, 2006. 
Medical Empiricism and Philosophy of Human Nature in the 17th and 18th Centuries.  Leiden: Brill, 
2014. 
Meld Shell, Susan. The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation and Community.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1996. 
Miller, Genevieve. The Adoption of Inoculation for Smallpox in England and France.  Philadelphia: 
University of pennsylvania Press, 1957. 
261 
 
Pead, Patrick. Benjamin Jesty: Grandfather of Vaccination.  Chichester: Timefile, 2016. 
Petty, William. Several Essays in Political Arithmetic. Fourth ed.  London: D.Brown, 1755. 
Porter, Dorothy. Health, Civilisation and the State: A History of Public Health from Ancient to Modern 
Times.  Abingdon: Routeledge, 1999. 
Porter, Dorothy Health, Civilisation and the State. A History of Public Health from Ancient to Modern 
Times.  Oxford: Routeledge, 1999. 
Porter, Roy. Bodies Politic : Disease, Death and Doctors in Britain, 1650-1900. Picturing History. 
Edited by Peter Burke, Gilman, Sander,L, Jordanova, Ludmilla, Porter, Roy: Reaktion Books, 
2001. 
———. Enlightenment : Britain and the Creation of the Modern World.  London: Penguin, 2000. 
Porter, Roy & Porter, Dorothy. Patient's Progress: Doctors and Doctoring in Eighteenth-Century 
England.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. 
Porter, Theodore. The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820-1900.  Chichester, West Sussex: Princetown 
University Press, 1986. 
Pringle, John. On the Nature and Cure of Hospital and Jayl-Fevers. In a Letter to Doctor Mead.  
London: A Miller & D Wilson, 1750. 
Reassessing Foucault: Power, Medicine and the Body.  Abingdon: Routeledge, 1994. 
Roberts, Michael. The Military Revolution, 1560-1660.  Belfast1956. 
Rodger, Neville, A.M. The Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815.  London: 
W.W Norton & Co. Ltd, 2005. 
Rosen, George. The History of Public Health.  New York: MD Publications, 1958. 
Satsuma, Shinsuke. Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century : Silver, 
Seapower and the Atlantic.  Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013. 
Schiebinger, Londa. "Human Experimentation in the 18th Century; Natural Boundaries and Valid 
Testing." In The Moral Authority of Nature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Skelley, Alan Ramsey. The Victorian Army at Home 
 Montreal: Croom Helm, 1977. 
Smith, J.R. The Speckled Monster:Smallpox in England, 1670-1970, with Particular Reference to 
Essex.  Chelmsford: Chelsford record Office, 1987. 
Somerville, Alexander. The Autobiography of a Working Man.  London: Charles Gilpin, 1848. 
Southwood Smith, Thomas. A Treatise on Fever.  London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown & Green, 
!830. 
Spiers, Edward, M. The Army and Society 1815-1914.  Hong Kong: Longmans, 1980. 
Summers, Anne. Angels and Citizens: British Women as Military Nurses, 1854-1914.  London: 
Routeledge Kegan & Paul, 1988. 
Taylor, James S. Jonas Hanway: Founder of the Marine Society: Charity and Policy in Eighteenth 
Century Britain. Ashgate, 1985. 
Trohler, Ulrich. Quantification in British Medicine and Surgery 1750-1830, with Special Refence to Its 
Introduction into Therapeutics.  Vol. Doctor of Philosophy, University of London1978. 
———. "To Improve the Evidence of Medicine" : The 18th Century British Origins of a Critical 
Approach.  Edinburgh: Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 2000. 
Tully, J (ed.) Silverthorne, M (trans.). Pufendorf, on the Duty of Man and Citizen.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Vale, Brian & Edwards, Griffith. Physician to the Fleet: The Life and Times of Thomas Trotter 1760-
1832.  Woodbridge: Boydell press, 2011. 
Walkowitz, Judith. The Contagious Diseases Acts. 
Watts, Sheldon. Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism.  New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1997. 
Wear, Andrew. Knowledge and Practice in English Medicine, 1550-1680.  Cambridge: CUP, 2000. 
———. Medicine in Society : Historical Essays.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
———. "The Popularization of Medicine in Early Modern England." In The Popularization of 
Medicine, 1650-1850, edited by Roy Porter, 17-41. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Weatherall, Mark. Gentlemen, Scientists and Doctors: Medicine at Cambridge 1800-1940.  
Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000. 
Western, John.R. The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century.  london: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1965. 
262 
 
White, Brenda. Legal Medicine in History.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Williams, Gareth. Angel of Death: The Story of Smallpox.  Basingstoke: Palgrave macmillan, 2011. 
Williamson, Stanley. The Vaccination Controversey. 2007. 
Wilson, Adrian. "The Politics of Medical Improvement in Early Hanovarian London." In The Medical 
Enlightenment of the Eighteenth Century, edited by Andrew & French Cunningham, Robert, 
4-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1990. 
Wise, T.A. Testimonies in Favour of T.A.Wise: Candidate for the Chair of Military Studies in the 
University of Edinburgh.  Edinburgh: Murray & Gibb, 1855. 
Wohl, Anthony. Endangered Lives:Public Health in Victorian Britain.  London: Methuen, 1984. 
Wrigley, E.A , Schofield, R.S. The Population History of England, 1541-1871.  London: Edward Arnold, 
1981. 
 
Ackerknecht, Edwin H. "Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867." Bulletin Of The History Of 
Medicine 22 (1948): 562-93. 
Appleby, John H. "Human Curiousities and the Royal Society." Notes and Records of the Royal Society 
Journal of the History of Science 50, no. 1 (1996): 13-27. 
Becker, Ann. M. "Smallpox in Washington's Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease During the 
American Revolutionary War." The Journal of Military History 68, no. 2 (2004): 381-430. 
Bennett, Michael. "Passage through India: Global Vaccination and British India 1800-1805." Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 2 (2007). 
Blanco, Richard L. "Henry Marshall (1775-1851) and the Health of the British Army." Medical History 
14, no. 03 (1970): 260-76. 
Blane, Gilbert. "A Statement of Facts Tending to Establish an Estimate of the True Value and Present 
State of Vaccination." Medico-Chirurgical Transactions  ( 1819): 315-33. 
Boog Watson, William N. "Thomas Robertson, Naval Surgeon, 1793-1828." Bulletin Of The History Of 
Medicine 46, no. 2 (1972): 131-49. 
———. "Two British Naval Surgeons of the French Wars." Medical History 13, no. 3 (1969): 213-25. 
Briggs, Asa. "Cholera and Society in the Nineteenth Century." Past and Present 19 (1961): 76-96. 
Carroll, Patrick. "Medical Police and the History of Public Health." Medical History 46, no. 4 (2002): 
461-94. 
Charlton, A. "George Cheyne : !8th Century Physician." Journal of Medical Biography 19, no. 2 
(2011): 49-55. 
Charters, Erica. "The Caring Fiscal-Military State During the Seven Years War, 1756-1763." The 
Historical Journal 52, no. 04 (2009): 921-41. 
———. "Military Medicine and the Ethics of War: British Colonial Warfare During the Seven Years 
War (1756-63)." Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 27, no. 2 (2010): 273-98. 
Craig, Stephen, C. "Sir John Pringle Md, Early Scottish Enlightenment Thought and the Origins of 
Modern Military Medicine." Journal for Eighteenth Century-Studies 38, no. 1 (2015): 99-114. 
Crowe, Kate, E. "The Walcheren Expedition and the New Army Medical Board: A Reconsideration." 
The Economic History Review 88, no. 349 (1973): 770-85. 
Davenport, Romola, Schwarz, Leonard and Boulton, Jeremy. "The Decline of Adult Smallpox in 
Eighteenth Century London." Economic History Review 64, no. 4 (2011): 1289-314. 
Dickson, D, J,H. "Topographical Remarks Shortly Illustrating the Nature and Origin of the Tropical 
Endemic. Or Yellow-Fever." Edinburgh Medical And Surgical Journal  (1816): 1-46. 
Greville, C. "Memoirs." 2. 
Hamlin, Christopher. "Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth Century Medical 
Thought." Social History of Medicine 5, no. 1 (1992): 43-70. 
Huth, Edward. "Quantative Evidence for Judgements on the Efficacy of Inoculation for the 
Prevention of Smallpox: England and New England in the 1700,S." Journal of the Royal 
Society of Medicine 99, no. 5 (2006): 262-66. 
Johnson, James. "Cholera in England." Medico-Chirurgical Review 16 (1832): 267. 
Jurin, James. "A Comparison between the Danger of the Natural Smallpox and That Given by 
Inoculation." 32, no. 374 (1723): 215. 
263 
 
Kelly, Catherine. ""Not from the College, but through the Public and the Legislature: Charles Maclean 
and the Relocation of Medical Debate in the Early Nineteenth Century." Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine 82 (2008): 545-69. 
Labisch, Alfons. "History of Public Health - History in Public Health. Loking Back and Looking 
Forward." The Society for the Social History of Medicine  (1998). 
Le Fanu, William R. "The Lost Half Century in English Medicine, 1700-1750." Bulletin Of The History 
Of Medicine 46 (1972): 319-48. 
Lever, J.W.C. "On the Sickness and Mortality among the Troops in the United Kingdom. Abstract of 
the Statistical Report of Major Tulloch." Journal of the Statistical Society of London 2, no. 4 
(1839): 250-60. 
Marshall, Henry. "Observations on the State of Health of the Troops in North Britain." The London 
medical and Physical Journal 50 (1823): 275-90. 
Meyell, Emily. "French Reactions to Jenner's Discovery of Smallpox Vaccination." Social History of 
Medicne 8, no. 2 (1995): 285-303. 
Miller, Genevieve. "Smallpox Inoculation in England and America: A Reappraisal." The William and 
Mary Quarterley 13, no. 3 (1956): 476-92. 
Neuburger, Max. "Francis Clifton and William Black. Eiighteenth Century Critical Historians of 
Medicine." Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 5 (1950): 44-49. 
Niebyl, Peter H. "The Non-Naturals." Bulletin Of The History Of Medicine 45, no. 5 (1971). 
Poynter, F.N.L. "Thomas Southwood Smith : A Treatise on Fever." Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 55 (1962): 381-92. 
Razzell, Peter. "Did Smallpox Reduce Height?". Economic History Review 51, no. 2 (1998): 351-59. 
Rosen, George. "Cameralism and the Concept of Medical Police." Bulletin of the History of Medicine 
27, no. 1 (1953): 21-42. 
Rosenbaum, S. "More Than a Century of Army Medical Statistics.". Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 83 (1990): 456-63. 
Schupbach, William. "The Fame and Notoriety of Dr John Huxham." Medical History 25 (1981): 415-
21. 
Sigsworth, Michael & Worboys, Michael. "The Public's View of Public Health in Mid-Victorian 
Britain." Urban History 21, no. 2 (2009): 237-50. 
Stearns, Raymond, P. "Remarks Upon the Introduction of Inoculation for Smallpox in England." 
Bulletin Of The History Of Medicine 24, no. 2 (1950): 103-22. 
Szreter, Simon. "Economic Growth, Disruption, Deprivation, Disease and Death: On the Importance 
of the Politics of Public Health for Development." Population and Development Review 23, 
no. 4 (1997): 693-728. 
Tognotti, Eugenia. "Lessons from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A." Emerging 
Infectious Diseases 19, no. 2 (2013): 254-59. 
Ullmer, James H. "The Scientific Method of Sir William Petty." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and 
Economics 4, no. 2 (2011): 1-19. 
Wakley, Thomas. "Relative Conditions of Navy and Army Surgeons." The Lancet 30, no. 775 (1838). 
White, Brenda. "Medical Police and Politics: The Fate of John Roberton." Medical History 27, no. 04 
(1983): 407-22. 
 
Uncategorized References 
Arbuthnot, John. "An Essay Concerning the Effects of Air on Human Bodies." London, 1733. 
Trohler, Ulrich. "The Introduction of Numerical Methods to Assess the Effects of Medical 
Interventions During the 18th Century: A Brief History."  jameslindlibrary.org (2010). 
 
